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Abstract 
The Epiphenomenal Mind is both a deflationary attack on the powers of the 
human mind and a defence of human subjectivity. It is deflationary because in 
the thesis I argue that consciousness is an epiphenomenal consequence of events 
in the brain. It is a defence of human subjectivity because I argue that the mind is 
sui generis real, irreducible, and largely an endogenous product (i.e. not 
dependent on society or its resources). 
Part I is devoted to arguing that the conscious mind is epiphenomenal. 
Arguing from, the irreducibility of mental states, the causal closure of the 
physical domain, and the principle of causal explanatory exclusion, I seek to 
demonstrate that all theories of mental causation necessarily violate one or more 
of these premises. Contemporary approaches to mental causation come under 
two broad categories, those that argue that mental events are supervenient on 
physical events (such as Davidson, Kim and Horgan) and those (like Haskar) 
who argue that the mind is an emergent property of the brain. Supervenience 
based theories, I argue, end up reducing mental states in their search for a theory 
of mental causation and emergence based theories end up violating the principle 
of the causal closure of the physical. 
In part II, I explore some of the consequences of epiphenomenalism for 
social theory. This exploration comes in the context of a defence of human 
subjectivity against (i.) those sociological imperialists who view the mind and 
self as a 'gift of society', and (ii.) social situationalists who have abandoned the 
concept of action and an interest in 'what's in the head' of the actor, in favour of 
a concept of social action which views behaviour as action only to the extent that 
it is socially meaningful. The conclusion is that the social sciences should return 
to an interpretative style (Weberian) methodology. 
Abbreviations 
AM anomalous monism 
CCP causal closure of the physical 
FFP the folks' folk psychology 
MMKE mean molecular kinetic energy 
OMR orthodox mental realism 
PI premise 1: The irreducibility of mental states 
P2 premise 2: The causal closure of the physical 
P3 premise 3: The principle of causal explanatory exclusion 
PE phenomenal experience 
PFP the philosophers' folk psychology 
RP readiness potential 
SS strong supervenience 
VIII 
Part I: Consciousness and Causation 
Chapter 1 
Makine; Mind Matter Less 
My itching isn't responsible for my scratching, my wanting a glass of wine did 
not cause me to open a bottle, and my belief that it is raining had nothing to do 
with my decision not to go riding today. Practically everything I believe about 
anything is false, but it's not the end of the world. It's not even the end of 
predicting and explaining people's behaviour. I Rather, it's the start of 
understanding ourselves and our place in the world better, and it's an 
acknowledgement we must make if we want to be able to explain the real causes 
of people's actions. 
As the title of this thesis suggests, I believe that conscious experience is 
an epiphenomenal consequence of events in the brain. That is to say, our 
conscious mental states (the sensation of pain, the anticipation that awaits the 
arrival of an old friend or eating one's favourite meal, the addict's cravings, and 
so on) have no causal powers. They are all the result of events in the brain, but 
the experiences themselves do nothing and it would make no difference to the 
way that we behave if we had no conscious life at all! 
Before exploring this position in detail, and the considerations that led to 
my adopting epiphenomenalism, it might be helpful to outline exactly what is 
being denied here. Being conscious, or so the orthodox story goes, differentiates 
humans, and certain higher order animals, from inanimate objects and simple 
forms oflife (plants, single celled organisms, insects and the like). At some point 
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during the evolutionary history of life a magic level of complexity was reached 
in the brains of some species and consciousness 'popped out' (we'll leave 
worrying about how this should be phrased until later). It may have just been a 
glimmer at first, some perception or sensation, certainly nothing like the fully-
fledged self-consciousness we all experience. Whatever its extent though, it 
conferred some evolutionary advantage on the organisms in which it was 
instantiated. Feeling pain made it more likely that organisms would withdraw 
from and avoid harmful stimuli. Remembering the location of danger or food 
conferred an evolutionary advantage on the individuaUgroup/species (depending 
on one's preferred theory regarding the unit of selection) that possessed the 
knowledge. And the ability to reason and imagine allowed conscious organisms 
to predict the consequences of their actions, allowing theories 'to die in their 
stead'. Gradually consciousness grew in both intensity and complexity until 
humans ultimately developed fully-fledged self-consciousness. We developed the 
capacity to think reflexively about ourselves, to distinguish ourselves from others 
and to realise that other humans are also self-conscious beings. In all these cases, 
so the story goes, the feeling of consciousness is a necessary condition for the 
behaviour that it causes. Thus, I don't open a bottle of wine because some 
neurons in my brain fire thus and so, I open a bottle of wine because I have a 
conscious desire for a glass of wine. I imagine the taste, smell, and feelings of 
pleasant intoxication that will result from its consumption. The relationship 
between neural events and conscious experience (or, to avoid any ambiguities, 
what we will term phenomenal experience) is, of course, highly problematic and 
1 Those of you familiar with the literature on mental causation will recognise the title and opening 
lines of this chapter as an alternative version of the last paragraph of Fodor's Making Mind 
Matter More. 
goes to the heart of the mind-body problem. At the outset, though, it is crucial to 
stress that both the lay and philosophical conceptions of mental causation hold 
that the phenomenal experiences (the 'what it is like' to desire, taste, see, touch, 
etc.) of mental states are a necessary condition for their causal efficacy. In 
laymen's terms, it does not matter a jot what my brain is doing, if I had not 
imagined the taste and smell of a bottle of Australian Shiraz and thought how 
well it would go with my dinner, I would not have opened a bottle. Henceforth 
we shall term this position 'orthodox mental realism.' I add the prefix 'orthodox' 
here because, despite advocating epiphenomenalism, the position I will defend in 
this thesis is still one of mental realism. That is to say, contrary to eliminative 
materialists (whose position we shall encounter later), I will argue that we must 
accept the world of phenomenal experience just as we find it and not attempt to 
reason it out of existence. It is not the existence of phenomenal experience which 
epiphenomenalism denies, only its causal powers. 
Over the course of this thesis I will develop an account of 
epiphenomenalism in which one's conscious experience is analogous to one's 
shadow. The motions of a shadow are a consequence of the movements of the 
body, just as the phenomenal experience of mental states is a consequence of 
neural events. The shapes of shadows are determined by the shapes of the objects 
creating them, just as the structure, content, and phenomenology of conscious 
experiences are determined by the neural events that cause them. Moreover, just 
as it is a physically necessary condition that an object casts a shadow (under the 
appropriate circumstances), it is a physically necessary condition that certain 
neural events instantiate the phenomenal experiences they do. That is to say, it is 
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a brute fact of nature that certain neural events cause certain phenomenal 
experiences. 
Most philosophers base their understanding of the mind-body problem on 
their intuition that the mind causally interacts with the body: that what they think 
and feel has a causal influence on their body and, thereafter, on the world. They 
are convinced that it is their pain that causes them to wince, writhe, scream, cry 
out, etc., and not the neurophysiological events going on in their brains. Feelings 
of pain, lust, anger, hunger, and so on, seem to grab hold of us and demand that 
we act. The idea that these feelings don't do anything, that it would make no 
difference to the way we behave if we never experienced them, seems absurd. 
Although almost everybody thinks that mental states interact causally with the 
body, discovering the nature of this interaction has proved to be an intractable 
problem. 
Neither the dualist nor the materialist camp has produced anything 
approaching a solution. Dualists can't explain how mind affects matter (or to the 
materialists' consternation believe they don't need to) and materialists constantly 
face the embarrassment of qualia. 2 Nevertheless, protagonists of both camps 
agree on the problem (explaining how mind affects matter) and the phenomenon 
under investigation (the material world as described by physics and the 
phenomenal world of experience). The battle, it seems, will be won or lost over 
qualia. The materialists' strategy for securing their efficacy has been to reduce or 
identify qualia with matter. The dualist camp, in contrast, has adopted the 
diametrically opposed position, maintaining that the only way to save their causal 
efficacy is to insist that qualia are sui generis real with irreducible causal powers. 
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Epiphenomenalism, it is almost universally agreed, has an unhappy alliance with 
both camps. On the one hand it refuses to agree with materialists that qualia are 
reducible to or identical with physical states, while at the same time refusing to 
acknowledge their causal powers. Consequently, qualia are left dangling-
portrayed as sui generis real, but entirely inefficacious. By claiming that 
phenomenal experiences are inefficacious, epiphenomenalists deny themselves 
the standard Darwinian explanation for their existence and lay themselves open 
to the three standard arguments against epiphenomenalism. Viz. that it cannot 
explain: (i.) the correspondence between the function and feel of mental states, 
(ii.) how a putatively biologically expensive but inefficacious property could 
evolve, and (iii.) why one should take seriously an argument that, since it claims 
to be merely the effect of physical processes, cannot appeal to reason for its 
justification. The first two of these problems will be discussed in chapter 5, 
where I will also develop and deal with some further challenges to my position. 
The third objection will be discussed when we consider rationality in chapter 8. 
Epiphenomenalism is an extremely difficult position to argue for 
directly.3 There are a handful of neurologists and cognitive scientists who 
attempt to use experimental evidence to argue that mental states are 
epiphenomenal. This usually takes the form of showing that certain neural 
processes believed to be the cause of behaviour occur prior to our conscious 
decision to act. Research has focussed on the role of focal-attentive processing of 
2 Qualia refer to what I have been calling the phenomenal experience of mental states. 
3 The only recent advocate of epiphenomenalism (of which I am aware) is Keith Campbell 
(1970). Though rather unsophisticated by modem standards, Campbell argues from the 
irreducibility of phenomenal properties and the completeness of physics for a "new 
Epiphenomenalism'. The new Epiphenomenalism is a form of double aspect theory which 
accepts that the mind and body causally interact (because the mind is the brain) but claims that 
phenomenal properties are non-physical effects of brain processes and entirely inefficacious. 
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complex stimuli, learning, decision making, and activities that require some 
degree of planning. Some researchers have argued that consciousness occurs as a 
consequence of these processes rather than causally entering into them. The 
evidence is far from decisive though and opponents of epiphenomenalism have 
used the same material to argue for mental causation.4 Since the empirical route 
is closed, and phenomenology is on the side of the orthodox mental realists, our 
only option is to eliminate the alternatives and demonstrate that 
epiphenomenalism is the only position consistent with a (broadly) materialist 
perspective. Our main goal in part I will be to evaluate the full range of positions 
open to materialist theorists of mental causation. I will argue that, although there 
is still a lot of work to be done putting flesh on the bones, all the metaphysically 
possible positions on mental causation have been identified and none are 
consistent with the fundamental principles of materialism (outlined below). This 
conclusion presents us with a stark choice: either abandon our belief in mental 
causation and adopt epiphenomenalism or drop one or more of our materialist 
principles. This is uncharted territory for the philosophy of mind and we have 
few principles with which to guide our choice. Short of (an unlikely) scientific 
refutation, we have little reason to abandon these three principles save for their 
contradicting our deeply held intuitions regarding the causal efficacy of mental 
states. Though neither option is appealing, I have opted for the former. 
4 For a summary of this research see Vel mans (1991) paper and subsequent peer commentary. 
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(P 1) The irreducibility of phenomenal states 
In what follows I will only mention the two anti-reductionist arguments that I 
find most convincing: the argument from property dualism, and what I shall term 
the causal mereological argument. Since reductionist accounts of mental 
causation are now generally regarded as having failed, we need only briefly 
consider the anti-reductionist arguments here. Non-reductive physicalism, which 
now dominates philosophy of mind, will be the subject of part I. 
The most familiar anti-reductionist argument exploits our intuitions 
regarding the incommensurability of physical and phenomenal properties. The 
argument, which has been most forcefully expounded by Thomas Nagel (1995), 
Frank Jackson (1982), and John Searle (1992), runs as follows: even if we know 
everything there is to know about the neurophysiology of a conscious state (be it 
the neurophysiology of a bat's echolocation or the experience of seeing red), we 
still do not know what it is like to experience the corresponding conscious state. 
As Searle notes (1992: 116-7), this is often interpreted as an epistemological 
argument when it should be read as ontological. The force of the argument 
derives from the fact that if we try to make an ontological reduction of qualia to 
their neurophysiological 'cause' something is always left out. With most 
ontological reductions, according to Searle, we first achieve a causal reduction 
(i.e. we discover that the causal powers of the reduced property are explained by 
the causal powers of the reducing property), before redefining the reduced 
property in terms of the reducing. The standard examples of this type of 
reduction include heat to mean molecular kinetic energy, light to electromagnetic 
radiation, colours to photon emissions of particular frequencies, and solidity to 
molecular movements within a lattice structure. In such cases we begin with a 
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definition couched in terms of its subjective experience (the appearance) before 
redefining the phenomenon after scientific discoveries (the reality). In the case of 
conscious experience, however, we cannot make this appearance-reality 
distinction 'because consciousness consists in the appearances themselves. 
Where appearance is concerned we cannot make the appearance-reality 
distinction because the appearance is the reality' (Searle 1992: 122). To 
explicate, we may say that to experience heat is to experience mean molecular 
kinetic energy (MMKE), but the sensation of heat is not 'nothing but' a 
neurophysiological response to MMKE. The experience of, for example, a 
roaring fire on a winter's evening is constituted by phenomenal properties such 
as warmth, pleasure, contentment etc. that are inevitably missed out in a 
neurophysiological description of the cause of the experience. 
What I have termed the causal mereological5 argument runs on a slightly 
different track. This argument exploits our Cartesian intuitions regarding res 
cogitans and res extensa6 in the context of mental causation. Let us suppose that 
token physicalism, which is a prerequisite for reductionist theories of mental 
causation, is true, and grant, for the sake of this argument, that mental states are 
causally efficacious. Thus, we are assuming that a token mental state X is 
identical to a physical state PI (we will call this 'composite' state XPI). Now let's 
suppose that XPI causes YP2, that is to say, token mental state X, which is 
identical to physical state PI, causes mental state Y, which is identical to physical 
state P2. We can now exploit the Cartesian intuition by working through the 
consequences of our second principle, the causal closure of the physical. As we 
5 Mereology concerns the relations between parts and wholes. 
6 Literally. 'thinking thing' and 'extended thing'. 
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shall see this principle states that all causation is physical causation, and arguably 
entails that one can provide a complete causal account that cites only the most 
basic physical particles, their properties and relevant laws. Emergentist theories 
of mental causation will be the subject of chapter 3, so we needn't worry that this 
scenario begs the question against emergentism. In any case emergentism denies 
that qualia are reducible and it is reductionist theories which concern us here. We 
are assuming that PI and P2 are 'nothing but' an aggregate of neurons in two 
different configurations and that the state of each neuron in P2 can be explained 
by the behaviour of the relevant neurons in PI. Now if X is identical to PI, and 
certain parts ofP} caused P2, it must be the case that certain parts of X can be 
identified with certain parts ofPl. But this is patently false, for while it may be 
plausible to suggest that certain mental states are composites of different 
perceptions, sensations, cognitions, etc., it would be absurd to claim that mental 
states are divisible into hundreds, thousands or perhaps millions of constituent 
elements and that each of those elements is identifiable with a part of PI (say, for 
example, the firing of a single neuron or the movement of a potassium ion across 
a cell membrane). Furthermore, even if such an identification were possible, the 
identity thesis would still face the problem of accounting for the unity of 
conscious experience within the causal framework. That is to say, on this model, 
XPJ is conceived as an aggregate of microphysiological events together with 
their phenomenal correlates. According to our second principle, XPJ'S causing 
YP2 is only shorthand for the constituent elements of XPI cause the constituent 
elements of YP2 to move into the specific configuration that composes YP2. 
However, if this were the case then it would make the characteristic unity of 
consciousness as well as the idea of a self (which depends on the unity of 
consciousness) epiphenomenal. That is to say, it would make no causal 
difference if we experienced the world as a disjunction of separate percepts 
rather than as a unified whole. Such an impoverished concept is surely not what 
defenders of mental causation have in mind. 
(P2) The causal closure of the physical 
In its basic form (which is adopted by Kim) this principle states that everything 
that has a cause has a physical cause. As such it is principally designed to rule 
out dualist interactionism, but it is formulated in such a way that it does not 
exclude the possibility of purely random events. Lynne Rudder Baker, however, 
argues for a more precise formulation of the thesis which she expresses as 
follows: 
Every instantiation of a micro-physical property that has a cause at t has a complete 
micro-physical cause at t. (Baker 1987: 79) 
Baker argues that a system is causally closed if and only if the elements of the 
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system interact only with other elements of the system. She therefore claims that, 
for example, neurophysiological systems are not causally closed (which she 
notes is an assumption held by many in the debate on mental causation) because 
'lower level' phenomena such as molecular or quantum events will causally 
influence neurophysiological processes that would otherwise be governed by 
neurophysiological laws. By her standards the only system that could count as 
causally closed is the microphysical, 'where "micro-physical" is a name for 
whatever tum out to be basic physical particles and their properties' (ibid.). 
Baker, I should note, has a vested interest in formulating the thesis in this manner 
because her project is to argue that the metaphysical assumptions underlying 
materialism necessarily preclude a solution to the problem of mental causation. 
The argument that only the microphysical domain is causally closed is essential 
for this project which concludes that we should ditch the fundamental premises 
of materialism. 
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Baker's restrictive definition is easily avoided by thinking of the physical 
domain as a whole as the system which is causally closed rather than any 
particular' level'. Such a move seems entirely justified since the causal closure of 
the physical is an ontological thesis that is entirely insensitive to the 
epistemological definition of, for example, the 'neurophysiological system'. By 
retaining a definition of causal closure that does not apply solely to 
microphysical systems we also avoid begging the question against emergentist 
theories of mental causation (which will be discussed later). 
Nevertheless, despite taking issue with Baker's logic, a strong case can be 
made in favour of her formulation if one adds strong supervenience as a premise. 
Oddly strong supervenience is the second assumption Baker identifies as being 
held by materialists which she argues makes the problem of mental causation 
insoluble. It is strange, therefore, that she chose not to use supervenience as a 
premise from which to argue for her formulation of the principle of causal 
closure. I will make the case for Baker's formulation below when I discuss the 
metaphysics of causation but at this point I want to move on and outline the third 
prenuse. 
(P3) The principle of causal explanatory exclusion 
This principle states that there cannot be two complete and independent causal 
explanations which share the same explanandum (see Kim 1993b). This is a 
relatively straightforward principle that is derived from the requirement that 
causes be counterfactually necessary for their effects. Thus, as Kim phrases it: 'If 
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C is sufficient for a later event E, then no event occurring at the same time as C 
and wholly distinct from it is necessary for E' (ibid. 243). This principle does not 
rule out the possibility that we may have several different and correct 
explanations for the same event, such as a rationalising explanation and a 
physiological explanation. It does, however, rule out the possibility that the 
rational ising explanation and the physiological explanation could both be 
complete and independent causal explanations. Consequently, whenever we 
confront a situation where we have two or more causal explanations, we are 
forced to enquire as to the relationship between the explanations in order to 
ensure that the principle has not been violated. 
The potential tension between the belief that mental states are causally 
efficacious (and hence that rationalising explanations are valid) and these three 
principles is the central problem confronting contemporary philosophy of mind. 
Those theorists that have attempted to secure the causal efficacy of mental states 
within an anti-reductionist framework have gravitated towards supervenience or 
emergence. Crudely speaking, these perspectives represent the contemporary 
incarnations of materialism and dualism respectively. However, the traditional 
versions of materialism and dualism are long dead and the contemporary 
inheritors of these traditions have spent the last fifty years squabbling over the 
spoils. The result is, frankly, something of a mess, with someone or other 
representing every conceivable point on what is now a continuum between the 
two (previously diametrically opposed) positions. Despite claiming that 
supervenience and emergence are the contemporary incarnations of materialism 
and dualism, it would be wrong to suggest that one could place these 
perspectives at opposing ends of the spectrum. Rather than pointing to any 
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concrete set of theories these positions are best viewed as approaches to the 
mind-body problem based loosely around the issue of reductionism. Where 
supervenience theorists tend towards a more reductionist strategy (while 
assiduously avoiding the now unpopular term), emergentists stress the 
irreducibility of mental states. It is my contention, though, that neither approach 
has succeeded (or indeed can succeed) in relieving the tension. Supervenience, I 
shall argue, violates our first premise (the irreducibility of mental states) and 
emergence our second and/or third premises. It is in this sense that supervenience 
and emergence may be seen as the contemporary versions of materialism and 
dualism, since in violating these premises their theories collapse back into the 
very traditions they sought to supersede. 
Following our discussion of supervenience and emergence we shall tum 
our attention towards the contemporary debate over connectionism and its 
implications for the status of mental states (especially propositional attitudes). 
These issues should be of considerable interest to social scientists whose 
ontology and explanatory framework is based on the existence and causal 
efficacy of propositional attitudes. Having argued (in chapters 2 and 3) that 
phenomenal experiences (henceforth PEs) are an epiphenomenal consequence of 
events in the brain, the debate surrounding connectionism and eliminative 
materialism provides a forum within which we can assess the causal efficacy of 
the content of mental states. I will conclude part I by fleshing out the version of 
epiphenomenalism that is developed in the first four chapters and anticipate and 
reply to some potential objections. 
It has been claimed that if epiphenomenalism turns out to be true that it 
will be the most important revolution in our world-view to date. Mankind may no 
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longer see itselfas being God's creation or as sitting in the centre of the universe, 
but we certainly think of ourselves as different in kind from any other physical 
system. We are conscious and we believe that our consciousness allows us to 
escape the causal chain that determines the behaviour of all other physical 
systems (except, perhaps, at the quantum level). This assumption is the bedrock 
of all that is distinctively human, if we choose to abandon it then we have to re-
examine everything that philosophy and the social sciences have to teach us. 
Moral responsibility is the first and most obvious casualty, but our sense of 
personal identity is also brought into question along with our assumptions 
regarding how we should go about explaining people's behaviour. Emotions such 
as love, honour and duty are robbed of their virtue. Creativity and original 
thought can no longer be viewed as an achievement of their author (defined as a 
conscious subject), since they become, like all other behaviour, merely the result 
of blind physical forces. Also called into question is the justification for our 
holding certain rational arguments to be true. If a theory or conjecture is merely 
the result of neuronal processes, and there is no rational subject to evaluate their 
worth, what justification do we have for judging them to be true or false? 
Examining the full consequences of epiphenomenalism would take 
several lifetimes, let alone being within the scope of a single thesis. Nevertheless, 
certain issues emerge quite naturally out of the discussion in part I and these will 
be explored in part II. I attempt, in part I, not only to argue in favour of 
epiphenomenalism, but try to get clear the relationship between conscious events 
and the physical events that cause them. Doing so then allows us to question such 
things as the relationship between the self and the brain, how conscious rational 
thought is related to non-conscious physical events and how explanations of 
behaviour that are based on the assumption of mental causation (folk 
psychological explanations) should be treated. Although the discussion of such 
subjects will necessarily be rather sketchy they do, I hope, provide at least the 
basis for more research and some suggestions as to how the social sciences (and 
the rest of humanity) might come to terms with epiphenomenalism. 
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Before diving in at the deep end of the debate on mental causation I want 
to take this opportunity to introduce some concepts and clear up some of their 
ambiguities. The following section is, I'm afraid, a little tedious, but so much 
hangs on precision and conceptual clarity in this debate that a bit of tedium is 
unavoidable. 
Supervenience and the metaphysics of causation 
Despite first receiving an enthusiastic reception in the philosophy of mind it now 
looks like the tide is turning against supervenience. Those theorists who once 
thought that supervenience might provide a useful tool in the search for a theory 
of mental causation now worry that supervenience may render all 
macroproperties causally impotent. Before we can begin to consider mental 
causation, therefore, we had better ensure that we are working with a 
metaphysics of causation that allows for the causal efficacy of macroproperties. 
By macroproperties I have in mind all those properties that are cited by the 
special sciences. To put it another way, all physical properties that are not at the 
level of the most basic particles and their properties. What we are after is a 
theory of causation that does not entail that properties such as being a spark plug, 
being fragile, or being a calculator are epiphenomenal. This section is designed 
primarily as an introduction to the issues we will face when confronting 
supervenient mental causation. I will, however, also be discussing issues relating 
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to causation in general that will be of relevance throughout the thesis. I will 
begin by providing a brief introduction to the concept of supervenience before 
outlining Kim's theory of epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. I will then 
take a brief look at the role causal laws play in explanations before concluding 
this section by considering the curiously titled concept of quausation. 
If the mental supervenes on the physical then a molecule for molecule 
identical copy of me would also be psychologically identical. If aesthetic 
properties supervene on physical properties then there could not be two works of 
art identical in all physical respects but differing in some aesthetic characteristic. 
Similarly, ifmoral characteristics supervene on one's actions then there could not 
be two men who face identical circumstances, and behave in an identical manner, 
but who differ in their moral attributes. 7 In its simplest form supervenience states 
nothing other than a pattern of property covariance between a supervenient 
property or properties (such as mental states, aesthetic properties, or moral 
virtues) and a subvenient base (such as a person's neurophysiology, the 
brush strokes of a painting or the actions of a man). Notice that in highlighting 
this pattern of property covariance supervenience tells us nothing about what 
causes the instantiation of a given higher order property and nor does it make that 
supervenient property reducible to or identical with its subvenient base. What the 
concept does do, however, is to ground certain higher order properties firmly in 
the physical world. I should stress at this point that the philosophical usage of the 
term supervenience differs from its meaning in everyday English. In everyday 
7 The latter use of supervenience was developed by R. M. Hare who introduced the concept to 
denote the relationship between goodness and the set of properties or qualities that constitute 
goodness. According to Hare, if we take St Frnncis to be a good man, it is logically impossible 
that a man in the same circumstances as St Frnncis, who behaved in exactly the same way, is not 
also a good man (Hare 1952: 145). 
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parlance to supervene is to occur subsequently, or as a change, interruption, or 
addition. The philosophical usage of the term implies no time lag or alteration 
and is far from synonymous with addition. As will become clear, supervenience 
is a relation between two synchronous properties rather than two discrete events 
or states. 
There are now several formulations of the supervenience thesis in the 
offing - strong versus weak and regional versus global being the main 
parameters. Which version of the thesis one chooses depends largely on the 
properties in which one is interested. Moral or aesthetic properties are likely to 
require a wider subvenient base than causally potent properties and mental 
properties are likely to have a still narrower subvenient base (though this is 
debatable). We will touch on some of these issues later, particularly with 
reference to the causal role of content bearing states. As far as possible though, I 
will try to avoid getting bogged down with the purely logical/conceptual debates 
and focus on supervenience as applied to causation and mental causation. 
Throughout this thesis, unless stated otherwise, when I use the term 
supervenience I will be referring to strong supervenience (defined as follows): 
A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each property F 
in A, if x has F, then there is a property G in B such that x has G, and necessar;~v if 
any y has G, it has F. (Kim 1984a: 65) 
I will use Kim's example of 'being a good man' to illustrate this relation. For our 
purposes it would be better if we could illustrate this example using a physical 
property, the subvenient bases for physical properties are, however, considerably 
more difficult to pin down. Properties such as being a spark plug, being fragile, 
or being a calculator, can not only be realised by a vastly larger number of 
subvenient bases, but since they are defined in part by the application to which 
they are put the subvenient base would have to include relational properties. 
18 
Moreover, if we were to illustrate strong supervenience with a physical property 
we would have to reckon with the mereological problem of identifying its 
subvenient base. Ifwe went down to the microphysical level, and there are good 
reasons (to be discussed later) for supposing that we may have to, it would 
become impossible to fit a description of the subvenient base, if such a 
description were available, into a single volume. Kim's example then will have 
to suffice. 
Suppose that the property of being a good man supervenes on the 
character traits of honesty, courage and benevolence. If St Francis is a good man 
then there is some combination of these traits (say honesty and benevolence) that 
St Francis has, and necessarily anyone who has these traits is also a good man. 
The combination of traits that St Francis has is obviously not the only 
combination of traits that together warrant the description 'being a good man'. If 
St Francis had lacked honesty but been courageous, for example, he might still 
have been a good man. One important point that is not illustrated by Kim's 
example is that supervenient properties have taxonomic priority. Supervenience 
does not allow us to first identify a subvenient base and then infer the existence 
of supervenient properties. We can only make such an inference once we already 
know that a given higher-order property A is realised by a physical base B and 
we have encountered a physical system S that is micro-indiscernible with respect 
to B. Only then can we use our knowledge of the microphysical properties of S to 
infer the presence of A. Any difference in the microproperties of Band S, no 
matter how seemingly trivial, precludes our making this inference. Kim's 
illustration of being a good man is slightly misleading in this respect since it 
appears to suggest that if a person x has the properties of honesty and 
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benevolence that x too would necessarily be a good man. This is not the case 
though since if x were misogynistic and cruel to animals as well as being honest 
and benevolent he might not qualify for the description 'being a good man'. 
To summarise supervenience: 
(i.) states a pattern of property covariance, 
(ii.) implies an asymmetric dependency relation (in that it does not make 
sense to say that the character traits of honesty and benevolence 
supervene on being a good man), 
(iii.) is consistent with the multiple realisation of supervenient properties 
by a range of physical bases, 
(iv.) gives taxonomic priority to the supervenient property, 
(v.) requires indiscemibility of subvenient bases to guarantee both 
instantiate the supervenient property. 
With the concept of supervenience now in place we can begin to approach 
the issue of causation where the causal properties are macroproperties. Here we 
will look at Kim's theory of epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. One of 
Kim's most instructive examples used to highlight what he means by 
epiphenomenal causation concerns the relationship between a disease and its 
symptoms. About this Kim says, 'the symptoms are not mutually related in the 
cause-effect relationship, although to the medically naive they may appear to be 
so related. The appearance of a causal connection merely points to the real causal 
process underlying the symptoms' (Kim 1984b: 94). Epiphenomenal causation 
then, refers to cases where there is a real cause-effect relationship occurring at 
one level and an apparent casual relationship occurring as a consequence at some 
higher level. In this thesis I argue that PE is analogous to the symptoms of a 
disease and that mental causation (where mental is read as referring to PEl is a 
species of epiphenomenal causation. That is to say, the PEs of, for example, a 
thirst followed by a desire for water, are related in a real cause-effect 
relationship, but the relationship is at the neurological level and the experiences 
themselves are, like the symptoms of a disease, not mutually related in a cause-
effect relationship. 
20 
Kim later, and rather confusingly, extends the use of the term 
epiphenomenal causation to cover cases of supervenient causation where there is 
a real causal relationship between macroproperties. Supervenient causation is 
thus a subclass of epiphenomenal causation. In what follows I will retain the use 
of the term epiphenomenal causation to refer exclusively to those illusory 
relations exemplified by the relationship between a disease and its symptoms. In 
the next chapter we will then examine whether the physicalists' application of 
supervenience succeeds in demonstrating the existence of genuine supervenient 
causation or just epiphenomenal causation. Unlike epiphenomenal causation, 
supervenient causation expresses a real causal relationship between two 
macroproperties or events in the following way: 'x's having F supervenes on x's 
having m(F), y's having G supervenes on y's having m(G), where m(F) and 
m(G) are microproperties relative to F and G, and there is an appropriate causal 
connection between x's having m(F) and y's having m(G)' (ibid. 99). Thus, if the 
supervenient cause of desiring a drink of water is the experience of thirst, the 
relation is as follows: Kim's having the PE of thirst supervenes on m(T), his 
having a desire for water supervenes on m(D), where m(T) and m(D) are the 
microphysiological events that realise the PE of thirst and the desire for water 
respectively, and there is an appropriate casual connection between Kim's having 
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m(T) and m(D). Without some account of the relationship between m(F) and F, 
and m(G) and G, of course, there is nothing to differentiate supervenient from 
epiphenomenal causation. For the purposes of this chapter we will set aside the 
job of accounting for the relationship when the macroproperties are mental (as in 
the thirst-desire example), and focus on cases where the macroproperties are 
physical. What differentiates the two theses is the causal role played by the 
microphysical subvenient base of the macroproperties involved. In a case of 
epiphenomenal causation, such as the progression of a disease and its symptoms, 
the microphysical event that is the subvenient base(s) for the symptoms is not 
causally efficacious in the progression of the disease. In a case of supervenient 
causation, such as a fatal blow to the head, the microphysical event(s) that is the 
subvenient base for the fatal blow is causally efficacious in causing death. 
For Kim supervenient causation (of macro properties) is ubiquitous: 'All 
observable phenomena are macrophenomena in relation to the familiar 
theoretical objects of physics; hence ... all causal relations involving observable 
phenomena - all causal relations familiar from daily experience - are cases of 
epiphenomenal causation' (Kim 1984b: 95).8 The ubiquity of supervenient 
causation means that unless the causal relations between macroproperties are real 
(that is to say they are related as cases of supervenient causation and not just 
epiphenomenal causation) no causal explanations would be possible. If the causal 
relations aren't real then every scientific explanation, every counterfactual, and 
every scientific law, expresses at most an observed regularity or constant 
conjunction as Hume would say. Since one could not possibly hope to give a 
8 Remember that for Kim supervenient causation is a species of epiphenomenal causation. It is 
supervenient causation that Kim is referring to here. 
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microphysical explanation of macro-events, one would have to give up all hopes 
of causal explanation. 
Lynne Rudder Baker argues that strong supervenience (henceforth SS) 
and the principle of the causal closure of the physical (henceforth CCP) entails 
just such a scenario. In response to Kim's theory of supervenient causation Baker 
argues that SS plus CCP means that the following relevance condition should be 
true: 
If an instantiation of a microphysical property m(F) is a complete cause of an 
instantiation of micro-physical property m(G), and necessarily, for every 
instantiation of m(F), there is an instantiation ofF, and necessarily, for every 
instantiation of m(G), there is an instantiation of G, then the instantiation of F is 
causally relevant to the instantiation ofG. (Baker 1987: 88) 
According to Baker the trouble with Kim's account, or indeed any account that 
accepts CCP and SS, is that causally related microproperties stand in the same 
relation to non-causally related macroproperties as they do to causally related 
macroproperties. Baker hopes that the following illustration will encourage her 
readers to join her in concluding that SS plus CCP leads to a reductio ad 
absurdum: 
suppose that a person exercising in front of a mirror jumps up and comes back 
down. Let m(F) be the micro-physical properties of the space-time region that 
includes the mirror and the exerciser as she goes up, m(G) be micro-physical 
properties of the space-time region that includes the mirror and the exerciser as she 
comes down; let F be some macro-properties of the reflection as the exerciser goes 
up, and G be some macro-properties of the reflection as she comes back down. 
Necessarily anything that has m(F) has F, and necessarily, anything that has m(G) 
has G. Therefore, by [the above relevance condition), the instantiation of the 
properties of the reflection in the mirror as the exerciser went up caused the 
instantiation of the reflection's properties as she came down. (ibid. 89) 
As we shall see this sceptical conclusion is unwarranted. The relevance condition 
has F supervening on m(F) and G supervening on meG). It does not, however, 
begin from the premise that F causes G. Rather, it states explicitly that m(F) 
causes meG). Most cases of causation involve both epiphenomenal and 
supervenient causation so it is not in the least surprising that one of the properties 
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which supervenes on m(F) is related as an instance of epiphenomenal causation 
to one of the properties which supervenes on m(G). Such cases of epiphenomenal 
causation are well known to science and indeed are utilised on a daily basis by 
people such as general practitioners when they enquire as to their patients' 
symptoms. The relevance condition fails to state that F and G are the only 
properties instantiated by m(F) and m(G). It merely states that the instantiations 
of F and G are causally relevant - which of course they are. An observer that has 
a view of the exerciser's reflection, but not of the exerciser, could use their 
observations of the exerciser's reflection going up to predict that the exerciser 
would soon come back down. Notice though that in the illustration employed by 
Baker her language as shifted from 'causally relevant' to 'caused'. Such a shift in 
emphasis is entirely unwarranted since it would only be valid (by SS, cep, and 
the relevance condition) if the instantiation of the reflections in the mirror of the 
exerciser going up and down were the only properties instantiated by m(F) and 
m(G). Since m(F) and m(G) include all the microphysical properties belonging to 
the time-space region that contain both the exerciser and the mirror, this is 
patently not the case. 
Baker does note that one way to avoid her sceptical conclusion is to claim 
that Kim's account was not intended to allow any inferences about 
macrocausation from microcausation. Instead Kim's account might be intended 
as a means of allowing us to give an account of microcausation for a given case 
of macrocausation. In response to this potential objection Baker appeals to the 
exclusion argument claiming that 'since the problem was that CCP and SS 
seemed to leave no room for macro-causation, one needs a reason to believe that 
macro-causation exists' (ibid. 89). I want to argue that Baker has failed to show 
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that macroproperty epiphenomenalism is entailed by SS plus CCP. The 
possibility of being able to provide a complete causal explanation at the 
microphysical level, plus the assumption that macroproperties supervene on 
microproperties, has absolutely no implications for the causal powers of 
macroproperties. To get macro property epiphenomenalism from SS plus CCP 
one needs to add some further premises regarding the relationship between 
macroproperties and their subvenient bases. If one is happy to accept, as I am, 
that there is no real ontological depth to the reductionists' layered world view-
that causal powers belong to events and that macro and microphysical 
descriptions are descriptions of the same events at different levels of analysis -
then there are no implications for macrocausation to be derived from SS plus 
CCP. What one needs to get macroproperty epiphenomenalism from SS plus 
CCP is some premise to the effect that macroproperties are cause" by 
microproperties. Materialism neither advocates nor entails such a view. 
Nevertheless the exclusion argument does become important for the 
causal powers of mental properties. Here the ontological relationship between 
mental events and their subvenient base is uncertain so the explanatory exclusion 
of the mental is a real possibility. Kim formulates the exclusion problem as 
follows: 'Given that every physical event that has a calise has a physical calise, 
how is a mental calise also possible?'(Kim 1998: 38) In other words, ifit turns 
out that mental states supervene on neural states, and if a neural state N at t 
contained sufficient conditions for a later event E, it would be a contradiction to 
say that a mental state M that supervened on Nat t contained necessary 
l) By caused I have in mind the common sense understanding of a cause being distinct from its 
effect. 
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conditions for E. Neither, of course, could M contain sufficient conditions for E, 
since this would result in overdetermination. Here again, however, the 
formulation of the exclusion argument requires the addition of further premises. 
If it turns out that token-token physicalism is true (that every token mental event 
is identical to a token physical event) then it makes no sense to ask 'how is a 
mental cause also possible?' It makes no sense, of course, because the mental 
cause would be the same event as the physical cause. Similarly, there would be 
no contradiction in saying that N contained sufficient conditions for E, and M 
contained necessary conditions for E, if Nand M are the same event under two 
different descriptions (where N refers to all the properties and powers belonging 
to an event andMis a more restrictive description of the same event). The 
explanatory exclusion of the mental only becomes a possibility if one adds a 
premise to the effect that Nand M are two different events (or so I shall argue). 
Much of the next chapter will be concerned with establishing whether PI (the 
irreducibility of mental states) is a strong enough ontological claim to entail the 
explanatory exclusion of the mental given SS and CCP. This is an issue that, with 
the notable exception of Kim (see Kim I993d), is rarely discussed in the 
contemporary literature on mental causation. As I hope to show, however, it is 
still the most important problem facing contemporary theorists of mental 
causation and it is a problem which has been obscured rather than eliminated by 
talk of supervenience. 
Though explanatory exclusion may be a problem for theorists of mental 
causation there are no good grounds for believing that it extends to 
macrocausation generally. Fodor diagnoses all those who have succumbed to this 
philosophical worry with a case of epiphobia. Epiphobia, according to Fodor, is a 
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neurotic worry that stems form two philosophical mistakes' ... (a) a wrong idea 
about what it is for a property to be causally responsible, and (b) a complex of 
wrong ideas about the relation between special-science laws and the events that 
they subsume' (Fodor 1990). Fodor's account is concerned with the role of 
properties in causal laws and their relation to the events that instantiate them. In 
what follows I will present a simplified model of Fodor's argument and argue 
that, although it provides causal relevance for some special-science properties, it 
hangs on a theory of reference that fails to secure causal efficacy for mental 
properties (especially PE). 
Fodor's argument is based on the following assumptions (all of which are 
relatively unproblematic): 
1. Covering principle: If an event e 1 causes an event el, then there are properties F. G such that: 
1.1. e 1 instantiates F 
and 
1.2. e2 instantiates G 
1.3. "F instantiations are sufficient for G instantiations" is a causal law . 
2. P is a causally responsible property if it's a property in virtue of the instantiation of 
which the occurrence of one event is nomologically sufficient for the occurrence of 
another. (ibid. 143) 
What Fodor's account hangs on is the relationship between events and the laws 
that cover or subsume them (Fodor's phraseology) and how the law' .. . projects 
the properties in virtue of which the individuals [events] are subsumed by it' 
(ibid. 143). Fodor claims that on his view whether a property is causally 
responsible reduces to the question of whether there are causal laws about that 
property. Although this is trivially true, in the sense that if we accept that the 
physical world is both casually closed and law governed it must be the case that 
causally efficacious properties are subsumed by causal laws, as a criterion for 
identifying causally efficacious properties it fails. In order to demonstrate this it 
is necessary to examine what Fodor means by basic and non-basic causal laws. 
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On Fodor's account, a law is basic if the properties projected by that law could 
not be reduced. That is to say, that there are no further-to-be-explained facts 
about the properties. A law is non-basic if there is a story to tell about how the 
properties projected by a law are causally efficacious. To take Fodor's example 
'meandering rivers erode their outside banks' is a non-basic law since there is a 
microstructural story to tell about the effects of particles suspended in the water. 
The law relating to these microproperties would be a basic law. 
Fodor is right that the question of whether a property is causally 
responsible reduces to the question of whether there are causal laws about that 
property. However, a strong case can be made that this is only the case when the 
laws are basic. The trouble is that it is possible for epiphenomenal properties to 
be related in a lawlike way without being causally responsible. Suppose, for 
example, that there is a law relating to hay fever sufferers that states that itchy 
eyes cause the eyes to water. Suppose also, for the sake of the argument, that this 
law is exceptionless. Thus, by Fodor's argument, itchy eyes are a causally 
responsible property in virtue of the fact that the occurrence of an event which 
instantiates itchy eyes is nomologically sufficient for an event that instantiates 
watery eyes. It still remains a possibility, however, that itchy eyes are related to 
watery eyes as an example of epiphenomenal causation. The only way that 
Fodor's account can be modified to prevent epiphenomenal properties slipping 
through is to reformulate 1.3 of the covering principle such that it refers to 
microphysical laws. In the case of properties invoked by a non-basic law, we are 
only justified in calling those properties causally responsible if they refer to 
micro-structural properties that are projected by a basic law. To explicate, we are 
justified in calling 'being a recessive trait' (one of Fodor's examples) a causally 
28 
responsible property because it is a property projected by a non-basic law and 
because it accurately refers to its implementing mechanism (DNA). A problem 
occurs if the property projected by a non-basic law has a multiply realisable 
microstructure (subvenient base) with disjunctive causal powers. For example, it 
is the property of being a mountain, according to Fodor, that causes Mt. Everest 
to have snow on top. Not so, the property of being a mountain has a multiply 
realisable microstructure with disjunctive causal powers (geologists refer to 
mountains and valleys on the seabed which clearly do not share the same causal 
powers as Mt. Everest). 
Notice that this appeal to causal laws as a means of identifying causally 
potent macroproperties does not state that macroproperties are causally 
efficacious because they figure in casual laws. Davidson's truism that causation 
is a relation between concrete events no matter how they are described is all too 
easily forgotten in these days of epiphobia (see the latter half of Davidson 1980). 
As Davidson rightly quips: 'Naming the American invasion of Panama 
"Operation Just Cause" does not alter the consequences of the event' (Davidson 
1993: 8). Figuring in causal laws may help us to identify causally efficacious 
properties and justify our attributing causal powers to them, but we do not need 
to know the relevant law to identify the cause of an event. 
Quausation 
Although Fodor's account, if modified along the lines suggested above, does 
guarantee the causal powers of F it does not entail the more specific claim that F 
quaused G. The concept of quausation (i.e. c qua F causes e qua G) was 
developed by Terence Horgan (whose account of mental quausation I will 
discuss in the next chapter). Here though I will illustrate the concept of 
quausation with LePore and Loewer's (1989) account: 
<c.F> is quausally related to <e. G> iff 0 c and e occur and are respectively F and G 
and there is some time before the occurrence of c at which these two conditionals 
obtain: (I) if c were to occur and be Fthen that would cause an event e to be G: (2) 
if c were to occur and not be an F then it would not cause an event which is G. 
(LePore 1989: 189) 
Suppose, to take a simple example, I drop a stone into a still pool thereby 
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creating ripples. The ripples are caused by the stone displacing a certain volume 
of water and we can say with absolute confidence that dropping the stone caused 
the ripples. Quausation, however, is a more specific concept than causation and 
while one can say with absolute confidence that the ripples were caused by 
dropping the stone we can say with equal confidence that the ripples were not 
quaused by dropping the stone. It was not the stone qua stone that caused the 
rippling but the stone qua object with a specific mass, volume, shape, hardness, 
etc. That is to say, if we had dropped a relevantly similar object (i.e. one with the 
same mass, volume, shape, etc.) in place of our original stone the causal relations 
at issue would be unaffected. 
Now let's consider a case where a property is quausally efficacious. 
Suppose Whistler's 'Old Battersea Bridge' were to come up for sale at auction. 
Let c be the event of Old Battersea Bridge coming up for sale and e be its sale, 
let F be the property of being the original painting and G be the event of its being 
sold for x amount. Quausation allows us to single out the property of 'being the 
original' as the quausally relevant property relative to G as follows: the property 
of being the original painting is quausally related to its eventual sale price iff c 
and e occur and are respectively F and G and there is some time before the 
\0 Iff is the abbreviation for' if and only if. ' 
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occurrence of c at which these two conditionals obtain: (1) if the original were to 
come up for sale it would cause the sale price to be x; (2) if c were to occur and 
not be the original (say, for example, the painting that comes up for sale is a 
known fake indistinguishable from the original) then it would not cause the sale 
price to be x. 
Quausation then is really just a sophisticated counterfactual that helps to 
clarify the relationship between a property in a cause-event and a property in an 
effect-event. The trouble with quausation is that it cannot cope with cases of 
epiphenomenal causation where the epiphenomenal properties are necessarily 
instantiated by the cause-event and the effect-event. To explicate, suppose that a 
disease necessarily instantiates its symptoms and the symptoms strongly 
supervene on the microphysical properties of the disease. In such cases, if we 
attempted to apply the counterfactual expressed by quausation it would show that 
the symptoms supervening on the cause-event (say the characteristic ache that 
accompanies the onset offiu) are quausally related to the symptoms supervening 
on the effect-event (headache, sore throat, etc.). It may be possible to rectify this 
weakness by clarifying the relationship between c and F, and e and G. I will say 
no more about this here but we will return to this issue in the following chapter 
when I discuss Horgan's account of mental quausation. 
To summarise, we have identified three different types of causation: 
epiphenomenal causation, supervenient causation and quausation. These different 
types, it should be noted, are not mutually exclusive. If a property is implicated 
in a given causal transaction: as epiphenomenal causation it may not also (by my 
restrictive definition) be related as an instance of supervenient causation or 
quausation; as supervenient causation it may also be, but is not necessarily, a 
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case of quausation but cannot also be a case of epiphenomenal causation; and as 
quausation it is necessarily related as a case of supervenient causation but cannot 
also be a case of epiphenomenal causation. Finally it should be noted that all 
three forms of causation confer causal relevance on the property in question but 
only quausation and supervenient causation provide scope for causal efficacy. I 
should point out here that my use of the term causal relevance is not synonymous 
with casual efficacy. As I use the term a property is causally efficacious if it is 
literally the cause of, or a partial cause of, a later event. A property is causally 
relevant if its instantiation is useful for predictive purposes. In the next chapter 
we will consider three approaches to mental causation that make use of 
supervenience. In each case we will first attempt to establish which type of 
causation the supervenience theorist has in mind and whether they are successful. 
I hope to show that, given PI-3 (premises which are shared by most of the 
authors to be considered) the PE of mental events may only be related as cases of 
epiphenomenal causation. The content of mental states, in contrast, may be 
related as cases of supervenient causation and may also be quausally efficacious. 
Having shown that the causal efficacy of the content of mental states is 
consistent with our three premises, however, is a long way from demonstrating 
empirically that they are causally efficacious. This latter question will be 
considered in chapter 4 where I will discuss connectionism and eliminative 
materialism. 
The most important point to be carried over into the next chapter is that 
neither counterfactuals nor causal laws are able to demonstrate the causal 
efficacy of macroproperties unless the relationship between macroproperties and 
the microproperties upon which they supervene (or from which they emerge) has 
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been clarified. This, as we shall see, is even more vital when the macroproperties 
involved are mental. 
Chaoter2 
Mental Causation: Supervenient Causation or Epiphenomenal 
Causation 
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By now we have a fairly clear idea about the various ways that macroproperties 
enter into causal relations. We have yet to consider, however, what is meant by 
the mental in mental causation. At the outset I stressed the importance of PE for 
the orthodox mental realists' concept of mental causation. It seems to me that any 
theory that denies that my itching literally caused my scratching or that my 
wanting a glass of wine literally caused me to open a bottle (or at least asserts 
that these aspects were necessary elements in a total cause) fails to qualify as a 
theory of mental causation. To be clear on this point, we would not expect any 
theory (materialist or dualist) to assert that PE is a sufficient cause of action. 1 
Rather, we would expect PE to be relevantly engaged in a causal chain that 
involves such things as nerve impulses, muscle contractions, neurophysiological 
events and the like. Moreover, if mental events strongly supervene on 
neurophysiological events, we would not expect the neurophysiological base of a 
given mental event to be a sufficient cause of action. Instead what we would 
expect is for the neurophysiological base to be a necessary part of a total 
neurophysiological event that is itself a sufficient cause for action (ceteris 
paribus, of course). 
With the above in mind we can agree with Davidson's (1980b: 221) 
definition that an event is mental if and only if it has a mental description (i.e. 
contains at least one mental verb). This definition makes intentionality the mark 
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of the mental. Typically intentionality is associated with a PE - there is 
something it is like to believe, admire, think, wish etc. Though many people 
would argue that unconscious mental states display intentionality, these are 
surely parasitic on conscious mental states. 2 A theory of mental causation then 
would be one that explains how one event with a mental description causes either 
a second event, which again has a mental description, or an action. Moreover, the 
theory must explain how the mental aspect of an event is a necessary condition 
for producing its effects. As we shall see, Davidson's own theory of anomalous 
monism arguably fails to fulfil the latter criterion. 
Anyone who is tempted to apply the supervenience thesis to mental 
causation has to perform a rather tricky balancing act with epiphenomenalism on 
one end and dualism on the other. The difficulty arises because physicalism 
requires that there be a tight connection between mental and physical properties. 
The tighter the connection the more kosher the theory is from a physicalist 
perspective. Ideally, the physicalist wants a theory that ensures a strict 
dependency relation between mental and physical properties. The trouble is that a 
strict dependency relation entails that physical properties alone become sufficient 
for causal explanation. There is no work left for mental properties and we are left 
with either a case of overdetermination (a violation ofP3) or epiphenomenalism 
and the explanatory exclusion of the mental. On the other hand if the dependency 
relation is relaxed, thereby making room for mental causation, we risk violating 
the principle of the causal closure of the physical and end up with dualism-
Descartes' revenge as Kim (1998: 38-47) terms it. 
1 With the possible exception of actions some dualists might count as wholly mental, a decision. 
mental calculation, etc. I will not complicate matters here by considering such actions or indeed 
whether such events should count as actions at all. 
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Part of what makes getting to grips with mental causation so difficult is 
that the term mental is used in an infuriatingly ambiguous manner. Although I 
think that most people would agree that a theory of mental causation should 
provide an ineliminable role for PE, this is a tall order to live up to. There is, 
therefore, a strong and understandable temptation to be a little vague when 
outlining a theory's explanandum. Consequently one often finds theorists hinting 
that their theory will secure a causal role for PE only to discover that the causal 
role of content, the function of mental states or the subvenient base of mental 
states is their real (and often unstated) target. I would not wish to diminish the 
importance of these latter projects but it is important to be clear about the 
explananda of the theories we are about to consider. After pinning down the 
explanandum we will have to question the type of causation that the theory 
secures (epiphenomenal causation, supervenient causation, quausation, or causal 
relevance) and assess whether any of our three premises have been violated in 
the process. 
In what follows I will consider three approaches to mental causation that 
arguably have different explananda. (i.) That the mental is casually efficacious in 
virtue of its phenomenal properties. (ii.) That the mental is causally efficacious in 
virtue of its physical properties or subvenient base. The debate surrounding this 
version centres on whether this is enough to secure causal efficacy for mental 
states or just causal relevance. (iii.) Finally, there is the (broadly) functionalist 
strategy of claiming that the mental is causally efficacious in virtue of its content. 
Typically this version does not go into detail about how content is instantiated. 
For each version of mental causation we will examine a paradigmatic account: 
:: See Searle. 1. (1992) ch. 7 
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for (i.) we will look at Horgan's account ofquausation; for (ii.) Davidson's 
anomalous monism and Kim's multiple-type physicalism; for (iii.) Dretske's 
dual-explanandum strategy. I should note that each account is considered 
heuristically for the light it can shed on theories of its type rather than for its own 
merits. 
Mental Quausation 
I have already outlined the concept of quausation in relation to macrophysical 
properties. There I argued that quausation may prove to be a useful tool in 
identifying the causally efficacious properties from the substantial set belonging 
to a given event. However, when those properties are macroproperties I argued 
that one needs to be clear about the relationship between the macroproperty in 
question and its subvenient base. Without getting this relationship clear there is a 
danger that epiphenomenal properties relative to the instance of causation in 
question (such as the symptoms ofa disease) may slip through and count as 
quausally relevant. Now Horgan subscribes to a form of the token-identity thesis 
where every token mental state is identical to a token physical state that 
guarantees the causal efficacy of mental states. Thus, if I were to drop a stone on 
my foot and subsequently shriek with pain, we can say with absolute confidence 
(given token physicalism) that the pain caused my pain behaviour. However, just 
as in the case of macrocausation discussed in the introduction. even assuming 
token physicalism is true, quausal epiphenomenalism remains a possibility. That 
is to say, the event/state that is picked out by the description 'the pain that 
resulted from dropping the stone' caused my behaviour, but it remains possible 
that it was not the pain qua pain (i.e. the PE of pain) but the pain qua electro-
chemical event/state that caused my behaviour. If it was the electro-chemical 
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event/state that caused my pain behaviour then token physicalism 
notwithstanding the PE of pain is quausally epiphenomenal. This anyway is how 
I interpret the problem Horgan seeks to tackle. 
Although quausaI epiphenomenalism (of the PE of mental states) is a real 
possibility, indeed I am arguing in favour of what might be termed a version of 
quausal epiphenomenalism in this thesis, it is not a real possibility within the 
framework of token physicalism. The reason is that token physicalism denies that 
events, such as those that occurred in my head following my dropping the stone 
on my foot, are composed of two distinct sets of properties, one mental and the 
other physical. For token physicalism pain is not composed of the PE of pain 
(phenomenal pain for short) plus the physical instantiation of that pain (or 
physical pain). Rather, pain is a single event/state that can be described using two 
different vocabularies. As Davidson has persuasively argued, causation is a 
relation between concrete events no matter how they are described, thus when 
Horgan claims that quausal epiphenomenalism is a problem even for token 
physicalism he is confusing the ontological question of what pain is with the 
epistemological issue of how that pain is described. Nevertheless, Horgan's 
account is still worthy of consideration within the context of nonreductive 
physicalism which does admit the existence of two distinct sets of properties. 
Finally, before delving into Horgan's account, we still have the job of 
identifying which aspect of mentality his account is designed to secure. As I have 
previously argued, the most natural interpretation of the mental in mental 
causation is PE. PE is, after all, arguably the only aspect of mentality that is 
necessarily mental (the content of mental states, though dependent on 
consciousness, may be unconscious). Thus we could interpret Horgan's project 
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as an attempt to save the PE of mental states from being reduced to the status of 
epiphenomena. At times though it looks like Horgan is going for the more 
modest task of securing a causal role for the content of mental states. We will 
consider, in what follows, quausation applied to both these projects. I will argue 
that the former task cannot be achieved without ditching one or more of our three 
principles (something that neither Horgan nor myself would be prepared to do). 
If his task is the more modest one of securing a role for the content of mental 
states then Horgan fares better. A victory in this latter task, though of 
philosophical importance, is of little consolation for those that view 
epiphenomenalism as an affront to human dignity. The causal efficacy of 
content, though necessary for the causal efficacy ofPE, is not sufficient. 
Horgan tells us that quausation is designed to ward of the possibility of 
quausal epiphenomenalism. Traditional epiphenomenalism, the view that mental 
states have no effects at all, is summarily dismissed on the basis that token 
mental states are identical to token physical states. Quausal epiphenomenalism is 
defined as a position that denies that ' ... mental events and states are causes ... 
and that they have the effects they do because they instantiate the specific mental 
properties they do' (Horgan 1989: 51). Thus, according to Horgan, unless it can 
be shown that the mental qua mental is efficacious, quausal epiphenomenalism 
remains a possibility. Indeed, we are told that this is the most pressing problem in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. Horgan's account runs as follows: 
c qua F causes e qua G if: 
(i.) event c causes event e. 
(ii.) c and e respectively instantiate properties F and G. 
(iii.) F and G are logically and metaphysically independent 
and 
(iv.) the transaction between c and e does not involve pre-
emption, overdetermination, or the like, 
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then the fact that c and e instantiate F and G respectively, is explanatorily relevant to the fact that 
c causes e iff the following Relevance Condition is satisfied: 
(R) For any world w in P[c,e],3 if c* is the event in w that is pertinently similar to c of W4• then 
(i.) if c* instantiates F in w, then c* causes (in w) an event e* which both 
instantiates G (in w) and is pertinently similar to the W-event e; and 
(ii.) if c* does not instantiate F in w, then event c* does not cause (in w) an event 
which is pertinently similar to the W-event e. (Horgan 1989: 58/9) 
The first four conditions are consistent with properties F and G being 
epiphenomenal; the real work of rooting out causally efficacious properties is 
done by the relevance condition. Though the relevance condition is designed to 
show how properties F and G can be quausally efficacious, it merely formulates 
(albeit in a philosophically rigorous way) a pattern of counterfactual dependency. 
In other words, it tells us that if the event were to occur again and the causally 
efficacious property were not present, then the effect would be different. So, for 
example, in the much discussed case of a man killed by a loud gunshot, if the 
bullet were replaced by a blank the relevance condition would show that sound 
was not the efficacious property: if c* does not instantiate F (the property of 
being a real bullet) in w, then c* does not cause (in w) an event which is 
pertinently similar to the W-event (there is a loud bang but it does not kill the 
man). Thus, the relevance condition purports to show that it is the property of 
being a projectile, not a loud bang, which kills the man. Horgan notes (ibid. 59) 
that this pattern of counterfactual dependency is often sought empirically. Quite 
how it could be used to demonstrate the causal efficacy of mental states remains 
a mystery - how does one go about removing mentality to check whether it is 
causally efficacious? 
3 P[c,e] refers to pertinently similar worlds (PSW) where the correlates c* and e*. as well as the 
background conditions w. resemble in pertinently similar intrinsic respects c and e. and the 
background conditions in W. 
~ W is the actual world in which event c causes event e. 
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The real worry, however, is whether quausation is compatible with both 
supervenience (either strong supervenience or Horgan's own theory of regional 
supervenience outlined below) and the token-identity thesis to which Horgan 
adheres. Horgan accepts that all our actions are explainable, in principle, with 
reference to the laws of physics as applied to our microphysical parts (see 
Horgan 1989: 64). We are also told, however, that whether or not event c 
instantiates property F is causally relevant to its effect. More precisely, whether 
or not event e instantiates property G is dependent on whether or not event c 
instantiates property F. Ifwe interpret the phrase 'instantiates' as referring to 
supervenience, then F supervenes on c and G supervenes on e. The trouble is that 
supervenience asserts a strict dependency relation between a supervenient 
property and its subvenient base such that necessarily anything that has the 
subvenient base also has the supervenient higher order property. This strict 
dependency relation poses something of a problem for the relevance condition, 
since it entails that necessarily if c instantiates F in W, c* must also instantiate F 
in w. 
This means that, for the mental to be causally efficacious qua mental, a 
token mental state F cannot be identical to a token physical state c. IfF were 
identical to c then F's causal powers would be identical to those of c and, 
therefore, it would make little sense to say that F is quausally efficacious (since 
this would be equivalent to saying that c is quausally efficacious). Moreover, ifF 
really were quausally efficacious (because it possessed some causal powers over 
and above those of c) then not only must the assumption oftoken-identity be 
mistaken but the principle of the causal closure of the physical would be 
violated- a position which, as we have already seen, Horgan accepts. On the 
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other hand, if it turns out that the mental is not causally efficacious qua mental 
and the token-identity thesis is true then the causal powers ofF would be 
identical to those of c and we would have a violation of PI (the irreducibility of 
mental states). 
Horgan's concept of regional supervenience does provide one way out of 
this impasse. As we shall see, however, it does so only for relational properties 
and so cannot be used to argue in favour of the causal efficacy of mental states 
when the mental is read as referring to PE. Horgan's account of regional 
supervenience runs as follows: 
There are no two P-regions that are exactly alike in all qualitative intrinsic physical 
features but different in some other qualitative intrinsic feature. (Horgan 1993: 
571) 
Horgan's point is that the subvenient base of a higher order property F need not 
be intrinsic to the individual that instantiates the higher order property - it need 
not supervene on 'what's in the head'. Indeed Horgan makes a persuasive case 
for widening the subvenient base of certain higher order properties beyond 
synchronous, internal events and states - the wide-content mental property 
wanting a drink o/water is a case in point (Horgan 1993: 571). Suppose, for 
example, to borrow one of Horgan's examples, that Oscar has a sudden desire for 
a glass of water. According to Horgan, Oscar's having this property is not 'an 
intrinsic feature of the spatio-temporal region directly occupied by Oscar's body' 
during the period in which Oscar desires water. In simple terms Horgan is 
claiming that Oscar's desire for water (a wide-content property) does not 
supervene on what's in Oscar's head. Nevertheless Horgan thinks that this wide-
content property is casually implicated in Oscar's behaviour. The reason for this 
is that the property's instantiation is dependent upon Oscar's having acquired the 
term 'water' in a world where water is H2O rather than XYZ. For Horgan then, 
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strong supervenience is not strong enough to guarantee the causal-explanatory 
relevance of wide-content. Perhaps the reason that Horgan feels that he needs to 
appeal to regional supervenience is because he has run together two different 
explananda. Oscar's desire for water is constituted, in part, by a PE of thirst. This 
PE, assuming PE supervenes on synchronous internal physical states, is an 
intrinsic feature of the spatio-temporal region occupied by Oscar's body. If the 
PE of thirst is a sufficient condition (ceteris paribus) for Oscar to take a drink 
then all the causal-explanatory work is done by phenomenal states plus their 
subvenient bases that are intrinsic to Oscar. Whether Oscar's desire is for H2O or 
XYZ is causally irrelevant in relation to his subsequent behaviour. 
To recap, the thrust of this section has been concerned with 
demonstrating that quausation is incompatible with supervenience. The trouble is 
that no matter how one interprets the qua relation as soon as one starts attributing 
causal powers to the quausal property (the F in c qua F) the supervenience 
relationship between c and F no longer holds. For F, where F is some PE, to have 
any quausal powers it must be the case that F is a new property added to c or a 
property generated by c but distinct from it. Either way it looks like quausation is 
straying into the territory of emergentism. 
Mental causation as physical causation 
While many would wish for a theory of mental causation that has the mental qua 
mental doing the causal work, for authors like Davidson (arguably) and Kim it is 
the mental as physical that is causally responsible. Although, as it is sometimes 
put, causal efficacy is 'transmitted' from the physical to the mental in virtue of 
the supervenience relation, this approach is open to the charge of 
epiphenomenalism on the grounds that mental properties are related as 
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epiphenomenal causation rather than supervenient causation. We will begin with 
Davidson's Anomalous Monism (henceforth AM). As the instigator of the debate 
on mental causation in its current form, the literature on AM is voluminous. In 
this brief critique we can barely scratch the surface of the complex issues that 
surround AM. Nevertheless, as I noted in the introduction, when it comes to what 
I consider to be the failure of theories of mental causation the devil has not been 
in the detail. As such we can afford to skate over some of the trickier issues and 
focus on the crucial question of the relationship between mental and physical 
properties. Let's begin by outlining Davidson's approach. 
AM states that all events are physical, though some events are also 
mental, and denies that mental phenomena can be given purely physical 
explanations. AM was designed to reconcile an apparent contradiction between 
the following three principles. That mental events interact causally with physical 
events. That events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws 
(the Principle of the Nomological Nature of Causality). And that there are no 
strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained 
(Davidson 1980b: 208). We will start by exploring these three principles. 
The first principle states the familiar assumption that mental events 
interact causally with the body and, via the body, with the external world. Our 
first worry concerns how this interaction is to be conceived. Davidson holds a 
version of the identity thesis where token mental events are identical to token 
physical events. Moreover, Davidson conceives of causation as a relation 
between concrete events no matter how they are described. It is difficult to 
imagine, therefore, what is being claimed by the premise that mental events 
interact causally with physical events that could not be expressed by 'physical 
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events interact causally with physical events'. Indeed, as Kim points out, this 
premise does not adequately capture our common sense understanding of what it 
means for a mental event to be causally efficacious. For, as Kim says, in the 
context of AM 'the claim that "Mental events cause physical events" only comes 
to the assertion ... that events with some mental property or other are causes of 
events with some physical property or other' (Kim 1993a: 20). It is consistent 
with (thOUgh not implied by) AM, therefore, that events with epiphenomenal 
mental properties cause events with physical properties. This is clearly not what 
Davidson has in mind. What we need is some account of how the mental 
properties of a cause-event are causally efficacious in producing the effect-event. 
This, however, does not seem to be available within a Davidsonian ontology of 
event causation. We will return to this issue after outlining the second premise in 
more detail. 
The second premise is the Iynchpin of AM. The Nomological Character 
of Causality states that where two events are related as cause and effect there 
must be a strict law covering the case. A strict law in this case refers to the type 
of laws that one would expect to find in a finished physics. Causal laws, for 
Davidson, relate to (and due to the nature of causal laws, must relate to) events as 
described and not individual dated events. Davidson suggests, for example, that 
, ... it would make no sense to speak of an individual event being "invariably 
accompanied" by another' (Davidson 1980b: 212). As we shall see, it is 
Davidson's belief that mental kinds cannot be correlated with physical kinds that 
supports his theory of the anomalous nature of the mental. Having noted that the 
Nomological Character of Causality does not refer to determinism, this should 
not be taken to mean that Davidson is an indeterminist. Indeed Davidson does 
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appear to endorse determinism. In The Material Mind, for example, Davidson 
describes a I 'homme machine (called Art) that has been built in man's image 
according to a finished physics, chemistry, neurobiology, etc. All of Art's 
physical behaviour, including his speech acts and intentional behaviour 
(physically described), would, according to Davidson, be entirely predictable. 
Despite this Davidson maintains none of Art's mental events (so defined) could 
be predicted or explained (neither, I suspect, would Davidson claim they could 
be retrodicted). The reason for this, and the reason why Davidson views the 
mental as anomalous, is that mental and physical schemes are incommensurable: 
It is a feature of the mental that the attribution of mental phenomena must be 
responsible to the background of reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the individual ... 
we must stand prepared, as the evidence accumulates, to adjust our theory in the 
light of considerations of overall cogency: the constitutive idea of rationality partly 
controls each phase in the evolution of what must be an evolving theory. (Davidson 
1980b: 222-3) 
Davidson concludes that if we conceive of man as a rational animal then we must 
accept the nomological slack between the mental and the physical (this is, of 
course, the third principle). 
Subsequent discussion has focussed on whether the above three premises 
are consistent with AM and the concept of supervenience 'taken to mean that 
there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some 
mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect, without 
altering in some physical respect' (Davidson 1980b: 214). 
It is the role played by psychophysical laws that has been most widely 
debated. Many commentators have claimed that psychophysical laws are 
required to fix the mental to the physical. Kim states the problem as follows: 
, ... the very same network of causal relations would obtain in Davidson's world 
if you were to redistribute mental properties over its events any way you like; you 
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would not disturb a single causal relation !f you randomly and arbitrarily 
reassigned mental properties to events, or even removed mentality entirely from 
the world. The fact is that under Davidson's anomalous monism, mentality does 
no causal work' (Kim 1993c: 269). 
Let me digress briefly, I have previously endorsed Davidson's 
extensionalist view of causal relations as relations between concrete particulars 
no matter how they are described. I agree with Davidson, therefore, that 'it 
makes no literal sense ... to speak of an event causing something as mental, or by 
virtue of its mental properties, or as described in one way or another' (Davidson 
1993: 13). Nor, of course, would it make literal sense to speak of an event 
causing something as physical, or in virtue of its physical properties. 
Nevertheless, it seems intuitively obvious that some of the properties belonging 
to an event are causally efficacious while others are epiphenomenal (relative to a 
given causal transaction). Consider, for example, Sosa's (1984) illustration of the 
loudness of a shot (epiphenomenal relative to causing death) and the property of 
being a projectile (causally efficacious in causing death). The trouble is that if we 
agree that it would make no sense to speak of an event causing something as 
mental, or as a projectile, can we then consistently maintain that PE is 
epiphenomenal? In other words, if it makes no literal sense to speak of an event 
causing something as PE or in virtue of its phenomenal properties described in 
one way or another then it makes no literal sense to claim that the opposite is true 
- that an event did not cause something in virtue of its phenomenal properties, or 
as described in some way or another. We will return to this issue later. 
Kim's argument is that on AM mental events are causally efficacious in 
virtue of their falling under physical types and that a mental type tokened by a 
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given mental event is epiphenomenal. That is not to say that Kim is contradicting 
the premise that mental events cause physical events (no-one, myself included, 
has charged Davidson with this type of epiphenomenalism). Rather, it is Kim's 
assertion that under AM events are causes only as they instantiate causal laws. 
This, Kim maintains, means that mental properties are epiphenomenal because 
'to suppose that altering an event's mental properties would also alter its physical 
properties and thereby effect its causal relations is to suppose that 
Psychophysical Anomalism, a cardinal tenet of anomalous monism, is false' 
(Kim 1993d: 270). Davidson has objected to this line of criticism (Davidson 
1993: 6) on the grounds that given his extensional views on causation, as I 
quoted above, it makes no literal sense to speak of an event causing something as 
mental or by virtue of its mental properties. In reply to Davidson, Kim notes 
(Kim 1993a: 20) that his claim was that mental properties, not mental events, 
make no causal difference under AM. Terminological quibbles aside, however, 
the problem still remains that AM seems to leave no causal role for mental 
properties. Here things start to get a little technical but it is worth spending some 
time ironing out these problems since, as I noted above, if an extensional concept 
of causation precludes talking about the causal powers of properties (mental or 
physical) then the epiphenomenalism I advocate would seem to make no literal 
sense either. 
Brian McLaughlin has made a number of cogent points on this issue. In 
particular he provides an account of why Davidson thinks that his extensionalist 
view of causation (Cl) is incompatible with C2: 
C2 If event c caused event e, then c caused e in virtue of certain of c' s properties. 
(McLaughlin 1993: 31) 
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According to McLaughlin, Davidson 'thinks that the claim that event c causes 
event e in virtue of c' shaving F implies that c's having F causes e (or that c 
causes e under the description 'the F l And since C 1 implies that causes are 
events, Cl and C2 are, he thinks, incompatible' (McLaughlin 1993: 33). Far from 
being incompatible, McLaughlin argues that C2 actually implies C 1. To explain 
why, McLaughlin turns to the 'weighs less than' relation discussed by Davidson 
(1993: 6): 
That a weighs less than b in virtue of weighing 10 pounds, does not imply that a's 
weighing less than 10 pounds weighs less than b. A's weighing less than 10 pounds 
is a state of affairs, and states of affairs have no weight. Thus, to be sure, a's 
weighing 10 pounds does not weigh less than b; for that is nonsense. But if b 
weighs (say) 11 pounds and a weighs 10 pounds, then a weighs less than b in virtue 
of weighing 10 pounds. And this implies that a itself weighs less than b. Moreover, 
if a weighs less than b, then a does so however a and b are typed (or described). 
(McLaughlin 1993: 33-4) 
The same goes, McLaughlin argues, for an event's having a certain property F. 
Thus the claim that event c causes event e in virtue of c' shaving F does not 
imply that the state of affairs of c' shaving F causes e. This is good news for our 
purposes since, it seems, we can consistently maintain an extensionalist view on 
causation while at the same time maintaining that PE is causally inefficacious. It 
does make literal sense, in other words, to claim that event c causes event e, 
event c instantiates property F (where property F is some PE), but that event c 
does not cause event e in virtue of c' s having (instantiating) property F. 
The identity of mental events with physical events, therefore, is 
insufficient to guarantee the causal efficacy of mental properties. The 
supervenience relation in this case does guarantee that mental properties are 
causally relevant, and that they are related to physical properties (and other 
mental properties) by a form of epiphenomenal causation, but it fails to show that 
mental properties participate in causal relations as supervenient causation. 
Ultimately AM faces the same problems as Horgan's quausation considered 
earlier. It seems inevitable that any version of nonreductive physicalism that 
subscribes to the view that mental properties supervene on physical properties 
will face the same fate. One simply cannot consistently maintain that PE is 
irreducible, supervenient on physical states, and causally efficacious, without 
violating either P2 or P3. The identity of mental and physical events is not 
enough, what materialist theorists of mental causation require is the identity of 
mental properties with physical properties. Any such identity would, of course, 
be a violation of our first principle. 
Multiple type-physicalism 
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Unlike many other authors in the field, Kim is sensitive to the distinction 
between the causal efficacy of mental states defined in terms of their PE, and the 
causal efficacy of their subvenient base. This is a rather difficult distinction to get 
one's head around, and matters are not made any easier by Kim's conspicuous 
lack of examples. One cannot blame Kim for this since the possibility of real life 
examples is precluded by the supervenience relation. To explicate, remember that 
SS states that a given subvenient base will invariably be accompanied by its 
supervenient property (or properties). Thus, ifPE strongly supervenes on the 
physical, there are no circumstances where one could have (for example) the 
neural correlate of pain without the experience of pain. It therefore makes no 
sense to ask how a person with a severe headache would behave if they lacked 
the neural correlates of pain. And neither would it make any sense to ask how a 
person would behave if they had the neural correlates but experienced no 
headache. This is essentially the problem that quausation tried, and I argued 
failed, to solve. 
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Like most authors (the only notable exceptions being the eliminativists), 
Kim is keen to secure a place for mental states in causal explanations. Unlike 
most authors, however, Kim seems (rather reluctantly) willing to give up the 
efficacy of the PE of mental states in favour of the content of mental states as 
realised by physical states. One can discern in Kim's work a growing 
acknowledgement that one cannot save the causal efficacy of PE without falling 
foul of the exclusion problem and thereby making events overdetermined 
(violating P3), or violating the physicalist principle of the causal closure of the 
physical (P2). 
Multiple-type physicalism states that mental properties supervene on 
disjunctive physical bases. To explicate, that the same mental property, say pain, 
may be realised in different systems, by a variety of physical bases - Ph in 
humans, Pm in molluscs, and PM in Martians. Further, that Ph may be realised by 
different physical bases in different individuals, in different circumstances, or 
even in the same individual at different times in their life. 'In this sense, we may 
say that mental kind M is disjunctively identified with physical kinds PI, P2, ... 
Note that M is not identified with the disjunction of PI, P2 ... ; nor is an M-
instance identified with an instance of the disjunctive property PI v P2 v ... We 
may call this proposal "multiple-type physicalism'" (Kim 1993e: 364). Thus, for 
an event or object to have a mental property M, is for Mto be physically realised 
by one of its physical bases. Moreover, M s causal powers are identical to those 
of its physical base. This makes' ... mental properties causally inhomogeneous in 
the sense that two instances of the same mental property may have quite diverse 
causal powers, and that the more diversely a mental property is realized, the 
greater its causal inhomogeneity' (ibid. 362). One of my aims in this thesis is to 
demonstrate that not all instances of a given mental state M are equally 
efficacious and to develop some sort of taxonomy or framework for identifying 
the relative causal efficacy of the subvenient base of M vis-a-vis other 
synchronous neural states. As such Kim's realisation model provides a sound 
philosophical basis for such an endeavour. 
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One of the strengths of Kim's thesis is that, not only does it escape many 
of the problems related to mental causation that we considered above (causal 
overdeterminism and the explanatory exclusion of mental states), but that it does 
not try make philosophy of mind the final arbiter of the causal efficacy of mental 
states. In short, it leaves science (cognitive, computational and neurological) with 
a real job to do. It does not attempt to settle the question of what, or how wide, 
the physical base of mental states are, and consequently leaves open the question 
of their causal efficacy. 
In order to demonstrate this lets take an action (A), 'opening a bottle of 
wine', motivated by a token conscious reason (M), 'I fancy giving that new Pinot 
Noir a try'. On Kim's view, M's causal powers must be identical with a token of 
a physical kind, PI, P2 ... (whichever realised M). The crucial point is that on 
Kim's model how wide PI, P2 ... turns out to be is left open. Thus ifit turns out 
(it doesn't) that M is realised by PI, and PI'S causal powers are identical with the 
whole brain and nervous system of the organism in which it is instantiated, then 
we can say that M caused A. Alternatively it might tum out that P2 realised M 
and that P2 is identical with the firing of a few dozen neurons somewhere in the 
brain that are neither necessary or sufficient for A. In which case M does not 
cause A. 
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Multiple-type physicalism attempts to solve the problem of mental 
causation by functionalising mental states, or, more specifically, functionalising 
the content of mental states. This requires that we adopt an all-encompassing 
reductionism about the mental and entails that mental states have no new causal 
powers over and above those oftheir physical realisers. Although functionalising 
of the content of mental states does appear to be the only means of solving the 
problem of mental causation that is compatible with physicalism and 
supervenience, as Kim is acutely aware, it does not work for the PE of mental 
states. Functional properties are causally efficacious in virtue of the role they 
play within a system. The phenomenal qualities that a property possesses are 
consequently irrelevant to its being able to perform its function. This is the 
antithesis of the orthodox interpretation of the causal efficacy of mental states 
where the PE is causally efficacious precisely because it has specific phenomenal 
qualities. If qualia are causally efficacious in virtue of their function then there 
seems no good reason why, for example, inverted qualiaS should not be possible. 
Because the PE of mental states resists functionalisation, Kim is led to the 
following dilemma: 
Ultimately we are likely to face the following choice: either embrace the realization 
view and save mental causation, or insist on the unique and distinctive status of 
mental properties, especially the qualia, but be prepared to give them up as causal 
powers. The paradoxical thing about this is that the choice offered may only be the 
illusion of a choice, for the two options may in the end collapse into one. If you 
choose the former, you may loose what makes the mental distinctively mental; and 
what good is it, one might ask, if you save mental causation but end up losing 
mentality in the process? ... If you choose the latter, again you may lose the 
mental, for what good is something that is causally impotent? ... Being real and 
having causal powers go hand in hand. (Kim 1993e: 36617) 
The loss of mentality resulting from the former choice is the belief that we, as 
conscious subjects and because we are conscious subjects, have control over our 
5 Examples of inverted qualia might be hot and cold, pleasure and pain, red and green etc. 
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own behaviour. The realisation view strips us of this power by reassigning the 
causal power of mental states to the brute and unthinking forces of the physical 
domain. We lose mentality twice over on this view. On the first scenario, by 
functionalising mental states and hence saving the causal efficacy of their 
content, the distinctive PE of mental states is robbed of its causal role. That is to 
say, from a functionalist perspective what matters is the function that the 
subvenient base plays in a given causal chain, not the characteristic PE of the 
supervenient state. On the second scenario, where PE can't be functionalised, we 
are left with only two choices, we must either adopt PE irrealism (which is not an 
option) or claim that they are irreducible hence epiphenomenal. Kim seems to 
think that these alternatives amount to the same thing since he views having 
causal powers as an essential criterion for being real. From a methodological 
perspective this is quite true, since by definition something entirely devoid of 
causal powers could never be discovered (being perceivable, by for example 
showing up on a scientific instrument, constitutes a causal power). Thus from a 
pragmatic perspective Kim is quite correct that having causal powers is an 
essential criterion for being real. PE, it seems plausible to suggest, escapes this 
criterion because it is necessarily experienced. Where causation is a relation 
between two or more events, a given instance of PE does not need to cause 
anything in order to make its presence literally felt. Moreover, the reason that we 
have concluded that the PE of mental states is epiphenomenal is precisely 
because they are sui generis real and irreducible to physical states. The reality of 
phenomenal states is indubitable; it is only their relationship to physical states 
that is in question. 
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The realisation view is also likely to face difficulties because of its close 
association with functionalism, which many philosophers find rather unpalatable. 
Although there are certain similarities, what differentiates Kim's model from 
classic functionalism is that on a functionalist account causal efficacy derives 
solely from the function that a given property plays within the system in which it 
is instantiated. Functionalists are typically not interested in how the property is 
realised and will allow a property to be realised by a potentially infinite set of 
systems. Thus, functionalists will frequently allow a property M to be 
instantiated by, and have the same causal powers in, systems as diverse as 
computers, biological systems or the population of China.6 On Kim's model, on 
the other hand, because M strongly supervenes on a subvenient base P, we can 
set limits on the physical systems that can instantiate P. Which physical systems 
are capable of instantiating M, therefore, becomes an empirical rather than 
logical or conceptual matter. 
Of all the supervenience theories on offer multiple-type physicalism is 
the only one to secure a form of mental causation while respecting the 
irreducibility ofPE and without violating either P2 or P3. By adopting a broadly 
functionalist approach Kim succeeds in securing the causal efficacy of the 
content of mental states. We may lose an aspect of mentality (PE) from mental 
causation on this account but it is the argument of this thesis that this is an 
inevitable consequence of the three principles outlined in the introduction. For 
this reason multiple-type physicalism, or something like it, must be the correct 
way to characterise the relationship between mental and physical properties. In 
all likelihood Kim's theory will be conceptually refined and empirical 
6 See (e.g.) Searle (1992) and Block (1978) for a critique of functionalism. 
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observations will certainly tell us about the conditions necessary for a system to 
realise a mental state. Nevertheless, if the argument presented in this thesis is 
correct then it would take a paradigm shift in the philosophy of mind to overturn 
Kim's basic argument - namely only the successful reduction ofPE or the 
repudiation of the causal closure principle will overturn his theory. 
Dretske's dual-explanandum strategy 
Thus far I have argued (following Kim) that real causation only occurs at the 
most basic level - whatever that might tum out to be - and that macrocausation 
has to be considered as supervenient or epiphenomenal causation. Moreover, that 
macroproperties can only be considered causally potent if they are identical to 
microproperties (though we need not know what these microproperties are). 
Though providing an ontological account of causation is an essential foundation 
for a sound methodology, it is of little or no practical use in itself. What we 
require is an account of causation that is sensitive to these ontological 
considerations, but that can form part of a methodology capable of prediction and 
explanation. That is, one that allows us to individuate the salient properties 
involved in causation without having to give a microstructural account of an 
event and all its antecedent conditions. 
Fred Dretske provides just such an account in his Reasons in a World of 
Causes (1988). His dual-explanandum strategy provides a useful account of how 
to individuate the salient causal properties from amongst an event's antecedent 
conditions. In doing so, Dretske persuasively argues that reasons, and their 
cognitive and conative components, rationalise (or causally explain) behaviour. 
Though I will argue that Dretske does not solve the problem, his approach is 
worth considering because, unlike many theorists, he is acutely aware of the 
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problem of causal explanatory exclusion. That is to say Dretske, as a physicalist, 
is willing to admit that a physical explanation, citing only the causal connections 
between the most basic particles, combined with the most fundamental physical 
laws and concepts, is sufficient to explain and predict all our movements without 
invoking intentional states. Yet, according to Dretske, reasons, beliefs and 
desires do causally explain our behaviour. His project is to reconcile these 
seemingly incompatible principles. 
I will begin by outlining Dretske's distinctions between behaviour and 
movement, and triggering and structuring causes, before moving on to consider 
his naturalised account of meaning and his suggestion as to how meaning may 
figure in causal explanations of behaviour. Here I will draw on Kim's account 
which clears up some of the confusion relating to the causal role of token and 
type indicating states and makes explicit the supervenience relation which is 
implicit in Dretske's account.7 As ever we will consider the role-played, on 
Dretske's account, by the PE of mental states and the type of causation that his 
account proposes. 
Dretske begins by distinguishing between behaviour and movement. 
Behaviour is to be construed as endogenously produced movement; it is 
something the organism does rather than something that is done to the organism 
(Dretske 1988: 2). Dretske is emphatic that we must not conflate the motor 
output M of an organism S, which has an internal cause C, with the cause of an 
organism's behaviour. When we enquire as to the cause of an organism's motor 
output, we are asking the how question: how does C cause M? When we ask, 
7 Dretske (1991: 216) endorses Kim's formulation of his account and acknowledges that it 
elucidates the type-token distinction. 
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'what caused S's behaviour?' we are asking a why question: why did C cause M. 
Put simply, physiology explains how C caused M, reasons explain why C caused 
M. 
Dretske's dual-explanandum strategy thus avoids the problem of 
overdetermination by claiming that physiology and psychology do not share the 
same explanandum. On Dretske's model the why question can be further 
subdivided: 
In looking for the cause of a process we are sometimes looking for the triggering 
event: what caused the C which caused the M At other times we are looking for the 
event or events that shaped or structured the process: what caused C to cause M 
rather than something else. The first type of cause, the triggering cause, causes the 
process to occur now. The second type of cause, the structuring cause, is 
responsible for its being this process, one having M as its product, that occurs now. 
(Dretske 1988: 42) 
Reasons causally explain behaviour, according to Dretske, by explaining the 
structuring cause (the cause ofC's causingM). In the case ofa classically trained 
dog, for example (see ibid. 43-4), the ringing of a bell produces an auditory 
experience (C) in the dog, which subsequently causes the dog to salivate (M). We 
may then ask what caused the dog to salivate and can answer by providing either 
a triggering cause, the sound of the bell ringing, or a structuring cause, that the 
dog has learnt to associate the ringing of a bell with food. 
To give a full account of the structuring cause in this case we would have 
to explain how the auditory experience of hearing a bell causes the dog to believe 
that food is on its way. Beliefs, on Dretske's account, are internal representations 
or maps that help us steer through the world and that figure in the cause of 
movement. In addition though, in order to count as a belief: 
The fact that it is a map, the fact that it says something about external conditions. 
must be relevantly engaged in the way it steers us through these conditions. What is 
required ... [see fig 2.1 below] is that the structure's indicator properties figure in 
the explanation of its causal properties, that what it s~s (about external affairs) 
helps to explain what it does (in the production of output). (Dretske 1988: 94) 
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F C -----causes ---------..M 
L-____ explains-s ____ ---'J 
Fig. 2.1 The role of indicator properties in Dretske's dual-explanandum strategy 
(taken from Dretske 1988: 84) 
Organisms acquire structures with indicating properties, on Dretske's model, 
through the familiar process of associative learning. Thus, if we return to the 
example of the classically trained dog, the bell ringing causes C which (due to 
associative learning) has the property of indicating F. C's indicating F (the dog's 
belief that food is on its way) causally explains why C causesM. 
Kim explains how reasons (R), on Dretske's account, explain behaviour 
in the following way: 
Stage 1: Why does C's having R at t cause M? 
Because C's having R at t supervenes on C's having N [nonrelational, intrinsic 
neural property 1 at t, and there exists in S an N .... M causal structure. 
Stage 2: But why is the N .... M structure present in S? How did content property R 
(i.e., the property of representing F) come to supervene on N in S? And how did S 
acquire the capacity to represent F? 
Because, in S, N is the internal indicator property ofF, and through a process of 
conditioning and learning the N .... M causal structure was established in S; this 
means also that in S, R came to supervene on N. In the process, N has acquired the 
function of indicating F, and this is how S came to have the capacity to represent F. 
(Kim 1991: 68) 
One of the strengths ofDretske's account is that it provides a causal role 
for wide content while respecting the assumption that the triggering cause of 
behaviour, to use Dretske's phrase, must be internal and virtually synchronous 
with the movement it is held to explain. That wide content does not supervene on 
'what's in the head' is now almost received wisdom in philosophy.8 Ifwide 
content is to figure in causal explanations of behaviour, therefore, it must do so 
8 See (e.g.) Putnam (1975) 
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by causally influencing the triggering cause. Dretske develops an information-
based account of meaning that allows meaning to do just that. Very crudely the 
meaning of an internal state C derives from its function of indicating F - it 
carries information about (e.g.) the presence ofF. This makes meaning 
dependent on extrinsic environmental conditions: C represents F because there is 
a reliable correlation between the occurrence ofF, and C representing F. 
Moreover, C's having meaning now is dependent on extrinsic and historical 
environmental factors. It is because C was reliably correlated with F during the 
learning process that results in its meaning (indicating/referring to) F now. 
It is not clear exactly what Dretske means by meaning. His approach is 
designed to give the semantic character of brain structures (or meaning) a real 
job to do. He does not want to make them epiphenomenal consequences of 
syntactic structures. He is quite emphatic about this and gives us the example of 
a soprano who, when singing a passage with a specific meaning, shatters glass 
due to the pitch of her voice. The meaning of the passage is clearly 
epiphenomenal; though it may be causally relevant if it turns out that only those 
phrases with a particular meaning reach the causally potent pitch. Dretske notes 
that: 'If having a mind is having this kind of meaning in the head, one may as 
well not have a mind' (ibid. 80). However, he later goes on to say that: 
'Whatever else a meaning might be, it certainly is not, like an event, a spatio-
temporal particular that could cause something to happen. No, in exploring the 
possibility of a causal role for meaning one is exploring the possibility, not of 
meaning itself being a cause, but of a thing's having meaning being a cause or of 
the/act that something has meaning being a causally relevant fact about a thing' 
(ibid. 80). In the end though Dretske's account of the causal efficacy ofa thing's 
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having meaning boils down to the function that internal indicating mechanisms 
play. The only thing that differentiates a semantic structure from syntactic 
structure is the causal history of the indicating structure in question. I have to 
admit that I am at a loss to understand why Dretske places such importance on 
this distinction. 
The trouble with this account of meaning, and this is probably true of 
most attempts to naturalise meaning, is that it completely sunders meaning from 
the PE of the meaningful. We, as systems with intrinsic (or original) 
intentionality,/eei meaning; systems possessing derived intentionality (even 
computational systems capable of 'learning') have no such feeling. Though we 
may be said to believe many things that we are never conscious of, when we are 
conscious of our beliefs there is a PE of believing, and this PE seems to be 
missed out of naturalised accounts of meaning. 
The point is nicely illustrated by Horgan who asks us to imagine: 
... a Frankenstein creature, created by Martians whose mastery of robotology and 
hmnan neurophysiology is vastly superior to ours. The Martians deliberately design 
the robot with neural circuitry very much like the circuitry that might have been 
instantiated by a sophisticated and well infonned philosopher, in 1990 America, 
who has an enonnous amount of knowledge about the world but has total amnesia 
about his own past .... Imagine that the creature is activated in Dretske's presence, 
and immediately begins arguing vociferously ... that it already has full-fledged 
propositional attitudes... (Horgan 1991: 87) 
Horgan argues that Dretske is committed to denying, because this robot has not 
yet learned anything such that his beliefs could be endowed with content, that it 
does not act on its beliefs or that it even has beliefs. This example illustrates what 
has been my primary concern in this chapter, the role of the PE of mental states. 
Suppose that the Martians had constructed the robot with identical (molecule for 
molecule) neural circuits to an actual 1990s American philosopher, since PE is 
supervenient on the synchronous internal physical states of the system in which it 
is instantiated, it must be the case that the robot has exactly the same experiences 
as the original philosopher. (At least at the moment of activation, thereafter 
unless the philosopher and his copy were in identical environments their 
experiences would differ.) There is a real tension between defending the claim 
that the robot has no beliefs and the physicalist's requirement that the robot 
experiences having beliefs. The only way out of this problem is to relax the 
requirement that content bear the right causal history to what it denotes. 
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One way to do this is to draw a distinction between reference and 
meaning. The content of the robot's thoughts do not refer to the objects/events 
they 'seem' to remember (since they have no causal connection to those 
objects/events). However, whatever internal (innate) structures allow the robot to 
use its native language are not robbed of their meaning because they fail to refer 
to the objects/events which they denote. Both innate and learned indicating 
structures have potentially the same causal powers. They are both capable of 
misrepresentation (something upon which Dretske places great emphasis), and 
both could potentially provide the subvenient base for PEs. Compare, for 
example, two different species which each have a fear of humans, but in the first 
case the fear is innate and in the second, learned. In both species the neural 
mechanisms that sub serve this fear have the same casual powers (they cause the 
animal to flee at the sight of a human, for example), are capable of 
misrepresentation (they may flee at the sight of a scarecrow) and both are 
capable of generating the PE of fear with the appropriate stimuli. 
Dennett also seems puzzled about Dretske's denial that innate 
mechanisms can figure in why explanations. Dennett suspects that Dretske has 
been distracted by the illusion that in the case of learning, but not of natural 
selection, 'the organism itself (or even: its mind or soul) does the understanding 
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- responds directly to the meaning' (Dennett 1991b: 123). In natural selection the 
'understanding' is done by the brute forces of selection, there is no understanding 
left over for the organism to do. If this is the reason why Dretske rejects natural 
selection then. as Dennett notes, 'of course, if"mere conditioning" is responsible 
for the redesign of the individual organism's brain. this too looks like taking 
responsibility away from the inner understander that Dretske is so loath to lose' 
(ibid. 124). 
To return for a moment to the distinction Dretske draws between 
structuring and triggering causes, Dretske has made a persuasive case that 
reasons causally explain behaviour when they are cited as the structuring cause. 
However, when reasons are cited in the context of a structuring cause they do not 
relate to the PE of mental states (indeed PE need not be a cited at all when 
reasons relate to a structuring cause). They are, in effect, third person descriptive 
accounts of why the causal mechanisms became hooked up in the way that they 
did. This focus on mechanisms, and the functions they perform, has the effect of 
making PE irrelevant for the purposes of explanation. Though mental states are 
of more relevance to the triggering cause, again it is the function that a given 
mental state plays that is of relevance not its PE. Thus Dretske succeeds in 
demonstrating that reasons can causally explain behaviour, but fails to show that 
I (as conscious subject rather than object of study) perform action A because I 
have a conscious reason R. We will encounter this distinction again in the next 
chapter when we consider Searle's theory of mental causation. 
Summary and conclusion 
Supervenience, it will be remembered, originated as a method of characterising 
moral and aesthetic properties so as to show that they are not something extra, 
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something in addition to the actions of a man or the brush strokes of a painting. 
This characterisation of property covariance works well for the relationship 
between a mental property and its subvenient base. It should be obvious from the 
foregoing discussion that, as applied to causation, supervenience is being used to 
assert something more than property covariance. In arguing in favour of mental 
qua mental causation one is surely claiming that mental properties are something 
in addition to physical properties. The burden of causation is more than the 
concept of supervenience can handle. Inevitably, it seems, whenever mental 
properties are characterised as both supervenient properties and causally 
efficacious properties we run into problems such as overdetermination or the 
violation of the causal closure principle. 
The supervenience thesis also encounters serious difficulties when it is 
removed from the relative safety of pure philosophy and applied to empirical 
observations. There is now a considerable research interest in exploring the role 
consciousness plays in cognition, perception, memory storage and retrieval, 
information processing and voluntary acts. Thus far, though the evidence is by no 
means conclusive, there appear to be at least some instances where conscious 
awareness results from these processes but does not directly enter into them. 
Although we are far from the stage when the neurosciences can pronounce on the 
issue of mental causation versus epiphenomenalism, we now have good reason to 
believe that at least some of the processes to which we had attributed 
consciousness a central role are performed unconsciously (see Velmans 1991). 
Conscious awareness, in these processes, appears to be a consequence of causally 
efficacious neural states rather than their cause. Even if it turns out that these 
processes are the exception rather than the rule, philosophical accounts of 
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supervenience must be able to account for them. Supervenience, and 
supervenient causation, are presented as general theories of the relationship 
between mental and physical events, if there are mental processes where 
consciousness can be shown to be an epiphenomenal consequence of physical 
events, supervenience theorists can not just dismiss them as anomalies. In the 
remainder of this chapter I will consider one of the putative cases of 
epiphenomenalism that has emerged from the neurosciences and explore whether 
or not the concept of supervenience can account for it. I should make it 
absolutely clear at this point that I am not attempting to use empirical material to 
argue in favour of epiphenomenalism. Indeed, for the purposes of the following 
discussion, it does not matter much whether the following putative case of 
epiphenomenalism turns out to be true. The point of the following discussion is 
merely to highlight the difficulties that arise when the 'supervenient cause' (PE 
of deciding to initiate an action) is not temporally coextensive with the 
'subvenient cause' (neurophysiological events). 
One of the best documented, and most discussed, cases of 
epiphenomenalism concerns the feeling of 'voluntary' control over the flexion of 
one's finger. In an intriguing set of experiments Benjamin Libet et at set out to 
establish the position of conscious awareness and decision making in the causal 
chain that results in the flexion of one's finger. To do so they recorded cerebral 
activity, the time ofa subject's decision to act and the time movement was first 
initiated. By using surface electrodes to measure the onset of a readiness 
potential (henceforth RP), and directly comparing RP with the time of the 
subjects conscious 'wanting' or intending to act, Libet et at were able to 
demonstrate that RP preceded movement by an average of about 800 ms for the 
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onset of the main negative component, or by 500 ms taking the onset ofRP at 90 
per cent of surface area (Libet et al. 1983: 630). The conscious awareness of the 
decision to act occurred around 150-200 ms before the onset of movement. Libet 
et al conclude that cerebral initiation of a freely voluntary act can begin 
unconsciously and several hundred milliseconds before the subjective awareness 
of a decision. 
Libet et al do not go as far as claiming that consciousness is 
epiphenomenal because, they claim, it is still possible that consciousness has the 
power of veto over unconscious' decisions'. This veto option seems unlikely 
though since, as Spence (1996) and Velmans (Vel mans 1991) have noted, 
neuronal states must persist for at least 400-500 ms before neuronal adequacy is 
reached. 9 Thus, any conscious veto would also result from neuronal states - in 
effect, a conscious veto would be the epiphenomenal consequence of an 
unconscious veto. 
This putative case of epiphenomenalism point to some difficult issues for 
supervenience, supervenient causation and token physicalism. Typically, 
concepts of supervenience make higher order mental properties supervene on 
synchronous internal physical states. Further, they assert that token higher order 
properties, and their causal powers, are identical with their corresponding token 
physical state. Upon what physical state is the conscious decision to act supposed 
to supervene? The problem is that the neural event to which we attribute causal 
efficacy (the RP) and the conscious 'decision' differ in duration. The neural 
event precedes the conscious event by some 300-600 ms (depending upon 
9 Neuronal adequacy refers to the temporal duration and intensity neuronal states must reach 
before conscious awareness is generated (see Libet 1993) 
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whether one takes the main negative component or RP at 90 per cent of surface 
area as the event's cause) which means that the PE of the conscious decision lasts 
only 25%-50% as long as the RP. In order to be consistent with any of the 
theories of supervenient causation considered above, we would have to identify 
the PE of the conscious decision to act with only those neural events with which 
it is temporally coextensive. The problem here is that the neural events with 
which it is temporally coextensive can only be ofa 150-200 ms duration (which 
is the time between the first occurrence of the conscious decision and the 
initiation of movement) as we have already noted though, neuronal adequacy 
requires 450-500 ms. Thus, in order to make supervenient causation compatible 
with this empirical material, one would have to identify a higher order mental 
property with a preceding neural state. Identity of this kind would be 
incompatible with the temporal order of causation as it is currently understood. 
In effect it would endorse backwards causation. It seems that there is going to be 
no neat fit between token mental states (supervenient properties) and token 
neural states (their subvenient base). 
67 
Chapter 3 
Emergence 
Life emerged from a rich and varied molecular soup. The complex behaviour of 
an ant colony emerges from a simple set of genetically prescribed rules that 
govern the behaviour of each ant. Consciousness emerges from a few pounds of 
neurons, glial cells and the rest. I emerged from my tent to watch a glorious 
sunrise. The economy is an emergent property of individual agents but is 
irreducible to the behaviour of individual agents. Other than indicating some 
basic change of state, these various usages of the term emergence have very little 
in common. Emergence is such an evocative term that its wide spread use is to be 
expected, however its application in contexts as varied as sociology, biology, 
physics, philosophy and the popular lexicon has created a quagmire of 
conceptual confusion and ambiguity. Moreover, with one or two notable 
exceptions, most authors are inexcusably lax in their characterisation of the term 
(thereby fuelling further cross-disciplinary confusion). Before we can get to the 
interesting bit, therefore, we have a bit of tedious (though ultimately fruitful) 
definitional and classificatory work to do. The payoff for this work is that it will 
greatly simplify our critique of the various theories of emergence. As I see it 
there are four distinct senses of the term emergence: emergent properties, 
emergent patterns, emergent complexity, and emergent powers. It is the claim 
that consciousness exhibits emergent powers that is of most relevance to our 
present inquiry since it poses a threat to epiphenomenalism. Though most of our 
attention will be focussed on emergent powers I will also spend some time 
exploring the potential application of the other versions. 
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Before discussing these four types of emergence I want to briefly consider 
and set aside the issue of predictability which is frequently invoked as a criterion 
for emergence. It is often said that a property or power is emergent if its 
occurrence could not have been predicted. 1 Predictability is an ontological red 
herring because whether or not the occurrence of a higher order property is 
predictable depends on (1) whether or not we can identify its constituent parts. 
And (2) whether there are general laws and theories available regarding the 
behaviour of its parts in isolation and combination. In the present context 
(whether or not one can predict the occurrence of conscious mental events based 
on knowledge of lower level physical processes), the second condition is only 
approximately satisfied. We suspect that the laws of classical physics and 
possibly those of quantum mechanics, govern the behaviour of brain. The first 
condition is no where near being satisfied. In the case of consciousness it is not 
clear what parts we should be investigating: plausible candidates include neurons 
and sub-neuronal structures, neuronal assemblies, neurotransmitters, brain 
regions, brain regions with particular frequencies, the list could go on. Moreover, 
although we have now amassed a considerable body of knowledge concerning 
the operation of individual neurons and small 'assemblies' of neurons, we have 
virtually no idea how the brain performs even simple cognitive tasks. That 
predictability if not a genuine ontological trait was recognised by many of the 
early emergentists, so why contemporary advocates cling to non-predictability as 
the criterion for emergence is something of a mystery. Hempel summarises the 
point as follows: 
... emergence of a characteristic is not an ontological trait inherent in some 
phenomenon: rather it is indicative of the scope of our knowledge at a given time: 
I See. for example, Popper and Eccles (1977). 
thus it has no absolute. but rather a relative character; and what is emergent with 
respect to the theories available today may lose its emergent status tomorrow. 
(Hempel 1965: 263) 
In the context of the present debate, prediction is a weapon that belongs in the 
hands of the reductionist camp. For ifit can be shown that the effects ofa 
putative emergent property are predictable based solely on the 'bottom up' 
causation of its constituent parts (more on this later), then it will have been 
shown that the emergent property does not possess emergent powers. However, 
absence of such evidence should not be used, especially at this early stage in 
research, as evidence of emergent powers (explained below). 
Emergent properties 
There are two senses of the term emergent properties, one trivial and one with 
real ontological depth. The trivial sense refers to a property that is possessed by 
the whole but is not by any of the constituent elements. Consciousness is an 
emergent property in this sense because (assuming consciousness is somehow 
caused or realised by physical states in the brain) none of the constituent 
elements of the brain display the properties of intentionality, phenomenal 
experience or anything else associated with consciousness. The more interesting 
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version of this, which has genuine ontological depth, is that some property p of a 
system x is emergent if and only if a complete description of x (at any level of 
analysis) fails to describe or identify p. Consciousness is again an emergent 
property by this definition since a complete description of the brain at any level 
of analysis fails to describe or identify phenomenal experience (or so I argued in 
the introduction). Note that on this definition some versions of non-reductive 
physicalism discussed in the previous chapter (Anomalous Monism is the most 
obvious example) as well most versions of dualism would claim that 
consciousness is emergent in this sense. 
Emergent complexity2 
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Before we can get to grips with the concept of emergent complexity we need to 
spend a little time on the notion of complexity itself We may begin by defining a 
complex system as one whose parts generate a proportionately large number of 
possible configurations. So in the present context, for example, we might 
consider a person's genotype to be a relatively simple system since, assuming we 
ignore environmental influences, despite its inherent complexity it can generate 
only one phenotype. A game of noughts and crosses, in contrast, which has a 
relatively small number of parts (in comparison with a person's genotype), has a 
potential for over 50,000 legal configurations. This highlights a second feature of 
complex systems, that they are observer relative. If one shifts one's perspective 
to that of a molecular biologist, a person's genotype is part of a complex system, 
a human gene pool, which has billions of possible configurations. Thus 
complexity only becomes an issue when we try, in whatever way, to understand 
or model reality. There are several features of model building worth considering 
here, firstly a model has to be simpler than the system being modelled. By 
getting rid of what one hopes will be superfluous details the model builder hopes 
to gain some understanding of the rules and laws that govern the system. The 
crucial stage in the construction of any model is deciding which 'building blocks' 
one should use. A building block is an abstract and simplified description of an 
element within a system (a gene, for example, is defined as a functional unit of 
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DNA). If one has been successful in eliminating the superfluous detail the 
building block(s) should behave (in the context of the model) as the element it is 
modelled on behaves in the real world. In a computer simulation of genetic 
change in a population, for example, the genes in the model behave in a similar 
fashion to strands of DNA in the real population. To take an example pertinent to 
our present inquiry, Goffman's dramaturgical analysis is a model of social 
interaction and roles are its building blocks. Goffman's aim when developing the 
concept of roles was presumably to sheer away all the irrelevant details of 
persons leaving only those elements that govern social interaction. Similarly, 
Marx's model was dialectical materialism and his central building block, class. 
Successful science (including social science) depends on ensuring that one's 
building blocks mirror the causally efficacious aspects of the system being 
modelled. In part this thesis is concerned with one of the building blocks of the 
social sciences, the human mind. At times it may appear as though the thesis (and 
part I in particular) is of little relevance to the social sciences. This apparent lack 
of relevance derives from the fact that I am not concerned with developing a 
model of society, social change, social interaction or any other sort of' social 
scientific' model. Rather, I am concerned with developing a model of the 
individual human mind. In other words, I am attempting to sheer away all the 
irrelevant details of persons to reveal a building block that may be of use in the 
construction of social scientific models. 
Having considered complexity, models and building blocks, we are now 
in a position to return to the concept of emergent complexity. Complexity is 
2 Much of this section was influenced and infonned by John H. Holland's (1998) discussion of 
emergence. 
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emergent if a small set of simple rules that govern the behaviour of the building 
blocks of a system are sufficient to generate complexity. Here the term emergent 
refers to the fact that in models there is a very real sense in which complexity is 
generated by the laws that govern the system. This is nicely illustrated by 
Holland's retelling ofHofstadter's (1979) ant colony metaphor: 
Individual ants are remarkably automatic (reflex driven). Most of their behaviour 
can be described in tenns of the invocation of one or more of about a dozen rules of 
the form "grasp object with mandibles," "follow a pheromone trail (scents that 
encode 'this way to food,' 'this way to combat,' and so on) in the direction of an 
increasing (decreasing) gradient," "test any moving object for 'colony member' 
scent," and SO on ... This repertoire, though small, is continually invoked as the ant 
moves through its changing environment. .. 
The activity of the ant colony is totally defined by the activities and interactions 
of its constituent ants. Yet the colony exhibits a flexibility that goes far beyond the 
capabilities of its individual constituents. It is aware of and reacts to food, enemies, 
floods, and many other phenomena, over a large area; it reaches out over long 
distances to modify its surroundings in ways that benefit the colony; and it has a 
life-span orders of magnitude longer than that of its constituents ... To understand 
the ant, we must understand how this persistent, adaptive organisation emerges 
from the interactions of its numerous constituents. (Holland 1998: 81-2) 
Whether society displays this type of emergent complexity is a question that I do 
not intend to discuss. This question is for model builders (particularly those 
concerned with the structure-agency debate) to ponder. It is worth noting, 
however, that although no-one expects that social life will be reducible to the 
operation of as few as a dozen rules, there are several schools of sociological 
thought, both past and present, that implicitly buy into this model of emergent 
complexity. We have already mentioned GotTmanesque dramaturgical analysis 
and Marxism, but to this list we may also add functionalism, and the exemplar of 
this approach, rational choice theory. For rational choice theorists the enormous 
complexity generated by the interaction of human beings can be reduced to the 
laws of instrumental rationality. There is, therefore, a sense in which according 
to rational choice theory man displays little more flexibility than the reflex driven 
ant. All our behaviour can be described and predicted by rules of the form: 
'never invest more (in time, energy, money or emotional commitment) than one 
believes one will receive in return,' 'always act in a manner that maximises 
pleasure and minimises pain,' and 'never pay more for a commodity (where the 
idea of a commodity includes such things as the love of a spouse) than is 
necessary. ' 
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Despite having said that I do not intent to become embroiled in the 
structure-agency debate by discussing this type of emergent complexity, I should 
note that my discussion of the individual human mind (especially in part II) will 
have some direct implications for this debate. My discussion of rationality, the 
self and agency in part II, for example, though not dealing explicitly with rational 
choice theory, presents a model of the agent that is incompatible with the rational 
actor model. 
Emergent patterns 
Emergent patterns are essentially heuristic devices that allow one to predict the 
future state of a system based solely on recurrent patterns. Thus, one can predict 
the future state of a system without necessarily having any knowledge about the 
generating mechanisms (i.e. the causal mechanisms that generate the recurrent 
pattern). Emergent patterns are familiar to both the natural and social sciences as 
well as their folk equivalents (we are all adept at predicting the course that the 
common cold will follow without having the slightest medical knowledge). The 
economic cycles of boom and bust are a familiar example within the social 
sciences. A more contentious example, which we will explore in the next 
chapter, concerns folk psychology. If eliminative materialists are right that the 
categories of folk psychology (such as propositional attitudes) fail to refer to any 
causally efficacious physical states then it may be that our ability to predict 
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people's behaviour derives from our having noticed certain commonly occurring 
patterns. 
Emergent powers 
It is the claim that the mind has emergent powers that threatens the version of 
epiphenomenalism being developed here and it is this version of emergence 
which we shall spend the remainder of this chapter arguing against. Before 
beginning our critique, it might be helpful to sketch out exactly what 
differentiates the theory of emergent powers from supervenience theories of 
mind. As I argued in chapter 2, those tempted by supervenience face a tricky 
balancing act between epiphenomenalism and dualism. To say that the mental 
supervenes on the physical is to say that mental states are dependent and 
determined by the physical states upon which they supervene. These dual 
characteristics, of dependency and determinacy, have proved (or so I argued) to 
be incompatible with the orthodox mental realists' claim that the mind is both sui 
generis real (i.e. irreducible) and causally efficacious. As soon as one relaxes 
either the dependency or the determinacy relationship, the scales tip towards 
dualism. On the other hand, if one retains a commitment to both dependency and 
determinacy then the scales become weighted in favour of epiphenomenalism. 
Proponents of emergent powers (henceforth, since the remainder of this 
chapter deals exclusively with emergent powers, I will drop the suffix powers), 
in contrast, have sought to escape this quandary by relaxing the requirement that 
mental states be both dependent on and determined by physical states. Although 
emergentists are committed to the view that mental states are (at least partly) 
dependent on physical states, the dependency relation is typically restricted to the 
generation of mental states and does not, therefore, entail the property covariance 
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characteristic of supervenience. This, in tum, gives emergentists the 'slack' they 
need to account for mental causation and true libertarian free will. 3 The basic 
idea is that consciousness emerges from physical events in the brain and 
thereafter enjoys a degree of autonomy such that it is able to exercise 'downward 
causation'. A notable exception to this is John Searle's account of system 
causation. Searle's view is that unless one accepts that the totality of the features 
of the brain at the microlevel are sufficient to fix the conscious state at that point, 
one would be forced to accept some form of dualism. Searle's own theory will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The emergentists' rejection of the supervenience thesis makes emergence 
a difficult position to evaluate from a physicalist perspective. Our critique of 
supervenience was based on demonstrating that all the accounts of supervenient 
causation violate one or other of the three principles we outlined in the 
introduction: (PI) the irreducibility of phenomenal states, (P2) causal closure, 
and (P3) the principle of causal explanatory exclusion. Though emergentists tend 
to be advocates of (PI), and accept that overdetermination (P3) is unacceptable, 
they are typically at pains to demonstrate that the physical world is open. 4 Thus, 
if one seeks to go beyond the dogmatic assertion of physicalist principles, one is 
forced into providing an immanent critique. Emergentism, however, is a broad 
church and there are those like Searle who seek to retain a commitment to 
materialism and whose theories can be approached in a similar manner to those 
in the previous chapter. 
3 That is to say an account of free will that is based on agent causation rather than the 
compatibilism of authors such as Dennett (1984) and Honderich (1988). 
4 See, for example, Popper (1982) and Haskar (1999). 
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Before discussing the emergentists' approach to mental causation it is 
first worth looking at the concept of downward causation. Roger Sperry 
famously introduced the analogy of a rolling wheel to demonstrate how features 
of a system can causally determine the behaviour of its parts (Sperry 1980; 
Sperry 1991). The idea is that the constituent elements of the wheel, its atoms 
and molecules, are carried through space and time on a trajectory that is entirely 
determined by the properties of the system. However, as 1. 1. C. Smart has noted, 
'to say that the motion of the particles is determined by the system as a whole is 
merely to say that the motion of each particle is determined by the resultant of 
the forces on it. If this is emergence, then this is a sort of emergence that the 
most reductionist and mechanist physicalist will never have dreamed of denying' 
(Smart 1981: Ill). Another example comes from Kauffman who asks us to 
imagine a wrong 'decision' causing the death of Tomasina (Kauffman 2000: 
129). Tomasina is the last member ofa molecular species and her death robs the 
biosphere of the unique proteins and molecules that constituted the now extinct 
species. Thereafter, not only are these proteins and molecules absent from the 
biosphere, but so too are their descendant mutations which might have given rise 
to new species and novel chemical reactions. Kauffman's point is straight 
forward, the behaviour of autonomous agentsS can have potential consequences 
for lower levels of organisation. From this, Kauffman concludes, 'Downward 
causation is real and nonmystical'. What does this mean? Well, it is real in the 
sense that an event described at one level of organisation occurred and it had 
consequences for future events described at a lower level of organisation. It is 
5 The definition of an autonomous agent, which is outlined in the quotes that follow, is quite 
technical (see Kauffman 2000: 49-109). for our present purposes a common sense understanding 
will suffice. 
nonmystical because the downward causation exists only relative to the 
biologists' conceptual scheme. To explicate, Kauffman says he distrusts the 
bottom up version of causation that is typical of reductionism and claims that 
there is a sense in which whole organisms are 'more than the sum of their parts' 
and 'part of the furniture of the universe'. Such statements, from a respected 
scientist, look like lending support to those who believe that there are emergent 
properties capable of exercising downward causation. Once again, however, as 
the following quotes illustrate, the language is misleading. 
In what sense is Tomasina nothing but the atoms and their locations and motions in 
three-dimensional space of which she is comprised? The concepts of atoms in 
motion in three-dimensional space do not appear to entail the concepts of an 
autonomous agent, self-consistent constraint construction, release of energy, 
propagating work tasks ... What, after all, do Newton's laws of motion have to do 
with a sufficient account of Tomasina's jump to the left rather than the right?' 
(Kauffman 2000: 129) 
But contrast this with Kauffman's general account of emergence: 
... the autonomous agent is, more than the sum of its parts, but not in the sense that 
the behavior of the autonomous agent is not explicable as the total organization of 
the parts organized into the whole agent in its environment. Rather, an autonomous 
agent is more than the sum of its parts in the sense that a wide variety - indeed, an 
infinite variety - of physical systems could be autonomous agents in the same 
sense, self-reproducing systems capable of carrying out at least one work cycle. 
(Kauffman 2000: 128-9) 
The first quote relates to the possibility of prediction, and notes that Newtonian 
physics, or any other physics for that matter, tells us next to nothing about the 
creatures that inhabit (or could inhabit) our biosphere. It may also be taken to 
imply that the laws of biology are irreducible to those of physics. This may well 
be the case but it is largely irrelevant to our present inquiry. This version of 
reductionism is a matter for philosophers of science to ponder and has no 
implications for our current project. The type of reductionism and bottom up 
causation that concerns us here relates to singular causal statements. Any 
singular causal statement in biology, for example Tomasina's wrong decision, 
must be reducible (in principle) to causal statements that refer only to atoms in 
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three-dimensional space. As the second quote illustrates, this type of 
reductionism is unambiguously accepted by Kauffman. This case nicely 
illustrates the danger of confusing methodological and ontological arguments. 
Kauffman's discussion of reductionism occurs in the context of developing an 
account of autonomous agents as an appropriate level of investigation and a 
useful conceptual tool for biology. All too often such methodological arguments 
are misinterpreted as making ontological claims about the reality of emergent 
powers. 
Clearly then, the opponent of emergence need not deny that a system's 
features causally determine the behaviour of its parts. Emergence, if it is to 
differentiate itself from physicalism and make space for libertarian free will, 
must specify the causal relationship between the system and its parts. 
William Haskar proposes the following definition: 
... if (for example) consciousness is emergent ... the behaviour of the physical 
components of the brain (neurons. and substructures within neurons) will be 
dijforent, in virtue of the causal influence of consciousness, than it would be 
without this property; the ordinary causal laws that govern the operations of such 
structures apart from the effects of consciousness will no longer suffice. (Haskar 
1999: 174) 
The introduction of the idea of causal laws is the key step in Haskar's definition. 
As far as we know the component elements of the brain behave (so as not to beg 
the question we should prefix this with 'in the absence of consciousness') in an 
entirely mechanistic manner. Though some have argued that quantum events can 
have a causal influence on the behaviour of neurons, thus yielding a degree of 
unpredictability, such quantum effects have no implications for the version of 
emergence developed by Haskar. Quantum effects aside, therefore, it is generally 
assumed that one can study the behaviour of neurons and, in principle, predict 
their behaviour using classical (i.e. Newtonian) physics. As long as one has 
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certain information about the neuron and its environment (the presence of 
neurotransmitters, the quantity and ratio of sodium and potassium ions across the 
membrane wall, etc.) and one knows the input, one can theoretically predict the 
output. If it turns out that the brain is just an aggregate of similarly mechanistic 
units, then there would seem to be no (in principle) reason to suppose that one 
should not be able to predict the brain's output based on information regarding 
the behaviour of each unit (again using classical physics).6 Haskar's criterion for 
emergence, which is admirable for biting the bullet and stating what is certainly 
an unfashionable position, is that consciousness must interfere with or determine 
the behaviour of the constituent elements of the brain. In effect, the presence of 
consciousness must violate the mechanistic laws that would otherwise govern the 
behaviour of neurons. This must be the case if consciousness is to have any 
causal influence on the body (and not just on other conscious states), since even 
emergentists accept that the brain is the vehicle through which the mind interacts 
with the body. Note that this is a stronger claim than that the presence of 
consciousness has a causal influence on the behaviour of neurons. Such a claim 
would be accepted by all those who reject epiphenomenalism. Anyone persuaded 
by the identity thesis, for example, would claim that the presence of 
consciousness has a causal influence on neurons because consciousness is 
nothing but neurological events/states. There is no violation of the causal laws 
6 It is of course highly unlikely that this will ever become an empirical possibility. For such a 
predictive task to be successful we would not only need a vast amount of computing power but 
one would require a model of the subject's brain that was accumte down to the atomic level. 
Neurologists who attempted such a predictive task would not be afforded the luxwy of 
approximation While the meteorologist can afford to ignore the infamous butterfly's wings. the 
neuroscientist's task might be thwarted by a sodium ion mapped onto the wrong side of a 
membrane wall. The human brain is an astonishingly sensitive piece of equipment where the 
slightest difference in the initial conditions can have potentially massive short term effects 
(recall, for example, the case of Proust, who was prompted to write A la Recherche du Temps 
Perdu by the taste of madeleine cake). 
80 
that govern the behaviour of the component elements of the brain because 
consciousness is identical with the operations of some of those components (as 
we shall see this essentially Searle's view). Take away consciousness (by general 
anaesthesia or inducing a coma) and you have ipso facto causally influenced the 
component elements of the brain. Haskar's claim is stronger than this because he 
denies any form of identity or supervenience. For Haskar consciousness is 
something extra, more than the sum of its parts, and irreducible to neurological 
states/events at any level of description. Thus, for consciousness to have a causal 
influence on the brain it has to do so from outside the system. Haskar's own 
version of emergence, which he dubs emergent dualism, is to my knowledge the 
only well worked out theory of emergence that explicitly adopts this criterion, 
and it is to this that we will now tum. 
Emergent dualism 
Haskar adopts a realist perspective with which I have considerable sympathy. 
Though he rejects the metaphysical premise that the physical is causally closed, 
he is willing to accept the empirical findings of contemporary science (and 
neuroscience in particular). That is to say, in the absence of what he terms an 
emergent self, he takes the constituent elements of the brain to be entirely 
deterministic and in principle predictable (hence his insistence that, in order to 
guarantee true libertarian free will, the presence of consciousness must violate 
the laws that govern the behaviour of the constituent elements of the brain). Like 
myself, Haskar is also a realist about the reality of our experience of mental 
states and rejects any from of reductionism (including the supervenience thesis 
which, like myself, he takes to be incompatible with mental causation). Where 
my own approach and that ofHaskar diverge is that Haskar is firmly committed 
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to the principle of mental causation and free will. To summarise, Haskar 
proceeds from three principles: the irreducibility of mental states; a belief that in 
the absence of consciousness the components of the brain behave in a 
deterministic manner; and a commitment to the existence of free will. The latter 
of these three principles Haskar takes to imply agent causation. His account of 
emergent dualism, and the related concept of an emergent self, is an attempt to 
construct a theory that is compatible with these three principles. 
Theories that posit some form of dualist interactionism are necessarily 
sparse on the ontological details of the non-physical properties and how they 
interact with physical properties. This is a methodological consequence of the 
transcendental realism which is typically the method of choice for dualists. For 
transcendental realists the existence of non-physical properties and powers are 
known only through their effects on the physical world. What we have in 
Haskar's account, though, is a rare and laudable description of the causal 
relations that obtain between the emergent self and the brain. The emergent self 
is presented as an entity that, though generated by events in the brain, is 
subsequently distinct from the events/states that brought it into existence. Haskar 
likens this emergent self to a soul-field, which, like a magnetic field, is distinct 
from the object that generates it. Once generated the causal relations are as 
follows: brain-brain interaction is deterministic, mind-mind interaction 
indeterministic, mind-brain and brain-mind interaction deterministic with the 
caveat that the effects of the brain on the mind are influenced by the mind's 
internal evolution (and vice versa). This allows Haskar to claim that: ' ... one 
can't say in general that a given brain input produces a certain mental effect 
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(ibid. 200).' This gives us a picture of mind-brain interaction that looks 
something like this: 
MI- --- - - ------ - --+ M2---- - -------- - -+ M3 (Conscious mental events) 
r r r 
B 1 • B3 (Brain events) 
Fig 3.1 Haskar's account of mind-brain interaction 
Here the arrows represent the direction of causation. Dashes represent an 
indeterministic relationship and unbroken arrows a deterministic relationship. 
(But again with the caveat that the brain-mindlmind-brain causation is influenced 
by the mind and brain's internal development.) 
Since emergent dualism is a consistent position, given its premises, and since I 
have no intention of rehearsing the well known dualism versus materialism 
debate, I want to criticise Haskar's account by showing that he falls foul of one 
of his own criticisms of materialism (a criticism which, incidentally, he views as 
'devastating') . 
Haskar correctly notes that physicalists are committed to the principle of 
the causal closure of the physical domain and argues that this causal closure is 
incompatible with the materialists' claim that conscious awareness confers an 
adaptive advantage. Assuming conscious states are identical with or supervenient 
on physical states then it follows that the causal powers of mental events are 
wholly determined by the physical states upon which they supervene. 7 If this is 
indeed the case then, Haskar argues: 'The mental properties of the event are 
irrelevant to its causal powers' (ibid. 78). Haskar goes on to note that: 
7 In support of this position Haskar quotes Kim approvingly (if rather selectively). 
What this means is that, given the physicalist assumption, the occurrence and 
content of conscious mental states such as belief and desire are irrelevant to 
behavior and are not subject to selection pressures. On this assumption. natural 
selection gives us no reason to assume that the experiential content of mental states 
corresponds in any w~ whatever to objective reality. And since on the physicalist 
scenario Darwinian epistemology is the only available explanation for the 
reliability of our epistemic faculties, the conclusion to be drawn is that physicalism 
not only has not given any explanation for such reliability, but it is in principle 
unable to give any such explanation. And that, it seems to me, is about as 
devastating an objection to physicalism as anyone could hope to find. (ibid. 79) 
There are a number of elements run together in this critique and it is worth 
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spending some time teasing them out and expanding on them. Any theory which 
explicitly denies (such as my own) the causal powers of mental states, or entails 
that mental states are causally inefficacious (which I have argued is the case with 
the supervenience thesis), cannot appeal to natural selection in order to explain 
the occurrence of any mental state or the correspondence between those states 
and objective reality. In terms of correspondence there are three distinct features 
that require explanation: 
1. The correspondence between the PE caused by the physical mechanisms that 
sub serve perception and the object being perceived (we'll call this percept-
object correspondence). For example, any theory of the mind needs to be able 
to explain the correspondence between my phenomenal experience of a tree 
(percept) and the objective features of that tree (object), its colour, height, 
shape, etc. In other words, given that correspondence (or lack of it) makes no 
causal difference, why does my visual image of a tree look like a tree and 
not, say, a table lamp.8 
2. The correspondence between the PE of meaning (be that symbolic or 
linguistic meaning) and intersubjectively agreed meaning. In Popper's 
8 Another problematic area related to percept-object correspondence is inverted qualia. 'This 
problem. however, does not appear to have any Darwinian solution and will not be discussed 
here. 
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terminology (which for brevity we will adopt) we may characterise this as the 
correspondence between World 2 and World 3. In the present context we 
may characterise World 2 as the content ofPE where that content relates to 
the meaningful objects that comprise World 3. World 3 consists of the 
products of the human mind, mathematics and mathematical symbols, 
language, the symbolic meaning attached to objects such as money, signs, 
religious imagery, etc.9 An example of why this correspondence constitutes a 
problem might be, why is it the case, given that my PE is epiphenomenal, 
that my PE of the meaning of the term 'philosophy' (World 2 object) relates 
to the intersubjectively agreed meaning of the term (World 3 object). 
3. The correspondence between, what I will term, the function and feel ofPE. 
The orthodox mental realist (henceforth OMRist) view is that we evolved to 
experience sensations and emotions such as lust and pain (in the appropriate 
circumstances) because those sensations and emotions cause us to act in a 
way that increases our chances for survival and the chances that our genes 
will be passed onto the next generation. Thus, I am caused to seek out a mate 
because I experience lust, and I am caused to withdraw from harmful stimuli 
because I experience pain. The OMRist perspective is consistent with these 
emotions and sensations being only contingently related to their function. It is 
entirely consistent with the OMRist perspective and evolutionary theory, that 
there are a potentially infinite number of sensations that could have fulfilled 
the function of causing us to withdraw from harmful stimuli (and perhaps do 
in other species, terrestrial or extraterrestrial). Martians and monkeys need 
91ltis is a more restrictive characterisation of World 2 and World 3 than Popper's formulation 
and by their use I do not mean to imply that I buy into Popper's ontology. I adopt them only 
because they are convenient and familiar locutions that are suited to the present inquiry. 
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not experience pain as we do. However, what evolutionary biology and the 
OMRist camp require is that all the potential sensations that could fulfil the 
function of causing us to withdraw from harmful stimuli are unpleasant. That 
is to say, a Martian would not be caused to withdraw their hand from a fire if 
their hand being burnt caused them to experience amusement, but they would 
withdraw if they experienced any sensation as unpleasant as pain. If 
epiphenomenalism is true the qualitative character of sensory and emotional 
experiences (as well as their contingent manifestation in human beings) is 
irrelevant to behaviour. We would behave in exactly the same manner if we 
experienced lust in response to harmful stimuli and pain in response to 
meeting a potential mate. 
The reliability of our epistemic faculties is a slightly different and more 
complex issue. Emergentists, and dualists generally, tend to appeal to the 
principles of reason and rationality rather than Darwinian evolution in order to 
account for the reliability of our epistemic faculties. It should be noted, however, 
that even if one grants that such an appeal is legitimate, even the most rational 
mind would be rendered impotent if the correspondences outlined above were 
not reliable. The mind would quite simply have nothing to reason about. For the 
moment we will concentrate on correspondence and return to this issue in part II. 
In all these cases, so Haskar would argue, mental states evolved, and 
correspond to objective reality, because they are causally effective and increase 
the organism's chances for survival and reproduction. The next question we must 
ask is how do these states discharge their function? For reductionists this is an 
easy question. Reductionists would claim that genes code for neural structures 
that cause us to (1) experience a correspondence between percepts and objects, 
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(2) experience a correspondence between World 2 and World 3, and (3) cause us 
to experience emotions and sensations that, in tum, cause us to behave in a 
manner that increases our chances for survival and reproduction. Moreover, 
reductionists would argue that the PE is able to discharge its function because it 
is (token-token) identical to the functioning of the neural structures that are 
coded for by specific genes. None of this is at all controversial and Haskar 
readily admits that if conscious states were identical to physical states their 
causal efficacy would be guaranteed (ibid. 74). 
What is problematic is Haskar's attempt to apply the same evolutionary 
logic to explain the correspondences cited in 1-3. I hope to show that Haskar's 
insistence that the mind is emergent precludes his adopting this evolutionary 
argument, and this is about as much of a devastating objection to emergence as 
anyone could hope to find! To see why this is the case we need to return to how 
Haskar views the relationship between mental and physical states. In what 
follows we will follow through the example of the correspondence between 
percept and object. The arguments outlined below can be applied mutatis 
mutandis to the correspondence between World 2 and World 3 and the 
correspondence between the function and feel of mental states. 
Despite Haskar's appeal to Darwinian evolution he does not offer us any 
account of the relationship between genetics and the mind or the emergent self It 
is, therefore, left up to us to construct such an account. The following example 
concerns how emergent dualism would explain this relationship in the context of 
a conscious reaction to a percept. Suppose, for example, I were to step out of the 
road to avoid an oncoming bus, emergent dualism would explain this action as 
follows: as the bus approaches light is reflected of its surface, hits my retina and 
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sends a signal to my brain. Neural structures in my primary visual cortex cause 
but are not identical with my experiencing a percept that represents the bus. This 
bus-percept is an emergent property (irreducible to whatever neural events 
caused it) and forms part of my mind. Its influence on me (on my emergent self) 
is dependent upon the internal evolution of the mind. That is to say, if I am 
awaiting the arrival of the bus because I want to take it to work, this bus-percept 
will provide a reason for me (but not a causally sufficient reason) for me to walk 
across to the bus stop and put out my arm. If, on the other hand, I have been 
absent-mindedly chatting to a friend in the middle ofthe road, the bus-percept 
will cause me to move out of the way in order to avoid being hit (but again it will 
not provide causally sufficient conditions). The crucial point to note is that 
Haskar would explain the correspondence between percept and the object by 
appeal to evolution, ' ... since conscious states are causally effective, they are also 
subject to Darwinian selection' (ibid. 197). However, by denying any form of 
(token-token) identity or the strict property covariance of supervenience, Haskar 
has broken the link between Darwinian evolution and the mind. There is nothing 
to tie the bus-percept to genes via the neural mechanisms that sub serve 
perception. 
To explicate, genes could not possibly code directly for an emergent 
property. Genes could only code for neural structures that might give rise to an 
emergent property. But since the point at issue is not the existence of these 
emergent properties but to explain their correlation with objective reality, a close 
correlation between the emergent properties and their physical cause is required. 
On emergent dualism genes code for neural structures that give rise to perceptual 
experiences. These perceptual experiences are emergent phenomena, irreducible 
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to the neural events that brought them into existence. Once created these 
emergent phenomena float free of their neural cause. If their existence benefits 
the organism to which they belong then it is conceivable that the genes that 
coded for the neural structures that caused the emergent phenomena will be 
passed onto the next generation. At this point it is important to note that any 
causal powers that the emergent phenomena possessed, their correspondence 
with objective reality and any evolutionary advantage they conferred on the 
organism in which they were instantiated are not passed on (directly) to the next 
generation. Rather, the neural structures that gave rise to the emergent 
phenomena is the hereditable trait. Now, if it turns out that the next generation 
does inherit these neural structures, and that these neural structures again provide 
an evolutionary advantage in virtue of the emergent phenomena they cause, then 
it looks like we have at least minimal property covariance between the emergent 
phenomena and their neural cause. Such property covariance is incompatible 
with the libertarian free will that Raskar's account is designed to secure. Property 
covariance of this sort would amount to a form of supervenience and this I have 
argued (and Raskar readily accepts) amounts to determinism, epiphenomenalism, 
and the subversion of free will. 
Despite the above criticisms emergent dualism remains a consistent and 
viable option. The point of the above discussion was not to provide a refutation 
of emergentism at the dualist end of the spectrum (since this is ruled out by the 
three principles outlined in the introduction). Rather, the point of the discussion 
was to show that emergentists cannot occupy a halfway house between outright 
dualism (of the Platonic/Cartesian tradition) and materialism by appealing to 
Darwinian arguments. 
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System causation 
If one accepts that conscious states are caused and realised by physical states in 
the brain, that is one accepts that conscious states are entirely determined by 
physical events in the brain, how is libertarian free will possible? For Searle 
libertarian free will, and we can agree with this point, is incompatible with our 
actions being determined by causally sufficient conditions, be they psychological 
(such as, for example, that the desire for a glass of wine is causally sufficient for 
me to drink a glass placed in front of me) or physical (hence the rejection of any 
form of compatibilism). True libertarian free will requires that I, as a conscious 
subject, am the cause of my actions and this would seem prima facie to be at 
odds with the claim that all my conscious states are caused and realised by 
physical events in the brain. Searle's intriguing solution to this problem begins 
by noting that during voluntary actions there are three gaps where we do not 
experience our psychological states as causally sufficient to determine our 
actions. Searle then goes on to suggest that these gaps in causally sufficient 
conditions exist at the neurobiological as well as the psychological level (thus 
escaping physical determinism and making room for libertarian free will). The 
final step is to postulate the existence of an irreducible self which acts on reasons 
but is not causally determined by them. 
Following the observation that we experience the world from the 
perspective of a unified self, Searle notes that our experience of action contains a 
lack of causally sufficient conditions. 'I do not experience my reasons - my 
beliefs and desires, for example - as causally sufficient to fix one decision rather 
than another ... [Nor do I] experience the decision as causally sufficient to 
produce the action I have decided upon' (Searle 2000: 7). Thus, there are two 
'gaps' where we experience the selfas acting voluntarily. There is the gap 
between reflecting on reasons, beliefs and desires, and making a decision and 
there is a gap between making a decision and acting on the decision. In the case 
of actions that are extended in time then there is a third gap during which we 
have to choose to continue performing the action. These gaps do not entail that 
reasons and decisions do not function causally, rather, that 'the antecedents 
function causally, but they do not function by way of causally sufficient 
conditions' (ibid.). 
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We will examine these gaps in detail later, before doing so it is worth 
reflecting on the reasons Searle presents for postulating the existence of a self 
Searle's conclusion (which he admits he came to with some reluctance) is that an 
ineliminable and irreducible self is presupposed by the nature of explanations of 
behaviour. Searle compares two types of explanation; both based on reasons, but 
in the case of the former involving free will: 
A: I made a mark opposite Jones' name because I wanted to vote for Jones. 
B: I got a stomach ache because I wanted to vote for Jones. 
Searle notes that there is a difference in the logical structure of A and B. 
Sentence B takes the form: Event (or state) x caused event (or state) y. Sentence 
A takes the from: A self S performed act A because S was acting on reason R. 
Sentence B, but not sentence A, states causally sufficient conditions, yet 
according to Searle both sentences are adequate explanations and the only way to 
explain this adequacy is to posit the existence of a self. 
Searle is quite right here, that ifsentences of the logical form A were 
adequate explanations for action then an irreducible self would be required to 
account for their adequacy. However, if one rejects the claim that reasons are 
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causes (that sentences of the logical structure of A are adequate explanations) 
then one is not forced to accept the conclusion that there must be an irreducible 
and ineliminable self This topic will be the focus of later chapters, for the 
present analysis we will accept Searle's conclusion. I should note, however, that 
I tend to think that the logical structure of action sentences is rather flimsy 
evidence for the existence of an irreducible self It seems to me that we would be 
better off questioning the logical structure of action sentences rather than 
inventing entities and powers that make them true. 
We can agree with the point (which will be taken up in chapter 9) that 
psychological causes are not causally sufficient for action: 'A complete 
specification of all the psychological causes operating on me at time 11, with all 
their causal powers, including any psychological laws relevant to the case, would 
not be sufficient to entail that I would perform act A under any description' (ibid. 
12). Searle's idea is that if this lack of causally sufficient conditions at the 
psychological level were matched by a lack of causally sufficient conditions at 
lower levels (e.g. neurological, molecular, quantum) then this might provide the 
gap necessary for the exercise of libertarian free will. 
Before examining Searle's proposal there are a couple of preliminary 
points to make. Firstly, Searle's position is dependent on the identity thesis. 
Searle is committed to the idea that bottom-up neurobiological processes in the 
brain 'cause and realise' consciousness. The idea Searle has in mind is that 
psychological causes and neurobiological causes are 'the same causal sequences 
described at different levels' (see ibid.14-15). The phrase 'causes and realises' is 
a little misleading. The concept of a cause presupposes a subsequently occurring 
effect; thus, we would have a neurobiological cause and a psychological effect. 
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Realises, though. suggests some form of identity where psychological properties 
are realised by a synchronous neurobiological 'cause'. We can clarify matters by 
considering Searle's approach to levels and bottom up and top down causation. 
Searle claims that these terms are misleading and that: 
Consciousness is no more on the surface of the brain than liquidity is on the surface 
of water. Rather the idea that we are trying to express is that consciousness is a 
system feature. It is a feature of the whole system and is - literally - at all of the 
relevant places of the system in the same way that the water in a glass is liquid 
throughout. (Ibid. 16). 
Searle's idea is that consciousness is realised by the whole system and 
that the gaps in causally sufficient conditions go right down to the 'bottom'. 
Quite why we should think of the brain as an indeterministic system is left open, 
but Searle suggests that if we abandon 'prejudice' of thinking of the brain in 
terms of neurons and go right down to the quantum mechanical level then 
indeterminacy does not seem so puzzling (see ibid. 17).10 Thus, because 
consciousness is realised by the whole system, causal explanations that refer to 
conscious states also refer to the whole system (at every level). Rational agency, 
for example, is ' ... realized in neurobiological structures that have these 
properties as well, that are themselves the underlying structure of rational 
agency ... '(ibid. 19 emphasis added). This mapping of conscious psychological 
processes onto lower level physical processes (presumably including the 
quantum level) is essential to prevent a lack of causally sufficient conditions 
logically entailing randomness. Quantum indeterminacy was introduced as a 
means of escaping determinism, but for Searle's version of system causation 
indeterminacy is not enough. Indeterminacy is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for free will since on its own indeterminacy merely introduces 
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randomness. To guarantee free will, consciousness and the self must be caused 
and realised by the whole system at every level (including the quantum level). 
Although this is a very appealing analogy, the idea that consciousness is a 
system feature that exists at every point in the system just as water in a glass is 
liquid throughout looks like a claim about the identity of consciousness with the 
system. Such an identity claim brings with it a host of problems relating to 
reductionism. The trouble is that identity goes hand-in-hand with reductionism 
and Searle is emphatic that consciousness is irreducible. We have already 
discussed Searle's anti-reductionist arguments and found them compelling. We 
have also noted that Searle claims these arguments are ontological not epistemic. 
However, after presenting his anti-reductionist arguments, Searle, as the 
following quotation illustrates, goes on to note that they have no deep 
consequences (see Searle 1992: 118-124): 
... once the existence of (subjective, qualitative) consciousness is granted ... there is 
nothing strange or mysterious about its irredUcibility. Given its existence. its 
irreducibility is a trivial consequence of our definitional practices. Its irreducibility 
has no untoward scientific consequences whatever. Furthermore, when I speak of 
the irreducibility of consciousness, I am speaking of its irreducibility according to 
standard patterns of reduction. No one can rule out a priori the possibility of a 
major intellectual revolution that would give us a new - and at present 
unimaginable - conception of reduction, according to which consciousness would 
be reducible. (Searle 1992: 124) 
As I understand it, the reference to untoward scientific consequences concerns 
epiphenomenalism and dualism. Searle's point is that despite its irreducibility 
consciousness can be treated as a biological phenomenon like any other, hence 
irreducibility has no deep consequences. Once can discern a subtle shift from 
ontology to epistemology here. The fact that the irreducibility of consciousness 
has no deep consequences derives, on this account, from the fact that it is 
10 There is some disagreement as to whether quantum indeterminacy could have any effect at the 
level of neurons. For an account of the possible role of quantum events in brain function see 
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irreducible only according to the standard patterns of reduction, and this is surely 
an epistemological claim. When one is concerned with the possibility of an 
ontological reduction there is no middle ground - either consciousness is 
reducible or it isn't. Searle seems to want to have it both ways; he tells us that 
where consciousness is concerned the appearance is the reality. This is an 
ontological claim with which we have agreed and it is true or false irrespective of 
the scientific concept of reductionism. On the other hand, Searle's version of 
system causation requires that consciousness can somehow be identified with the 
physical processes in the brain which cause and realise it. It seems that Searle is 
advocating a position that may be characterised as one of numerical identity with 
property dualism. That is to say, consciousness is identical with the system which 
causes and realises it, but possesses properties irreducible to that system. There is 
nothing inconsistent in the claim that a single physical entity can possess both 
physical and mental properties, but it is inconsistent to maintain that 
consciousness is both identical to the system and irreducible to that system. 
Before going on to outline Searle's theory of system causation it is first 
worth outlining what Searle views as the alternative model of the relationship 
between the three psychological 'gaps' and neurobiology. Since the title of this 
model, psychological libertarianism with neurobiological determinism, is self 
explanatory we can quickly present the hypothesis using a slightly modified 
version of Searle's diagrammatic representation of the model. 
Penrose (1994), and for a critique of Penrose see Grush (1998). 
causes with gaps in sufficient conditions 
deliberation on reasons- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- --. decision 
C&R C&R 
causally sufficient for 
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neurobiological states ~ neurobiological states 
Fig. 3.2 Hypothesis 1: psychological libertarianism with neurobiological 
determinism. Previous conventions apply in this diagram: dashes represent an 
indeterministic relationship, solid lines a deterministic relationship and the 
arrows represent the direction of causation. C&R means causes and realises. 
The reasons for presenting hypothesis 1 will become clear later. At this point I 
shall outline Searle's second hypothesis, system causation with consciousness 
and indeterminacy. According to this hypothesis the lack of causally sufficient 
conditions goes all the way down to the neurobiological states that cause and 
realise the conscious states. It is here that the self (a term which Searle uses 
reluctantly) comes into play. Unfortunately Searle does not have much to say 
about the neurobiology of the self We are told that: 
There is an x such that: 
1 . x is conscious. 
2. x persists through time. 
3. x operates with reasons, under the constraints of rationality. 
4. x operating with reasons, is capable of deciding, intending, and carrying out 
actions, under the presupposition of freedom. 
5. x is responsible for at least some of its decisions. (Searle 2001: 95) 
When it comes to the neurobiology of the self we are left, more or less, to our 
own devices. Nevertheless there are several obvious features that are entailed by 
Searle's description of the self in conjunction with the claim that the self is 
caused and realised by neurobiological states: 
6. x, like all conscious phenomena, is caused and realised by neurobiological 
states. 
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7. (From 2.) the neurobiological structures that cause and realise the self persist 
through time. 
8. (From 3.) the neurobiological structures that C&R the self act on certain 
neurological states that cause and realise beliefs, desires, reasons and the rest. 
This point is, more or less stated by Searle when he claims: 'In the end when 
we talk about consciousness affecting other elements, we are really just 
talking about how the elements affect each other because the consciousness is 
entirely a function of the behaviour of the elements ... '(Searle 2001: 297) 
9. (From 4.) the neurobiological structures that decide, intend and carry out 
actions, do so in the absence of causally sufficient conditions. 
Point 9 yields the following problem: How does the self, so conceived, operate 
such that it is able to causally influence other neurological events in such a way 
as to be in accord with the its own desires. (This convergence of two language 
games, neurobiological and mental, may sound odd, but it is consistent with 
Searle's hypothesis and helps to avoid some long and clumsy locutions.) A 
similar point is made by Searle when he notes that the problem with his 
hypothesis is in explaining how the consciousness of a system can give it a 
causal efficacy without being detenninistic (Searle 200 I: 297). In other words, if 
as a neurological structure operating through time the self provides causally 
sufficient conditions for decisions and action (contrary to Searle's hypothesis) 
then the system would be detenninistic and would not, therefore, allow room for 
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libertarian free will. If the self does not provide causally sufficient conditions 
then what causes the system to act in accordance with the self s desires. If the 
system is to remain indeterministic in virtue of quantum indeterminacy then it 
looks like all Searle's proposal amounts to is a theory of random decision making 
and choice of action. Again this is something which Searle accepts is inconsistent 
with free will. 
Returning to our troubles with Searle's anti-reductionism, there is still the 
problem of accounting for how conscious states can be causally efficacious given 
that they are irreducible to physical states in the brain. The reason that this is 
problematic is not because we fail to understand Searle's claim that conscious 
states are system features that are causally efficacious because they are caused 
and realised by events in the brain. Rather, the problem stems from one of 
Searle's reasons for rejecting hypothesis 1. Searle claims that hypothesis 1 leads 
to epiphenomenalism because it ' ... has the consequence that the incredibly 
elaborate, complex. sensitive, and - above all - biologically expensive system of 
human and animal conscious rational decision making would actually make no 
difference whatever to the life and survival of the organisms' (Searle 2001: 286). 
Given Searle's position, which we have characterised as one of numerical 
identity with property dualism, this does not follow. On this thesis 
neurobiological processes cause and realise conscious experience, our experience 
of the gap, rational decision making, etc. The only difference between hypothesis 
1 and hypothesis 2, in relation to the causal powers of reasons, beliefs and 
desires, is that on hypothesis 1, but not hypothesis 2, the conscious deliberation 
on reasons and decisions are caused and realised by neurological states that form 
part of a total neurobiological state at T 1 that is causally sufficient for the 
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neurobiological state at T2. On the second hypothesis, the neurobiological state 
that causes and realises reasons has to be acted upon by an irreducible self in 
order to move the system (without introducing causally sufficient conditions) to 
the state at T2. Ifhypothesis 1, but not hypothesis 2, entails epiphenomenalism, 
this can only be because the self (in hypothesis 2) contributes something 
radically different in kind from the neurobiological cause and realisation of 
reasons in hypothesis 1. However, if the self is nothing more than a 
neurobiological process then it is no better offwith regard to causal efficacy than 
reasons are in hypothesis 1. 
To make this point absolutely clear, on hypothesis 2 the self is conceived 
as an entity which is caused and realised by the whole system (down to and 
including the quantum level). In hypothesis 1 all mental states are again caused 
and realised by the whole system (down to and including the quantum level). 
Searle claims that mental events in hypothesis 1 are epiphenomenal and that the 
self in hypothesis 2 is causally efficacious in moving the system according to its 
own desires (the selfs desires must, of course, be realised by the whole system). 
What Searle has been unable to do is to provide any explanation for either the 
powers of the self in hypothesis 2, or why mental events in hypothesis 1 are 
epiphenomenal but the self in hypothesis 2 is causally efficacious. Without 
something to fill this explanatory gap Searle's hypothesis is little more than 
wishful thinking. 
Both Haskar and Searle have provided detailed accounts of the causal 
relationships that would have to obtain between mental and physical events in 
order to guarantee free will and mental causation. Haskar appeals to emergent 
powers but, in common with all other dualist accounts, fails to explain either the 
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origin of these powers or how they causally influence physical events. His appeal 
to Darwinian evolution, which I argued was illegitimate given the autonomy of 
the emergent self, only serves to illustrate the deep divisions between 
materialism and dualism which have only been glossed over by talk of emergent 
powers. Searle is no more successful in demonstrating the causal powers of an 
irreducible self, indeed in some ways he is even less successful than Haskar. By 
retaining a commitment to superveniencell Searle denies himself the escape 
route of emergent powers and without an explanation of how the self guides the 
system his appeal to quantum indeterminacy looks like introducing randomness 
while leaving free will and mental causation as elusive as ever. 
The moral of the last chapter was that supervenience ends up either 
entailing epiphenomenalism or straying into the territory of emergence. The 
moral of this chapter is that emergence ends up either collapsing back into 
supervenience, with its attendant problems (as with Searle), or straying into the 
territory of dualist interactionism (as with Haskar). The conclusion is that neither 
non-reductive physicalism, as typified by the theories of supervenient causation 
discussed in the previous chapter, nor emergence offers any middle ground 
between reductionist physicalism and dualist interactionism. So where does this 
leave us and what choices do we have? Well, if you endorse supervenience and 
want mental causation, then it looks like you are going to have to give up 
premise 1 and accept that mental states are reducible. If emergence is more to 
your taste then you have two options. If you want emergence and mental 
causation then you are going to have to give up premise 2 and embrace a form of 
11 Searle is quite scathing about the concept of supervenience claiming that it does no 
philosophical work. However, despite not using the tenn himself. he does endorse the central 
tenets of strong supervenience (see Searle 1992: 124~) 
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dualist interactionism. Alternatively you could resolutely refuse to give up any of 
your materialist principles, but then you will be stuck with emergence with 
epiphenomenalism. Either way, if the last fifty years of philosophy have taught 
us anything, they have taught us that we are not going to be able to have our cake 
and eat it. Despite all the recent advances in the philosophy of mind we still face 
the same set of problems that confronted the traditional versions of dualism and 
materialism. The only difference is that in today's concept rich world to see these 
problems clearly we have to cut through an awful lot of undergrowth. That is not 
to say that progress has not been made in recent years. We were always going to 
have to go down a lot of dead ends before finally solving the mind-body problem 
- at least now they are marked on the map. 
101 
Chapter 4 
Folk Psychology, Connectionism, and Eliminative Materialism 
Epiphenomenalism deals folk psychology a serious blow. Central to all concepts 
of folk psychology is the assumption that people behave the way that they do 
because they have the conscious experiences they do. Once this principle has 
been denied all that's left is an account of the role played by the content of 
mental states. Eliminativists, however, believe that the fatal blow against folk 
psychology has already been struck - epiphenomenalism notwithstanding. One 
prong of the eliminativists' attack is the claim that if the brain turns out to be a 
connectionist network then folk psychology is wrong about the causes of our 
actions and the elimination of its ontology (propositional attitudes, propositional 
memories, and so on) follows. In this chapter I want to argue that not only is folk 
psychology under no threat from connectionism but neither does 
epiphenomenalism present it with any insurmountable problems. In making this 
case we need to be absolutely clear about what is meant by folk psychology. To 
that end I will spend some considerable time outlining what I take to be three 
different versions of folk psychology: what I will term the folks' folk 
psychology, the philosophers' folk psychology and the computational theory of 
mind. We will explore these three versions in detail below, but briefly, the folks' 
folk psychology (henceforth the FFP) is the psychology used by ordinary folk in 
their day-to-day interaction with the world. The philosophers' folk psychology 
(henceforth PFP) is the philosophers' and psychologists' ontological elaboration 
of the FFP. And the computational theory of mind is a specific empirical thesis 
(or family of theses) which claims that at the implementation level cognitive 
thought consists of rule governed symbol manipulation. Of the above three 
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versions of folk psychology (henceforth FP) only the latter empirical theory 
would be falsified if connectionism is true. The falsification of this empirical 
theory, however, cannot possibly warrant the elimination ofFP's ontology. 
Eliminative materialism is only a plausible doctrine if one identifies FP with the 
computational theory of mind or, at the very least, if something akin to the 
computational theory of mind is entailed by FP. I will be at pains in this chapter 
to argue that any such identification does a disservice to ordinary folk and that 
most philosophical accounts ofFP are more or less consistent with even the most 
radical versions of connectionism. 
Given epiphenomenalism, if mental states are to have any explanatory 
role it must be because they are linked to other mental states or action by a form 
of epiphenomenal or supervenient causation. Although we have concluded that 
PE must be linked to future mental states and action by epiphenomenal 
causation, this causal relation is of no practical use. The conclusion that PE is 
epiphenomenal means that regardless of how reliably a given PE covaries with 
an action (such as phenomenal pain and withdrawal) this covariance cannot be 
exploited. It cannot be exploited, of course, because we have no access to PE. 
Having ruled out PE as a predictive and explanatory tool we are only left with 
mental content. Mental content, we have concluded, may be linked to the content 
of other mental states or action by supervenient causation. Thus, although the 
belief (defined in terms of its PE) that the car is low on fuel does not cause the 
driver to pull into a petrol station, the belief (defined in terms of its content) may 
be causally relevant if it supervenes on physical states that do cause the driver to 
pull in. Moreover, in order to be explanatorily useful, mental kinds must covary 
in a systematic and reliable way with physical kinds. So, for example, the belief 
that the car is low on fuel, if it is to be explanatorily useful, must covary in a 
systematic and reliable way with physical states that cause the driver to pull in. 
This property covariance, however, need not instantiate the kind of strict laws 
that Davidson argues against in proposing the thesis of anomalous monism. 
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Connectionism, however, poses a threat to even this restricted concept of 
mental causation. If it turns out that the brain really is a sophisticated 
connectionist system then some have argued that mental content, propositional 
memories and propositional attitudes, will find no place in a completed scientific 
ontology. Since many people working in this field seem willing to hand over the 
keys of our ontological toolkit to science, no place in a completed scientific 
ontology means no place in any ontology. Thus if cognitive researchers can't 
find beliefs anywhere in the brain, psychologists, sociologists, and the man on 
the Clapham omnibus will all be expected to stop using the term just as we have 
stopped crying 'witch' every time we suffer some misfortune. In line with what I 
have said earlier (following Searle) about the appearance being the reality, I 
think that this abrogation of responsibility is a mistake. In short, as long as the 
man on the Clapham omnibus believes that he has beliefs then science can not 
tell him otherwise. 
We will return to this issue later, at this point I want to sketch an account of 
how mental content might be causally relevant. The first point to note is that a 
theory of causal relevance must begin with an account of how mental states map 
onto the physical states upon which they supervene and which are the putative 
cause of the behaviour one is seeking to explain. Thus, if one wants to explain 
behaviour by citing beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes, one must 
first provide an account of why those properties are explanatorily relevant. 
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Before doing so, however, I want to introduce a distinction between occurrent 
and dispositional propositional attitudes. Occurrent propositional attitudes are 
states that occur now and are experienced as such. Unless stated otherwise when 
I refer to such occurrent states I mean to include both their PE and their 
subvenient base. We will consider the nature of dispositional propositional 
attitudes in detail below, for now it is enough to note that when we attribute a 
dispositional propositional attitude to a person we are referring to a disposition to 
hold an occurrent propositional attitude. In most of what follows I will focus on 
beliefs but everything I say can be generalised to cover the other propositional 
attitudes and propositional memories. Causal relevance: 
The PE of believing (the what it is like to believe that ---> covaries in a systematic 
and reliable way with certain neuronal states (we have concluded that this must be 
the case from our discussion of supervenience). The neuronal states upon which 
consciously held beliefs supervene are necessary and sufficient for the behaviour 
that is traditionally explained by those beliefs (ceteris paribus\ Moreover, in cases 
where behaviour is explained by dispositional beliefs, the behaviour is caused by 
neuronal states that are!unctionally similar to those that provide the subvenient 
base for occurrent beliefs. The property covariance is such that one can predict, 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the behaviour caused by the subvenient base 
of dispositional beliefs based solely on our having correctly ascribed a dispositional 
belief (Plus relevant contextual infonnation) to a person. 
If our conclusions from the last two chapters are accurate then the above account 
is a best case scenario. On this account, we lose the mental (in the form ofPE) 
from mental causation but, as we saw in previous chapters, this is often an 
unstated consequence of contemporary materialist theories of mental causation. 
We will assess in this chapter how realistic an account of mental relevance this 
is. 
At this point, it is probably also worth outlining the worst case scenario-
mental irrelevance. 
Even on the worst case scenario occurrent beliefs covary in a systematic and 
reliable way with certain neuronal states (due to supervenience). However, the 
I In what follows all such claims should be read as being hedged by ceteris paribus clauses. 
neuronal states upon which occurrent beliefs supervene are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the behaviour they are held to cause. Moreover, when we refer to 
dispositional beliefs rather than occurrent beliefs, these tenns fail to refer to a~v 
physical states. Beliefs, therefore, are irrelevant to the prediction and explanation 
of behaviour. 
If this scenario, or some variation of it, turned out to be true, then it seems 
inevitable that propositional attitudes would go the same way as luminiferous 
ether, phlogiston, and witches. Propositional attitudes, in short, would be 
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eliminated from our scientific ontology. This would be a worst case scenario, of 
course, because it would wipe out much of the subject matter of the social 
sciences in a single stroke. My hunch is that the truth will lie somewhere 
between these two extremes. Though I will argue that propositional attitudes are 
here to stay, I will suggest that the class of events they are invoked to explain 
will shrink dramatically. This, as the eliminativists are fond of reminding us, is 
an ongoing trend. We no longer, for example, have recourse to intentional states 
in order to explain the movements of the planets or the aetiology of disease and 
natural disasters. I will argue, however, that it is unlikely that propositional 
attitude terms will be eliminated from any of the disciplines in which they are 
currently employed. 
In the first two chapters we adopted mental realism as a working 
hypothesis. That is to say, although we questioned the causal efficacy ofPE, we 
assumed the existence of mental states as they have traditionally been 
understood. We have traditionally assumed the existence of three broad and 
interrelated categories of mental states: perceptual states derived from both 
proprioception and exteroception (pain, smell, touch, sight, etc.); emotional 
states; and cognitive states such as propositional attitudes. Each of these classes, 
according to common sense psychology, has a causal influence on our future 
mental states and behaviour. With the burgeoning of interest in connectionism in 
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the early eighties the very existence of these mental states, and the status of 
common sense psychology, was put in doubt. Interestingly, attention has focused 
almost exclusively on the latter class mentioned above but connectionism also 
poses questions for our common sense understanding of the causal role of 
perceptual and emotional states. However, unlike propositional attitudes there is 
no well worked out theory regarding the casual powers of these classes and since, 
as we shall see, they are probably not candidates for elimination anyway, 
attention has focussed elsewhere. It is worth highlighting the link between theory 
and elimination at this point. The standard justification for elimination is to show 
that a theory in which certain properties or entities figured prominently is 
mistaken. The rejection of the theory then entails the elimination of the 
properties or entities which figured in the theory unless a place can be found for 
them in a successor theory. The trouble is that although theories abound in the 
cognitive sciences in which propositional attitudes and propositional memories 
figure prominently, ordinary folk do not hold such theories. Or at least they do 
not hold the type of theory whose rejection would entail the eliminativists' 
conclusions. 
Despite nearly twenty years of debate there is still very little consensus 
regarding the implications of connectionism for FP. This lack of consensus is due 
partly to the wide variety of folk psychologies on offer. There is little agreement 
about the scope or ontological depth ofFP, whether it is a set of rough and ready 
generalisations or a causal-explanatory model, for example. More importantly 
though, there is disagreement about the properties and powers that physical states 
would require in order for them to count as the referents of the posits ofFP (i.e. 
the referents of beliefs, desires, and the rest). Specifically, there is some debate 
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as to whether FP is committed to propositional modularity - the view that 
propositional attitudes are functionally discrete and semantically interpretable 
states. To phrase this in terms of supervenience, there is some debate as to 
whether propositional attitudes supervene on neurophysiological states that are 
semantically interpretable and causally active on some occasions and causally 
inactive on others. This latter feature means only that, for example, my belief that 
water boils at 100°C has no causal influence on my decision about when to mow 
the lawn. The only area of agreement seems to be in setting the minimal 
requirements for FP to be considered as a candidate for elimination. Viz. FP must 
be a theory that conceives of cognitive thought as rule governed symbol 
manipulation. Our first task, when examining the implications of connectionism 
for FP, therefore, will be to develop an account of FP and test whether these 
requirements are met. We well also need to be sensitive to the theory of reference 
that is being employed by the various commentators on FP. Steven Stich (1996) 
has persuasively argued that before one can come to any conclusion regarding 
the elimination or retention of folk psychological categories, one owes the reader 
a theory of reference. Unfortunately most commentators are not careful to 
provide an explicit theory of reference. This problem is particularly acute when 
discussing ordinary folks' (as opposed to academics') conception of common 
sense psychology. 
Though the debate surrounding connectionism may seem far removed 
from the social sciences it does have some direct and fundamental implications 
that are worth keeping in mind. Not only is part of the ontology of the social 
sciences on trial here but the very status of language within the social sciences is 
called into question. We have already accepted that all human behaviour is 
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caused by, and in principle explainable solely in terms of, the behaviour of the 
most fundamental particles and their properties. Accepting this microphysical 
determinism does not, however, preclude the possibility that human thought and 
behaviour might be determined by what some view as language dependent 
phenomena such as concepts, beliefs, and social rules. Ifbeliefs, desires and the 
other propositional attitudes do supervene on functionally discrete states that are 
semantically interpretable, then one can still talk of beliefs superveniently 
causing actions. Moreover, if our acquisition of beliefs is somehow dependent on 
(again I am talking about supervenient causation here) language then one can still 
embrace epiphenomenalism while espousing the 'culturist' traditions of, for 
example, Winch, hermeneutics, or structuralism. To elaborate, no-one disputes 
that learning a language or acquiring a belief involves physical changes in the 
brain. If it turns out that these changes create, or create the potential for the 
instantiation of, functionally discrete states that interact in the way that they do 
because of the linguistic world that the subject inhabits, then not only is 
consciousness irrelevant to the study of man and society but so too is man's 
biological 'hardware'. This is not a debate that I intend to enter into. I merely 
wish to note that the possible truth of hermeneutics, structuralism, Winchian 
social psychology, rational choice theory, and a good many other 'isms' is 
dependent on propositional modularity. If it turns out that learning a language, 
acquiring beliefs and so on, does not create physical states that display 
propositional modularity (as connectionists maintain) and hence are the 
'language of thought', as Wittgenstein would say, then language and beliefs are 
merely the vehicle for the expression of thought that exists independently of 
those phenomena. This latter scenario would allow man a great deal more 
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autonomy over culture and society since, put simply, his thoughts would be his 
own rather than being a 'gift of society'. Very crudely, the computational theory 
of mind, and to a lesser extent the PFP, supports the former hypothesis and the 
connectionist model the latter. 
Connectionism: a brief introduction 
The nature of the debate between the connectionist motivated eliminativists2 and 
the defenders of the computational theory of mind and FP makes it almost 
impossible to provide a description of connectionism that does not beg the 
question. I therefore caution readers that are unfamiliar with the subject not to 
make assumptions based on the following description and to take note of the 
liberal sprinkling of scare quotes. 
Although connectionism has been around for some time, it was only in 
the early eighties that it emerged as a serious challenge to the dominant paradigm 
within the philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology, viz. the computational 
theory of mind. The computational model of cognition (which for brevity we will 
call the classic model) is based on the idea that the mind operates in the same 
way as a digital computer with cognitive processes being conceived of as rule 
governed symbol manipulation. To explicate, on the classic model cognitive 
thought consists of the syntactically driven interaction between neurally realised 
representations. It is for this reason that propositional modularity is such a comer 
stone of the classic model for it is the structural properties of the physical 
instantiations of representations (in conjunction with syntactically realised rules) 
that causes the system's behaviour (see Fodor 1988). 
: Connectionist motivated eliminativists, like the Churchlands, argue that if connectionism is true 
propositional attitudes will have no place in a completed scientific ontology and should, 
therefore, be eliminated from all ontologies. 
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It was hoped that the study of the rules that enable the simulation of 
cognitive processes in computational models might shed some light on the rules 
that govern the same cognitive processes in humans. After forty years of research 
based on the classic model though, researchers faced what has been described as 
Kuhnian crisis. The classic model proved to be too rigid and deterministic to 
account for the flexibility of human cognitive processes and was seemingly 
incapable of performing many of the most basic human abilities (such as, for 
example, pattern recognition). These shortcomings led researchers to tum their 
attention to connectionist networks (or neural network/parallel distributed 
processing models, as they are sometimes called). 
Connectionists abandoned the idea that cognitive processes are governed 
by explicit rules in favour of an approach that viewed 'high level' cognitive 
processes as arising from the interaction between simple 'neuron like units'. 
Connectionist networks are built from layers of units that are 'functionally 
similar to neurons'. However, as Berkeley has warned us, there are important 
differences between the units in a connectionist network and neurons which 
makes the claim that connectionism is a biologically plausible model 
questionable. Briefly, in a connectionist network each unit is connected to all the 
units in the previous and subsequent layers. Neurons, in contrast, are typically 
only connected to around three per cent of the other neurons in the surrounding 
1 mm of tissue. This makes connectionist systems massively parallel in 
comparison to the relative sparsity of connections in a neuronal network (see 
Berkeley 1997). Moreover, as Berkeley notes, there are twelve different types of 
neuron in the neo-cortex alone which each have different firing patterns. Some 
neurons have oscillatory firing patterns, some have firing patterns that are a 
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function of their recent history and some spike randomly (i.e. in the absence of 
any input). None of these subtleties, and Berkeley cites many more, are mirrored 
in connectionist networks whose connections are in the form of continuous 
numerical values. 
One of the main advantages of connectionist models over symbol 
manipulating models is that connectionist networks are capable of 'learning'. 
One of the most commonly used methods enabling connectionist networks to 
learn is back propagation. This method uses a learning algorithm during 
'training' to adjust the connection weights of the units. Initially a network is 
presented with and processes an input. The output of the system is then compared 
to the desired output and an error signal is derived. The error signal is then fed 
back through the system adjusting the connection weights in the direction of the 
desired outcome according to the learning algorithm. Though there are some 
parallels with Hebbian strengthening and feedback connections,3 many 
commentators have concerns about the biological plausibility of these learning 
procedures and note that it looks more like programming than learning. These 
concerns seem warranted when we consider that training a network to perform 
even simple tasks can involve hundreds of rounds of training. It seems fair to say 
that so far connectionist systems are far from being realistic models of neural 
networks. 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, connectionism has generated 
tremendous excitement within the fields of cognitive psychology and the 
3 Hebbian strengthening is the tendency of neurons within a network to strengthen their 
connections after a period of excitation by increasing their stockpile of neurotransmitters or 
growing extra synapses. This then enables the neurons to reform the network and fire together 
again in the future (see Hebb 1949). Feedback connections are loops of nerve fibres that connect 
cells receiving input with the original firing cell. 
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philosophy of mind. The features of connectionism that are of interest to 
philosophers are thankfully straight forward and do not require any familiarity 
with the applications to which connectionist systems have been put or the 
structural details of connectionist networks. For our purposes we need only note 
that representations/propositions in connectionist networks, unlike the classic 
model, are widely distributed and not semantically interpretable, or so it is 
claimed (we will examine this claim later in the chapter). The easiest way to 
appreciate these features is by comparing the way that information is represented 
in classic and connectionist models. In classic models, each representation, and 
each element in a proposition, is functionally discrete. Problem solving consists 
of manipulating these functionally discrete elements according to explicit rules. 
Moreover, in classic models information is stored in such a way that it is 
semantically interpretable. Crudely speaking, this means that someone with the 
appropriate technical knowledge could identify a representation in a classic 
system by citing the spatial co-ordinate(s) of the representation - they could say, 
'that means ___ .' This does not entail that a representation in a classic system 
must be stored at a single point. Rather, it entails that information may be 
accessed independently of other information and that a single item of information 
(e.g. a belief) may be removed without affecting the rest of the system (see van 
Gelder 1991). Connectionist systems, in contrast, store information holistically in 
the form of, what van Gelder terms, superposed schemes. In a superposed 
scheme, all the information is stored by the whole system without it being 
possible to make any fine-grained distinctions. 'Thus in connectionist networks 
we can have different items stored as patterns of activity over the same set of 
units, or multiple different associations encoded in one set of weights' (van 
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Gelder 1991: 43). The upshot of all this is that if connectionism is true all our 
beliefs, desires, propositional memories, and so on, are causally implicated in all 
our actions. So, for example, my belief that water boils at 100°C is just as 
casually efficacious in my decision to mow the lawn as my belief that the lawn 
needs mowing. This, the eliminativists claim, means that connectionist systems 
cannot exhibit propositional modularity and FP must, therefore, be false. 
Some have objected that propositional attitudes might be encoded in 
connectionist systems as activation patterns and that activation patterns might 
count as functionally discrete and semantically interpretable states. Moreover, 
that occurrent beliefs are realised by synchronous activation patterns, and 
dispositional beliefs are realised by the systems' disposition to go into a state that 
is a realisation of the belief in question. There could be some truth in this 
assertion which would dovetail nicely with both supervenience and the thesis of 
multiple realisation considered earlier. We will return to this issue towards the 
end of the chapter but at this point I want to consider the eliminativists' reply. 
Ramsey, Stich and Garon object to this possibility on the grounds that activation 
patterns are not enduring states of the system. People hold, they claim, an 
enormous number of beliefs over a long period of time but activation patterns are 
transient states and cannot, therefore, be identified with the instantiation of 
beliefs in a connectionist system. Moreover, while it may be true that 
connectionist networks have an enduring 'disposition' to realise a particular 
activation pattern, this disposition cannot be a physical realisation of 
dispositional beliefs. The reason, they claim, is that they are not the 'right sort of 
enduring states - they are not the discrete, independently causally active states 
that folk psychology requires' (Ramsey et al. 1996: Ill). But by whose standards 
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are they not the right kind of enduring states? Certainly not, I shall argue below, 
by the standards of ordinary folk. Since ordinary folk do not claim to know what 
the referents of beliefs are, activation patterns and dispositional activation 
patterns would suit ordinary folk perfectly well as the referents of beliefs. By 
saying that they are not the right sort of enduring states Ramsey et al mean they 
are not the right sort of enduring states by the standards of the classic model. As 
we shall see below, Ramsey et al make the conditional claim that if the most 
radical version of connectionism turns out to be true then the elimination of 
propositional attitudes will follow. This claim is only coherent, however, if FP is 
committed to propositional modularity. While it is almost universally agreed 
within the cognitive science community that this is the case (at least for those 
who view FP as synonymous with the classic model), it is academic arrogance in 
the extreme to make eliminativist claims based on this assumption. I will argue 
below that the cognitive science community, as well as philosophers of action, 
have hijacked ordinary folks' ontology and developed it into the paradigm I have 
been calling the PFP. The history of eliminative materialism can then be seen as 
the history of certain theories within this paradigm and their failings - namely 
the classic model. To argue for the elimination of the unembellished ontology 
based on the failure of its ontological elaboration is unwarranted. 
The folks' folk psychology 
The folks' folk psychology (FFP) may be taken to be an account of the role that 
folk believe propositional attitudes and intentional states play in the prediction, 
explanation, and causation of thought and behaviour, as well as the creation of 
reasons for action. A good place to start is by spending some time outlining our 
common sense conception of propositional attitudes. In what follows I will focus 
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on beliefs since a discussion of beliefs will highlight some important points that 
can be generalised to the other propositional attitudes. We must be careful, at this 
point, to resist the temptation (to which many philosophers and psychologists 
succumb) to attribute to ordinary folk theories about propositional attitudes that 
more properly belong to the academic study ofFP. The difficulty that has 
confronted academics in this area is that ordinary folk do not typically have 
much to say about the nature of beliefs. Nevertheless, we all have some deep-
seated intuitions about propositional attitudes and it is these intuitions that we 
will consider here. 
The first point to note is that propositional attitudes are embodied states. 
As Cohen notes: ' You answer the question whether you believe that p by 
introspecting or reporting whether you are normally disposed to feel that p when 
you consider the issue' (Cohen 1996: 266). Cohen goes on to distinguish 
between belief and acceptance. Acceptance according to Cohen does not have 
this associated 'feel'; it is rather a policy for inference. Thus, one can believe not 
p whist simultaneously accepting that p. but one cannot simultaneously believe 
both p and not p. Examples of this distinction are not hard to come by. I am, for 
example, happy to accept that quantum mechanics is true, but I do not believe it 
to be true (because of the counterintuitive consequences of the superposition 
principle). A second feature of beliefs is that they need not be occurrent states. If 
we accept, as seems right, that beliefs are characterised by a disposition to feel 
disposed toward a proposition, then we need not be experiencing, or indeed need 
never have experienced the associated feel, in order to be said to believe that p. 
As such one need never have considered p in order to be said to believe that p. 
All one requires in order to attribute a belief to another is one's own belief that, 
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should they consider the issue, they would feel that p. This point extends to all 
propositional attitudes. When we say that Jon is embarrassed that he could not 
remember x's name, for example, he need not be embarrassed now. Rather, it is 
true to say that Jon is embarrassed that he could not remember x's name if Jon 
would feel embarrassed should he consider the issue. If Jon is no longer disposed 
to feel embarrassed should he consider the issue we would normally say that Jon 
was embarrassed that he forgot x's name. 
It would be a mistake to attribute to ordinary folk a theory about the 
referents of propositional attitudes beyond noting that for occurrent states the 
referent is (or includes) the associated feel. So, for example, the referent of my 
belief that Jon is embarrassed is my feeling that Jon is embarrassed. Similarly, 
the referent of Jon's embarrassment is his feeling of embarrassment. As for the 
referent of dispositional propositional attitudes, ordinary folk don't seem to have 
any firm ideas and no strong intuitions. Question people about the referent of 
propositional memories and you are more likely to elicit some intuitive response. 
Any intuitive response, however, would fall far short of anything that could be 
described as a potentially falsifiable theory. (See Stich (1996) for arguments in 
support of the claim that ordinary folk do not have any firm intuitions about the 
referents of propositional attitude terms.) 
On the folk conception, beliefs can support counterfactuals - had 
Jonathan not believed that the traffic lights had changed to red he would not have 
stopped the car. It is important to note that, although beliefs can support 
counterfactuals, it is consistent with the folk conception of beliefs that a person's 
actions are not determined by their beliefs. It is thus consistent with the folk 
conception of beliefs that a person holds a belief that p but does not act on it, or 
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that their belief that p is superseded by other propositional attitudes. As Davidson 
notes, 'Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and mediated by 
further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit' (Davidson 
1980b: 217). When beliefs do issue in behaviour, it would seem that they do so 
(on the folks' conception) by providing grounds for reasons. These reasons are in 
tum cited as explanations for action. 
It seems to me that this is about all one can say about the folk conception 
of propositional attitudes. Note that the account just bruited makes no reference 
to the causal role of propositional attitudes. Clearly people do attempt to explain 
behaviour by referring to reasons, beliefs and desires, but they remain mute on 
the question of whether these states literally cause their behaviour in the way that 
philosophers often suppose. Indeed, on the rare occasions when ordinary folk cite 
the cause of their behaviour, causation is attributed to the self(the '1') and not to 
any antecedent events or mental states. Thus someone may exclaim, 'I just 
couldn't help myself, I had to ... ' An addict, for example, may feel compelled to 
alleviate their craving without thereby citing their craving as the cause of their 
subsequent behaviour. In non-pathological cases agency is never perceived to be 
or reported as being entirely subverted. Thus someone may say, 'I lit the 
cigarette because I had a craving that I could not resist' but never, 'the craving 
caused me to light the cigarette'. 
I noted in the introduction (following Stich) that the theory of reference 
one applies to beliefs and desires will have important implications for the 
eliminativist conclusions one draws. If the above account of propositional 
attitudes is along the right lines, then it contains an implicit theory of reference 
that effectively grants immunity from elimination to the folk conception of 
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propositional attitudes. Or, more accurately, the lack of a well worked out theory 
of reference guarantees immunity from elimination. The folk conception does not 
designate any physical state or entity to fulfil the role attributed to propositional 
attitudes. There can be no empirical refutation of the folk conception of 
propositional attitudes because ordinary folk typically do not hold well worked 
out theories that could be falsified and propose no powers, objects, or states 
whose existence we might question. Moreover, because each use of a 
propositional attitude term refers to an occurrent or potential 'feel', it does not 
much matter what causes or realises this feel. If it turns out that this feel 
supervenes on physical states that display propositional modularity then that's 
fine. If connectionism is true, and this feel supervenes on some activation pattern 
that does not display propositional modularity, that's fine too. Since ordinary 
folk do not claim to know what the subvenient bases of propositional attitudes 
are, that is to say what their physical referents might be, they will happily allow 
science to fill in the gaps in their ontology. Our stock of propositional attitude 
terms may expand or contract if we learn to discriminate subtle differences in our 
experience of holding propositional attitudes, but it is inconceivable that we have 
misidentified the experience of, for example, lusting after p, being embarrassed 
that x, etc. Even if our worst case scenario were realised and no propositional 
attitudes tum out to be causally relevant, this would still not entail elimination. 
As long as people are disposed to feel that p, be embarrassed that x, etc., 
propositional attitude terms will have a referent and they will not be eliminated 
from the popular lexicon. Similarly, though people often have some firm 
intuitions regarding the nature of the self (particularly if they belong to a 
religious group), such accounts rarely designate an entity or substance that 
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science might find absent. Even people who believe in an immaterial soul rarely 
hold any theories about its interaction with the body (such as Descartes' famous 
theory concerning the role of the pineal gland) that might be falsified by science. 
Moreover, the self to which agency is attributed is known through experience 
and, though I argue that the experience is epiphenomenal (which robs the 
experiential self of its agency), the existence of the self defined in terms of the 
content of one's experience is indubitable. The future of propositional attitude 
terms within academic disciplines that seek to explain and predict behaviour by 
citing its cause is less secure and it is to this that we shall now tum. 
The philosophers' folk psychology 
What I have termed the philosophers' folk psychology is really a paradigm rather 
than any concrete set of theories. By this term I mean to include all those 
ontological elaborations of the FFP that have emanated from the philosophy of 
action and the cognitive sciences. The PFP goes well beyond anything that is 
manifest in experience and as such, unlike the common sense psychology used 
by ordinary folk, the theory is open to refutation by both empirical evidence and 
philosophical argument. 
We are repeatedly told that FP allows us to predict and explain others' 
actions by both eliminativists and the defenders ofFP. The philosophical 
literature is full of banal and rather contrived examples of how knowledge about 
a person's mental states enables us to predict their behaviour. The following 
account is typical of those found in the literature: 
... if someone desires that p, and this desire is not overridden by other desires. and 
he believes that an action of kind K will bring it about that p, and he believes that 
such an action is within his power. and he does not believe that some other kind of 
action is within his power and is a preferable way to bring it about that p. then 
ceteris paribus, the desire and the beliefs will cause him to perform an action of 
kindK. (Horgan and Woodward 1991: 149) 
The ubiquitous example is the action of putting up an umbrella and it is worth 
rewriting the above account for this specific case: 
Jon looks out of the window and notices that it is raining. lbis causes Jon to come 
to believe that it is raining. If Jon desires to stay dry, and this desire is not 
overridden by other desires, and he believes that taking an wnbrella with him will 
bring it about that he stays dry, and he does not believe that some other kind of 
action is within his power and is a preferable way to bring it about that he stays 
dry, then ceteris paribus, the desire to stay dry and his belief that taking an 
umbrella with him will bring it about that he stays dry, will cause him to take an 
umbrella with him. 
It is important to note that, in cases such as these, the occurrence of beliefs and 
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desires are hypothesised to account for what appears to be purposeful behaviour. 
When I perform such trivial actions as getting a beer from the fridge, putting up 
an umbrella, or turning on the light, I am not aware of the kinds of belief-desire 
combinations that Horgan and others would have us believe cause my actions. 
Indeed were I aware of these kinds of belief-desire combinations for all my 
actions I am sure that I would suffer cognitive overload - my mind would 
become so paralysed by all these belief-desire combinations that action would 
become impossible. These examples, therefore, go well beyond what can be 
inferred from experience and what looks at first sight like an innocent description 
of human cognitive processes is in fact heavily theory laden. Philosophical and 
psychological theory is evident in two respects here, it assumes the existence of 
beliefs and desires that are not manifest in experience (they operate 
unconsciously according to the theory) and it gives those beliefs and desires a 
causal role. It is this putative causal role that differentiates the PFP from the FFP. 
As soon as one accords propositional attitudes a causal role, propositional 
modularity naturally follows. For Jon's belief-desire combination to literally 
cause his behaviour, for example, it must be the case that his non-relevant 
beliefs, that for example water boils at 100°C and the lawn needs mowing, are 
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causally inactive. The two elements that define the paradigm ofPFP and 
differentiate the PFP from the FFP then are (i.) on the PFP but not on the FFP 
propositional attitudes are assumed to literally cause behaviour and (ii.) in order 
to fulfil this role they must be functionally discrete states. 
Eliminativists and defenders ofFP, of course, differ on their 
interpretations of why talk of beliefs and desires is useful. Eliminativists (and 
instrumentalists) typically argue that FP is merely a generalised description that 
will suffice for day-to-day life but has no ontological depth. I.e. beliefs and 
desires do not designate sui generis real, causally potent properties, states, 
entities or anything else. Defenders ofFP, in contrast, typically explain its 
success by arguing that at least some of the posits ofFP refer to causally 
efficacious states. 
We will examine these arguments a little later in the chapter, at this point 
I want to question the assumption that FP is a useful tool for prediction and 
explanation. The first point to note is that ordinary folk do not typically explain 
their behaviour in ways that parallel the causal explanations of behaviour 
provided by the defenders ofFP (such as those in the above examples). This 
should not be taken to mean that ordinary folk are not adept at predicting and 
explaining behaviour, for clearly they are, I merely want to note that they do not 
typically cite folk psychological categories when they do so. Nor do ordinary 
folk claim to be applying a theory, invoking causal laws, or anything much else 
when they predict others' behaviour. Thus, if the PFP is correct, it must describe 
processes that are (generally) unconscious. When propositional attitudes are used 
to explain behaviour it is typically in cases where the behaviour was in some 
sense strange, atypical, or when more information is required for the behaviour to 
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seem to 'make sense'. We should allow ourselves to be struck by how little we 
have recourse to folk psychological explanations and how, most of the time, our 
own and others' behaviour seems completely natural- without requiring 
explanation or justification. Doing so helps to counter the intuitive appeal of the 
PFP model and allows us to question why we assume that the accounts that allow 
us to make sense of others' behaviour parallels whatever causes us to view the 
behaviour of others as natural or without need of explanation. Dennett explains 
this as follows: 
We are communal folk psychologists, who are constantly explaining to other 
people why we think that so and so is going to do such and such. We have to talk; 
and when we talk, because life is short, we have to give an edited version of what 
we are actually thinking; thus what comes out is just a few sentences. Then, of 
course, it is only too easy to suppose that those sentences are not mere edited 
abstractions or distillations from, but are rather something like copies of or 
translations of the very states in the minds of the beings we are talking about. 
(Dennett 1991a: 142) 
There are, of course, many PFP theories that fall under the broad rubric ofFP. 
The central theme of most accounts is that FP is a theory. Moreover, it is a theory 
that explains how it is possible for people to make predictions because it is the 
theory that people apply when they make those predictions. In order to deserve 
the name of FP it seems plausible to suggest that the theory must posit the 
existence of propositional attitudes and attribute to them a role in causing 
behaviour. Propositional attitudes, in other words, must be the vehicle of thought 
and not its consequence. To put this another way, it must be the case that my 
experience of the desire for a beer, and my belief that there is a beer in the 
refrigerator (or the neural states upon which these experiences supervene), 
literally cause my going to the refrigerator to get the beer. Note that this is a 
stronger claim than that propositional attitude terms serve to explain my 
behaviour to others by making my behaviour intelligible to them (which does not 
entail that the explanation cites the cause of my behaviour). This weaker claim 
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still gives propositional attitudes a real job to do, but here their job is explanatory 
not causal. An explanatory role may not satisfy theorists of mental causation but 
it is worth remembering that there are many perfectly adequate explanations in 
FP (the FFP that is) that are not causal explanations. Consider, 'Why is he in a 
bad mood?' 'He just got out of bed on the wrong side this morning.' 
As we have already seen, propositional attitudes need not be occurrent 
states and a crucial aspect ofPFP is that propositional attitudes literally cause 
behaviour regardless of whether or not they are experienced. To clarify what is 
entailed by this point, suppose that John goes to the refrigerator to get a beer. 
Prior to embarking on this course of action John thought to himself, 'I am going 
to get a beer from the fridge.' On the PFP model we can attribute to John a desire 
for beer and a belief that there is a beer in the refrigerator. This belief-desire 
combination was (ceteris paribus) casually sufficient for John's action. Now 
suppose that Jonathan performs the same action (the action of going to his fridge 
to get a beer) but without any conscious intentional beer-thoughts. According to 
the PFP model Jonathan's action must also have been caused by a desire for a 
beer and a belief that there is a beer in the refrigerator (albeit a non-conscious 
belief and desire) and Jonathan's belief-desire combination was again (ceteris 
paribus) casually sufficient for his action. Moreover, to explain or predict John 
and Jonathan's actions the PFP model would have us apply a law to the effect 
that if a person desires a beer, believes that there is a beer in the refrigerator, and 
they hold no other beliefs or desires that supersede their beer-desire, then ceteris 
paribus they will go to the refrigerator to get a beer. 
In what follows we will consider the various ways that such a story could 
be fleshed out. Specifically, we will consider how one is able to predict John and 
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Jonathan's actions. Do we, for example, apply an explicit law of the type cited in 
the example, was the prediction made by the application of general rules or by 
some combination of the twO?4 We will also consider whether this account 
presupposes that propositional attitudes are semantically interpretable, 
functionally discrete states that are causally potent on some occasions and 
causally inert on others. This triad, first proposed as entailed by the folk 
psychological conception of propositional attitudes by Ramsey, Stich and Garon, 
has been the focus of much debate. Ramsey et al argue that, if connectionism 
turns out to be true, it will falsify this conception of propositional attitudes and 
elimination follows. 
As Ramsey et al note, there are a variety of different connectionist 
models on offer. Some of which have units, or aggregates of units that one could 
plausibly argue represent propositions and function as causally discrete units. 
However, in what follows I will assume that something like the most radical 
version of connectionist models turns out to be true (i.e. turns out to be an 
accurate model of human cognitive processing at both the psychological and 
implementation levels). Since I intend to argue (with a few caveats) that the PFP 
(contra Ramsey et al) is consistent with even the most radical connectionist 
models, my case can only be strengthened if it turns out that neural networks do 
not display all the properties attributed to connectionist networks. 
4 Another possible explanation is off-line simulation. According to off-line simulation theory we 
predict other's actions by feeding the propositional attitudes that we attribute to them into our 
own 'off-line' decision making apparatus and derive a prediction as an output. Since the 
empirical evidence seems to be against off-line simulation, and because there are some strong 
arguments in support of the claim that an ability to perform off-line simulations would itselfbe 
dependent on having internalised a theory, I will not discuss off-line simulation here. For a 
critique of off-line simulation theory see Stich and Nichols (1996). 
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Stich and Ravenscroft (1996) have provided a useful summary of the 
forms that FP could take and their potential for elimination. Their account begins 
by differentiating between internal (based on Lewis' (1970; 1972) accounts) and 
external accounts ofFP. On the external account FP constitutes a theory that 
systematises the 'platitudes' and generalisations to which everybody (or almost 
everybody) in a culture accepts. On this, external account, FP is not the type of 
thing that could be true or false and hence is not a candidate for elimination 
(what I have termed the FFP falls into this category). Since we are concerned 
with the PFP model here, and we have accepted that the PFP is a theory that 
claims to refer to the causes of behaviour (which are necessarily internal) this 
external account is not of much interest to us here. There is, however, an external 
account ofFP, proposed by Greenwood, that is worth considering. Though his 
'culturist' defence ofFP is not quite what Stich and Ravenscroft had in mind by 
an external account, it is plausibly construed as such. 
Greenwood's account is based on the now familiar distinction between 
movement and meaningful action. Greenwood argues that social psychologists 
(but we may extend his argument to cover the social sciences generally) are 
typically not interested in the cause of behaviour, but in how action is interpreted 
as meaningful social behaviour. Thus, according to Greenwood, even if it turned 
out that FP was wrong most of the time about the cause of our actions, or even all 
of the time, this would still not warrant the eliminativist conclusions that 
Churchland and others have drawn. 
The classification of an action as an instance of aggression or dishonesty does not 
presuppose any of a possible variety of competing causal explanations of 
aggression or dishonesty. There is, for example, no inconsistency in supposing that 
some instances of aggression are best explained in terms of motives of revenge. 
that other instances are best explained in terms of eX1'Osure to "violent stimuli" .... 
and that others still are best explained in terms of excitations of the lateral 
hypothalamUs, because the correct description of an action as an instance of 
aggression does not presuppose any of these competing causal explanations of 
aggression. (Greenwood 1991b: 73) 
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The common eliminativist response to this defence ofFP is to note that much of 
FP's characterisation of action is dependent on the intentions the agent had in 
executing those actions. Thus, an action is altruistic if the agent's intentions were 
to perform an action that would be beneficial to others but at a cost to himself 
Similarly, an action is aggressive if it is caused by the intention to cause harm. 
Greenwood's external account ofFP may save its ontology, but it is at the 
expense of the very purpose to which that ontology is typically applied. 
Greenwood's tactic here is to move the emphasis from intentions to the way that 
people represent their actions: 
In attributing shame to another, I mean that that person represents some actions of 
his or hers (intentional object) as personally humiliating and degrading (intensional 
content). Such attributions are true if and only if agents represent particular aspects 
of reality in the particular ways attributed to them, irrespective of the adequacy of 
causal explanations referenCing such psychological states. (Greenwood 1991b: 77) 
This reply presupposes the accuracy of one's self knowledge in the identification 
of phenomenal states, something that has been questioned in recent years. 
Churchland's reply to this type of tactic is to assert (in a Sellarsian fashion) that 
FP is committed to the view that the identification of phenomenal states is itself 
theory governed. And that if the theory that informs the identification of these 
states is mistaken, then so too is the ontology upon which it relies (see 
Churchland 1998). Once again Greenwood's externalism comes to the rescue 
here. Greenwood argues that the identification of phenomenal states does not rely 
on the application of a theory, but on learning how to represent external social 
reality. In the case of shame, for example, Greenwood argues that identifying 
shame is not a matter of discriminating internal states. Rather, it is a matter of 
learning to treat certain actions as 'personally degrading and humiliating'. Thus, 
someone can be said to have learned the concept of shame not when they can 
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identify an internal state but when they can 'articulate this from of representation 
of social reality' (ibid. 83). They need not know, according to Greenwood, that it 
is conventionally classified as shame in their form of social life. The circularity 
in this argument should be glaring. The point of Greenwood's argument was to 
account for the self-knowledge of shame in a manner that was not informed by a 
theory. Greenwood attempts to redefine shame, not in terms of the self-
identification of an internal state, but rather by the way that one learns to 
represent certain actions as degrading and humiliating. The question we must 
now ask is how exactly is one to identify actions that are degrading and 
humiliating'? Degradation and humiliation are internal states which eliminativists 
claim, if FP were true, would require the application of a theory to identify. It is 
incumbent on Greenwood to show how we can learn to represent external reality 
without having to self-identify any internal states, and this is something that 
Greenwood has singularly failed to do. 
Nevertheless, Greenwood is certainly right to redress the balance by 
asserting that at least some folk psychological categories are identified by 
reference to external reality (an aggressive act, a helpful act, an honest act, etc.). 
Whether or not this will grant these categories immunity from elimination, 
however, remains to be seen. In particular those who adopt this line of defence 
owe us an account of how these categories become socially meaningful. In the 
case of shame, for example, I argued that although Greenwood is correct in his 
assertion that self-identification of shame is dependent on learning to represent 
external reality, one can still not self-identify shame without reference to internal 
states. There may be examples of folk psychological categories that are not 
dependent on the self-identification of internal states, but they are typically not 
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the focus of the eliminativists' critique. Moreover, even if it turns out that there 
are folk psychological categories that can be identified without the self-
identification of internal states (identifying another person's behaviour as helpful 
or honest are possible examples), these categories may still prove to be 
candidates for elimination. The trouble is that these states may not survive the 
elimination of the internal states that are identified as the cause of behaviour by 
FP. Thus, for example, ifit turns out that no actions are literally caused by 
revenge, hatred, or a desire to cause harm to another, we may very well choose to 
abandon the classification of actions as aggressive - perhaps replacing it with a 
more neutral term such as harmful. This is one of the categories of action that, if 
epiphenomenalism is true, may see the elimination of folk psychological terms 
from causal explanations. One might see, for example, the growth of pathological 
explanations for criminal behaviour as a precursor to the eventual elimination of 
folk psychology from jurisprudence. 
Stich and Ravenscroft identify a number of elements that an internal 
account ofFP might include. The first way that folk psychological capacities 
might be sub served is by a store of information (possibly in the form of 
propositions or declarative sentences) that can be applied to guide behaviour. A 
second way to construe FP is some combination of both rules and information. In 
this case, for example, the rules might function as a guide for the application of 
the information (but note that there are many possible ways that rules and 
information might interact). The final possibility is as a Fodorian style set of 
internalised rules, which might be either learned or innate, consciously accessible 
or unconscious/tacit, that are applied as guides for problem solving, to 
accomplish tasks, predict others' behaviour and so on. On Fodor's account there 
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need not be any 'central meaner' to understand the rules of the tacit 'theory'. 
Rather, each rule can be broken down into simpler rules which are, in turn, 
composites of 'elementary operations' that can be performed unthinkingly by the 
nervous system (see Fodor 1968). 
Stich and Ravenscroft argue that only the former two options are 
potential candidates for elimination. If the latter option turns out to be the correct 
version, that the system that sub serves our folk psychological capacities (of 
prediction and explanation) consists of all rules and no propositions, then it will 
make no sense to claim that FP is either true or false. Thus Stich and Ravenscroft 
argue that eliminativists who adopt an internal view ofFP must be committed to 
the view that FP isn't all rules and no propositions (129-30). This conclusion 
would only be warranted if the rules made no reference to propositional attitudes. 
However if this were the case then the eliminativist would win by default since 
any system that does not make use of propositional attitudes hardly deserves the 
name ofJolk psychology. On the other hand, assuming the rules relate in some 
way to propositional attitudes, eliminativism is still a viable option. All the 
eliminativist need do is show that propositional attitudes do not exist and they 
will get the elimination of the rules that relate to them for free. If this were the 
ca~e, and the eliminativists get their way, then paradoxically it would guarantee 
causal relevance for propositional attitude terms. This surprising conclusion is 
entailed by the fact that we know humans have the ability to predict one 
another's behaviour. Thus, if these capacities are subserved by a set of rules that 
make reference to propositional attitudes terms, it would be in virtue of our use 
of propositional attitude terms that we are able to predict behaviour - ex 
hypothesi propositional attitude terms would be causally relevant. 
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Conclusion 
I want to conclude this chapter by returning to the concept of causal relevance 
and by exploring how our experience of believing, desiring, etc. fits in with 
supervenience and connectionism. Before doing so it is worth taking stock of the 
ground covered so far. Starting with the classic model, there seems little doubt 
that if the brain turns out to be a connectionist network then cognitive thought 
cannot consist of rule governed symbol manipulation and the classic model must 
be false. I have not spent much time defending this claim because it seems to be 
generally accepted and because the truth or falsity of the classic model has little 
bearing on the social sciences whose methodology is based on something more 
akin to the PFP. The FFP survives untouched by connectionism, I argued, 
because it does not make the sort of empirical claims that could be falsified by 
connectionism or any other empirical theory. Where the FFP does make 
'empirical' claims they are in the form of generalisations and near universally 
accepted platitudes (what Stich and Ravenscroft characterise as an external 
model) and hence cannot be falsified by connectionism. This leaves us with the 
PFP. The PFP, since it purports to be about the causes of people's behaviour, is 
certainly an internal account by Stich and Ravenscroft's standards. As such it is 
the type of theory that could be falsified. In what follows I will argue that the 
PFP can survive the connectionist onslaught but not entirely intact. Specifically I 
will suggest that the PFP is only an adequate causal-explanatory model for those 
cases where behaviour is caused by occurrent states. 
Let's start by stating some uncontroversial observations: 
1. Cognitive thought is experienced (at least some of the time) as verbalised (i.e. 
as a series of words, expressions, and sentences). Propositional attitude terms 
frequently occur in this verbalised thought. However we often also 
experience propositional attitudes without verbalising the experience - we 
can hope, desire, believe, want, and so on, without verbalising these 
experiences. 
2. When we communicate with others we do so using language and 
propositional attitude terms form part of that language. 
3. (From 2) If our brain is a connectionist system then part of its input and 
output is in the form of language, propositional attitudes, declarative 
sentences and the rest. 
To this list we may now add a fairly uncontroversial premise (at least for 
materialists): 
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4. Our internal dialogue containing propositional attitude terms, and the 
experience of propositional attitudes themselves, supervenes on synchronous 
internal states. 
If premise 4 is correct then it would seem to rule out the wholesale elimination of 
propositional attitudes and lend some support to the PFP since: 
5. Ex hypothesi, there must be subvenient neural states that physically realise 
the experience of holding propositional attitudes and using propositional 
attitude terms. Consequently, there must be some neural state one could 
identify as the physical realisation of the use of any given propositional 
attitude term and the experience of propositional attitudes themselves (even if 
those states are merely activation patterns rather than enduring states of the 
system). 
Connectionist motivated eliminativists would not necessarily deny this 
conclusion. What eliminativists would deny is that cognitive processes operate 
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by the manipulation of these aforementioned states (in the manner of the classic 
model). Nor would connectionists deny point 3, that if the brain is a 
connectionist system then its input and output is in the form of language 
containing propositional attitude terms. Rather, connectionist motivated 
eliminativists would claim that the interesting part of cognitive thought, the bit 
between the input and the output, does not contain anything that could be 
identified with propositional attitudes, let alone anything like the rule governed 
manipulation of those propositional attitudes. This is the crux of the matter for 
the PFP, for if there is nothing in the brain that could be identified with beliefs 
then it cannot be true that our beliefs cause our behaviour. 
The eliminativists' claim, however, is only plausible by the strict criteria 
of the classic model. If the brain is a connectionist network then it doesn't look 
like we will find any enduring states that display propositional modularity and 
the classic model will have been proved wrong. The PFP model, however, does 
not typically make any specific claims about whether or not dispositional beliefs 
are enduring states that display propositional modularity. Thus, where 
dispositional beliefs are invoked in explanations of behaviour, a system's 
disposition to realise an activation pattern that could be identified with an 
occurrent realisation of the dispositional belief in question would be compatible 
with most versions of the PFP. Beliefs in this case, however, could not be said to 
literally cause behaviour. Rather, neurally realised dispositional beliefs form part 
of the necessary background conditions for action. Where beliefs are invoked in 
causal explanations all that is required to vindicate the PFP is that beliefs display 
propositional modularity at the point when they cause action and causally 
influence cognitive thought, and activation patterns will adequately fill this role. 
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When behaviour is explained by non-conscious beliefs, however, we have 
no basis for inferring the existence of activation patterns that fulfil these criteria. 
As I noted during my discussion of the PFP, the existence and causal efficacy of 
non-conscious propositional attitudes are hypothesised by PFP to account for 
seemingly purposeful behaviour. For occurrent states supervenience entails the 
existence of a physical base and allows us to make certain inferences about the 
properties belonging to this physical base. No such inferences can be made for 
dispositional states or states whose existence are merely hypothesised. This has 
the unfortunate consequence that if it can't be explained by folk then it can't be 
explained by the PFP. Since academia hopes to go beyond the common sense 
explanations of ordinary folk, it will have to look beyond the PFP to find its 
explanations. 
Returning now to causal relevance, in chapter 2 we accepted Kim's 
multiple realisation thesis and the accompanying hypothesis that mental states 
supervene on physical bases with disjunctive causal powers. The substance of 
this hypothesis was that the causal power of mental content is identical to that of 
its subvenient base, but that the same mental content may be realised by a variety 
of different bases with diverse causal powers. Thus, if the physical realisations of 
beliefs are activation patterns, the causal powers of those activation patterns are 
likely to be disjunctive - on some occasions they may be sufficient (ceteris 
paribus) for action and on others neither necessary nor sufficient. Our final 
conclusion then is rather sketchy. Neither our best case nor our worst case 
scenarios of mental relevance for occurrent states are quite right and the truth 
must lie at some indeterminate point between the two. Or, perhaps, at different 
points for different actions, people, times, and so on. For dispositional 
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propositional attitudes connectionism seems to entail something like our worst 
case scenario. Although it is consistent with connectionism that dispositional 
propositional attitudes (what the PFP would claim are non-conscious beliefs and 
desires fit into this category) support counterfactuals, we are not entitled to claim 
that they literally cause behaviour. If the brain is a connectionist network then to 
refer to non-conscious/dispositional propositional attitudes is to adopt the 
intentional stance. Although the intentional stance may be a useful predictive tool 
it has to be recognised that it cannot supply causal explanations. 
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ChapterS 
Epiphenomenalism 
In chapters 2 and 3 we reviewed all the metaphysically possible solutions to the 
problem of mental causation (or at least all those materialistically kosher 
positions) and found none that are compatible with the three principles outlined 
in the introduction - except for epiphenomenalism that is. Faced with a choice 
between giving up one or more of our three principles or our long standing 
commitment to mental causation, I have opted for the latter. Epiphenomenalism, 
however, is a most unsatisfactory solution which, as we shall see, saddles us with 
just as many problems as it solves. The thought that I, along with the rest of 
humanity, am nothing more than a conscious automaton is not one that I enjoy 
and in truth it is not one that I believe (in the sense of belief versus acceptance 
outlined in chapter 4). The consequences of epiphenomenalism are so counter-
intuitive that I think we would be justified in questioning the sanity of anyone 
who claims to believe it. As Kant pointed out no determinist can choose to sit 
back and wait to see what their beliefs and desires will cause. Similarly, no 
epiphenomenalist can choose to ignore their causally inefficacious phenomenal 
states and wait to see what actions their brains will instigate next. The human 
constitution, it seems, is not capable of embracing either determinism or 
epiphenomenalism as a lifestyle choice. Nevertheless, when I face the intellectual 
choice between giving up my acceptance of materialism and the 
epiphenomenalism that I have argued it entails, or my intuitive belief in mental 
causation, materialism and its unpalatable consequences wins the day. 
To recap, we (reluctantly) adopted epiphenomenalism because we found it to 
be the only position compatible with the following three principles: 
PI The irreducibility of phenomenal states. 
P2 The causal closure of the physical. 
P3 The principle of causal explanatory exclusion. 
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The latter two of these principles have long been accepted as the foundations of 
the materialist perspective and are generally regarded by those working within 
the materialist tradition as uncontroversiaI. Our first principle, which gained 
currency in the latter half of the twentieth century following some convincing 
arguments proposed by Searle, Nagel, and others, is now also generally accepted. 
The current incarnation of the mind-body problem (stemming largely from 
Davidson) concerns the apparent incongruity between these three principles and 
the assumption that mental states are causally efficacious. Our principal goal in 
part I was to review the various attempts to reconcile these principles with the 
assumption of mental causation. I have argued that, to date, all these attempts 
have violated one or other of the three principles. Moreover, I suspect that we 
have now exhausted our stock of metaphysically tenable positions. It will be 
objected that even if one accepts the conclusions of part I (that all previous 
attempts have failed) the future state of knowledge cannot be predicted and a 
satisfactory solution may still be forthcoming. We have seen, however, that the 
devil has not been in the detail. Rather, the detail has served to obscure some 
fundamental and irreconcilable inconsistencies in the materialist position. We 
can, to be sure, expect many more sophisticated theories that putatively 
demonstrate the causal efficacy of mental states. Ultimately, however, any new 
theory will face the ineluctable choice between non-reductive and reductive 
physicalism, assert mental-physical covariance or divergence, and propose 
'upward' or 'downward' causation. Our survey of supervenience and emergence 
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has taken us back and forth within these parameters and we have found no 
position consistent with the three principles set out in the introduction. That is 
not to say that progress had not been made in recent years. The supervenience 
thesis in particular has arguably secured the causal efficacy of mental states that 
can be functionalised (such as mental content) and can, or so I argued, be used to 
demonstrate the causal relevance of phenomenal states. However, as I have 
stressed repeatedly, phenomenal states resist functionalisation in the manner of 
mental states that can be individuated independently of their PE (as in the case of 
the content of propositional attitudes). 
Having exhausted our stock of metaphysically tenable positions we face a 
stark choice, physicalism and PE causation seem irreconcilable and something 
will have to give. Ultimately we must choose between abandoning our 
commitment to one or more of our three principles, or retaining our commitment 
to these principles and accepting epiphenomenalism. This is uncharted territory 
for philosophy and we have few principles to guide our choice. Both positions 
are deeply offensive to our intuitions and ultimately the choice is likely to 
depend on which theory's consequences are more in accord with our world view. 
If we choose the former option, we may retain our belief in mental causation but 
at the expense of our scientific worldview (since this option will probably entail 
some form of dualist interactionism or the radical sense of emergence involving 
emergent powers). Ifwe choose the latter then we solve the problem of mental 
causation, or more accurately we avoid the problem. Nevertheless, this option 
generates some philosophical and epistemological problems of its own and it is 
to these that we will now tum. 
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In this chapter I want to explore the concept of epiphenomenalism in a 
little more depth. Though nothing I will say in this chapter affects our previous 
conclusions this exercise will help to elucidate some of the problems that 
epiphenomenalism generates and to contextualise these problems in relation to 
those of non-reductive physicalism. I also hope to question the basis of our 
dismissive attitude towards epiphenomenalism by contrasting our 
counterintuitive reactions to its consequences with our counterintuitive reactions 
to the consequences of non-reductive physicalism. My aim is to show that 
epiphenomenalism is no better or worse off than contemporary non-reductive 
physicalism and deserves to be given serious attention. 
Evolutionary arguments against epiphenomenalism 
Evolutionary theory presents epiphenomenalism with its greatest embarrassment. 
Having left qualia dangling, we have denied ourselves access to the standard 
Darwinian explanation for their existence. The critique of epiphenomenalism, 
which barely receives a paragraph in most texts, is always of the same form. First 
there is the dogmatic assertion that we all know that mental states are causally 
efficacious. This is followed by the more sophisticated argument that qualia 
aren't brute facts of nature. 1 Rather, they are the consequence of a long 
evolutionary history and that they evolved precisely because they are causally 
efficacious - endowing their possessor with an adaptive advantage. It is then 
claimed that one of the driving forces of evolution is efficiency, and that 
mutations that are high in energy consumption tend to be weeded out unless they 
confer some evolutionary advantage on their possessor. It is further noted that the 
I The only exception to this argwnent comes from panpsychists. Chalmers being the best known 
contemporary advocate. 
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brain consumes a proportionally vast amount of energy and that much of the 
activity of the brain is directly involved in consciousness. The conclusion is that 
the very existence of conscious mental states serves as compelling evidence for 
their causal efficacy. Although there are cases of so called 'spandrels' in nature, 
they are typically low in energy consumption. If qualia are mere spandrels then 
their intensity and degree of complexity is astounding, prima facie 
they are too big for the building to support! 2 
Those who adopt this argument are quite right to note that nature tends 
towards frugality. The trouble with their argument, however, is that it does not 
differentiate between the energy required to generate conscious experience and 
the energy required to generate the neural correlates of conscious experience 
(identity theorists would, of course, get around this problem by claiming that the 
experience and its neural correlate are identical). We do know that much of the 
activity of the brain is related to the performance of tasks with which 
consciousness is associated. However, until we know what (if any) causal 
contribution is made by the experience we will be unable to decide if conscious 
experience is too expensive to hitch a ride on the brain's evolution. IfPE were 
some property of the functional organisation of the brain or of certain biological 
processes, rather than being some distinct 'substance', then no extra energy 
would be required in order to bring it into existence. Indeed I will argue that a 
persuasive case can be made that not only is consciousness not too biologically 
expensive to hitch a ride on the brain's evolution but that it comes at no extra 
~ Spandrel is an architectmal tenn which denotes an ornamental work (that perfonns no structural 
function) designed to fill the gap between the curves of arches and its surrounding rectangular 
mouldings. Gould and Lewontin (1979) borrowed the term to refer to a phenotypic trait that 
perfonns no biological function. 
cost. Moreover, I will suggest that this position is entailed by most materialist 
accounts of mental causation. 
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Suppose that there is some property P of the brain in virtue of which 
consciousness is instantiated. P is invariably implicated in the causal chains with 
which consciousness is associated - it is involved in causing behaviour, it occurs 
as a consequence of environmental stimuli, and it is involved in causing other 
neurological states that also have property P. Suppose also that P consumes the 
lion's share of the brain's energy supply. Even if we knew all there is to know 
about P, I suggest, there is no evidence on the basis of which we could infer that 
consciousness is biologically expensive. I will illustrate this with an example. 
Suppose that all members of the genus car are conscious and that there is some 
property P of the engines of cars in virtue of which cars are conscious. Some 
species, it turns out, have much more complex conscious lives than others. The 
Smart car is only minimally aware of its environment while the Jaguar XKR has 
a sophisticated understanding and awareness of traction control, aerodynamics 
and sound proofing (amongst other things). Mechanics, we might imagine, will 
one day discover the property that is instantiated in the engines of cars in virtue 
of which they are conscious. Suppose it turns out that it is the property of being a 
piston chamber that instantiates consciousness in cars (is the property in virtue of 
which cars are conscious). Smart cars with their meagre 698cc engines 
consequently have much simpler conscious lives than Jaguar XKRs with their 
massive 4.2 litre V8s. Piston chambers consume almost all of the energy 
available to cars since it is there that combustion occurs. No mechanic in their 
right mind, however, would claim that the property of being a piston chamber is 
too expensive to hitch a ride on the evolution of the car. Though there are many 
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other mechanisms that could have performed the piston chamber's function more 
efficiently (perhaps electric motors might have been more efficient), being a 
piston chamber is an absolutely indispensable evolutionary trait for the species 
Jaguar XKR. Notice that all the energy consumed by the piston chamber is 
accounted for - some is lost as heat, some turned into kinetic energy, and so on. 
There is no energy left over to produce car-consciousness. Ipso facto if you 
belong to the genus car and you have a piston chamber you get consciousness for 
free. 
An exactly parallel argument can be constructed for the property P of the 
brain that instantiates consciousness, whatever that property turns out to be. No 
matter what property or properties instantiate consciousness in humans - whether 
it is functional, relates to biological hardware, occurs at the quantum or atomic 
level - the property must participate in a causal chain. Assuming it does so then, 
just as with combustion in a piston chamber, all the energy consumed by the 
physical states that instantiate the property will be accounted for. If you are a 
human and have P you get consciousness for free. 
If one accepts, as I do, that PE is irreducible then this is, I think, a 
compelling argument against contemporary materialist theories of mind. To 
pursue the above analogy, any microphysical states or effects of the piston 
chamber must be caused, according to materialism, by antecedent microphysical 
states. As such there is no causal work left over for car-consciousness to perform. 
If conscious states have causal powers they must utilise some energy in 
exercising those powers (again according to materialism). Assuming that all the 
engine's energy supply is accounted for by microphysical causal relations, 
however, there is no energy left over for consciousness and car-consciousness 
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must be epiphenomenal. Those who view the evolutionary argument against 
epiphenomenalism as compelling had, for that reason, better look towards 
emergence for their theory of mental causation. Only if consciousness exhibits 
emergent powers would the presence of consciousness result in greater energy 
consumption than that of its physical realisation alone. Materialism will not 
tolerate missing energy or events without a cause since both would be a violation 
ofP2. If such events were to occur then materialism would be false and some 
version of emergence or dualism would be vindicated. 
The evolutionary argument against epiphenomenalism, however, is a 
double edged sword. We have yet to consider the argument that PE would not 
exist if it were not causally efficacious. I have to confess that I can neither 
provide nor know of any convincing counterarguments. Epiphenomenalism 
seems to entail that PE is just a brute fact of nature. Such a statement is not likely 
to be met with anything other than disdain by those who argue in favour of 
mental causation. It is worth remembering, however, that as a brute fact of nature 
PE is in distinguished company. The metaphysical question, 'Why is there 
something rather than nothing?' no longer prompts scientists into providing 
teleological explanations that cite some divine will. What's more, whenever a 
divine will has been invoked to explain the existence of the physical universe, it 
is the creator's existence that becomes the unexplained fact. Although I think that 
we should always continue the search for answers to such metaphysical 
questions, we should at least recognise the possibility that ajust so story is all 
there is to tell. 
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Epiphenomenalism and epistemology 
Although I believe epiphenomenalism is the most plausible doctrine regarding 
mental-physical causal relations, it contains numerous inconsistencies that make 
it far from ideal. Specifically, epiphenomenalism generates some serious 
epistemological problems relating to both self-knowledge and the problem of 
other minds. Epiphenomenalism, it will be remembered, states that PE has no 
causal influence on physical states although it is caused by them. By endorsing 
the supervenience thesis we have also ruled out the possibility that the PE has 
any casual influence on future mental states. The reason for this is that 
supervenience states that mental properties are dependent on synchronous 
internal physical states. Thus antecedent mental states are entirely inefficacious -
they affect neither mind nor matter. Prima facie the phenomenology of self-
conscious awareness seems to refute this. I am aware of phenomenal states not 
physical states and I could not be aware of phenomenal states unless they had 
some causal powers. In other words, when I react to the sights and sounds around 
me I react not to the neurophysiological cause of my perceptions but to the qualia 
themselves (or at least this is how I experience my interaction with the world). 
Thus, if I am waiting for a bus, I do not experience (directly) the event in the 
external world of the bus's arrival as causing me to think, • Ah good the bus.' 
Rather, I experience my thought, • Ah good the bus' as being caused by my 
having noticed a big red phenomenal object appearing in my visual field. In such 
cases it is the big red phenomenal object that I am aware of and not whatever is 
going on in my primary visual cortex (or so the OMRists' story goes). 
There are two issues here and we must be careful at this point to clearly 
differentiate them. The first relates to the putative causal powers of the big red 
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phenomenal object. The reason we were persuaded by epiphenomenalism is that, 
as physicalists, we believe that there must be a complete causal account that 
explains our noticing the arrival of the bus which does not cite phenomenal 
states. Such a story might include such things as the surface of the bus reflecting 
light waves with a frequency of 600 nanometers, light hitting the retina, nerve 
impulses passing down the optic nerve and the neurophysiological events going 
on in the primary visual cortex, but would make no mention of the big red 
phenomenal object (or quale). Since we have rejected the idea that the big red 
Quale might be identical to any of the things mentioned in our story, it follows 
that the big red Quale is epiphenomenal. Thus, although it appears to us that we 
are reacting to qualia, if epiphenomenalism is true then qualia do not from part of 
the causal chain that links perceptions and reactions. I use the term perceptions 
here (and in what follows) to refer to our ability to acquire true beliefs about the 
world. In the context of the foregoing discussion I take it that this ability is 
sub served by neurophysiological events, with the conscious experience of qualia 
being their epiphenomenal consequence. Thus, by stating that we react to our 
perceptions, I mean that our behaviour is caused (in part), not by our reacting to 
qualia, but by the antecedent neurophysiological events that subserve perception. 
The real problem here relates not to the putative causal powers of qualia 
on action and thought but to the epistemological question of how we can come to 
be aware of our phenomenal states at all. In the above story, when the bus rounds 
the comer, I not only experience a big red Quale but I know that I am 
experiencing a big red quale. The trouble with this is that if phenomenal states 
really are epiphenomenal then we have to ask ourselves how we know that they 
exist. In other words, how can we know of the existence of a property that has no 
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causal powers? Clearly though, we are all aware that phenomenal states exist, we 
can predict their occurrence, philosophise about their role in mental causation 
and alter the physical world by (inter alia) writing books about them. 
Epiphenomenalism, therefore, is prima facie self-refuting. As an 
epiphenomenalist, of course, I am committed to arguing that our self-conscious 
awareness of our conscious states is also an epiphenomenal consequence of 
physical events. It seems counterintuitive, however, to claim that the subvenient 
base for self-consciousness would exist in the absence of the PE of self-
consciousness. It is not hard to imagine the evolution of complex neural 
structures, such as those that sub serve pain behaviour (we will call these 
structures physical pain), in the absence of the phenomenal experience of pain 
(phenomenal pain for short). That is to say, I can happily accept that it is a 
contingent fact that physical pain causes phenomenal pain and that the evolution 
of physical pain would have occurred in just the same way regardless of whether 
physical pain had caused or realised phenomenal pain. To return to the 
distinction between belief and acceptance, as an epiphenomenalist I am happy to 
accept that the evolution of the brain was unaffected by the presence ofPE. In 
the case of physical and phenomenal pain I believe that physical pain would have 
evolved in just the same way regardless of the presence or absence of 
phenomenal pain. However, when I consider all PE, and self-consciousness in 
particular, I no longer find it intuitively plausible (that is, I no longer believe it to 
be possible) that the brain's evolution would have occurred in just the same way 
without PE. Moreover, it seems even more incredible that the ontogenetic 
development of the brain is unaffected by the presence ofPE. Although I accept 
that epiphenomenalism is true I cannot believe that a molecule for molecule 
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identical world populated by automatons could contain philosophers who wony 
about the causal efficacy of non-existent qualia. To put this in the starkest 
possible terms, as an epiphenomenalist I am committed to claiming that had I 
been born an automaton with no conscious experience I would still have written 
a thesis entitled The Epiphenomenal Mind. 
It is easy to be seduced by these sorts of worries into conceiving of the 
brain as some form of Cartesian theatre upon which our mental lives are played 
out. It seems that the brain must somehow be 'aware' of the existence ofPE in 
order to account for the possibility of self-knowledge and the fact that discourse 
about PE forms part of the physical world. The idea of a Cartesian theatre, 
though, only serves to complicate matters without solving any of the fundamental 
problems. Nevertheless, it is worth thinking through what such a Cartesian 
theatre might look like since this will help to elucidate the problems faced by 
epiphenomenalism. To that end I present the following analogy which also helps 
to clarify some of the problems faced by non-reductive physicalism. 
Suppose that some scientist designed a conscious robot, we will call it Art 
after Davidson's robot in The Material Mind. Now suppose that Art is fully self-
conscious and experiences the world much as we do. He is in possession of fully-
fledged propositional attitudes, experiences pain and pleasure and even has a 
theory of mental causation. However, Art's mental states are epiphenomenal, 
they are caused by events in Art's circuitry but they have no causal influence on 
either Art's circuitry or on his future mental states. Suppose also that the 
scientist, we will continue the theme and call him Donald, is in complete control 
of Art's actions - perhaps via some handset such as those used to control 
computer games. Now suppose that Donald has had a long standing interest in 
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cybernetics and he has figured out a way of transmitting and translating the 
electrical patterns upon which Art's conscious states supervene directly into his 
own nervous system. Much to Donald's delight he found that he was able to 
experience the world exactly as Art does, he experiences the pain that Art feels 
when he skids into a wall and the pleasure that Art feels when he is oiled and his 
batteries recharged. In this scenario we will further imagine that Donald is still 
self-conscious and retains complete control of Art (via his computer console). If 
this fantasy scenario were to transpire then we can assume that Donald would do 
everything in his power to ensure that Art experienced only pleasurable 
sensations. Donald would take great care, when playing with Art, not to lose 
control and let him skid into walls and he would ensure that Art was well 
maintained, oiled, and his batteries recharged regularly. 
Ifwe allow the analogy to be stretched further into the realms of science 
fiction, we might imagine that Donald can become so absorbed with his new toy 
(in the manner that a child might become engrossed in a computer game) that he 
temporarily loses all sense of self He begins to experience the world as Art. Just 
as a child might become so engrossed in a computer game that they react 
unthinkingly to the stimuli on the computer screen, Donald begins to react 
automatically to the stimuli that Art experiences. Now, instead of reacting to 
Art's desire to be recharged by thinking, 'I experience Art's desire for __ ' 
Donald's unconscious brain is doing the thinking for him, when Art experiences 
a desire Donald's brain takes the appropriate actions to fulfil the desire. 
In effect, Donald's brain has become a Cartesian theatre upon which 
Art's mental states are played out. Instead of the Cartesian self, however, the 
audience is composed of a few pounds of neurons, glial cells and the rest, 
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arranged in such a way as to minimise Art's pain and maximise Art's pleasure. 
Now suppose we replace Donald, in our analogy, with evolution and Art with an 
'unintended' and fortuitous consequence. We might suppose that evolution hit 
upon the idea of a conscious self as an indicator of the relative fitness of the 
organism. One of the main problems with epiphenomenalism is in accounting for 
the correspondence between the function and feel of mental states (i.e. why, if 
the PE of mental states is epiphenomenal, do harmful stimuli cause pain rather 
than pleasure), this analogy solves that problem by making phenomenal states an 
indicator of the state of the organism. 
Although this analogy may strike one as (briefly) plausible we soon find 
that we have come full circle and face exactly the same problems that we sought 
to solve. To recap, we initially adopted epiphenomenalism because we could not 
find a place for the PE of mental states within our physicalist ontology and 
because we were unwilling to adopt any form of dualist interactionism. We now 
face exactly the same problems with the conscious robot analogy. That is to say, 
we are still left with the problem of explaining how the PE of Art's mental states 
can have any effect on Donald's brain. We got around this problem initially by 
making the subvenient base of Art's phenomenal states do the causal work but 
we must now confront the fact that we have merely added a further layer of 
complexity (Art's phenomenal states and the circuitry upon which they 
supervene) without solving any of our problems. The PE of Art's mental states is 
epiphenomenal. All the causal work is being done by their subvenient base. Thus 
in our analogy Donald is not reacting to Art's PEs but to the electrical events in 
his circuitry (the circuitry upon which Art's PEs supervene). Although this 
scenario is ridiculous in the extreme, it is worth remembering that this is 
precisely the set of problems that confronts non-reductive physicalism and for 
which they, as yet, have no solution. 
Knowing one's own mind 
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Epiphenomenalism also forces us to confront some profound issues relating to 
self-knowledge, introspection, and the nature of the self We will consider the 
nature of the self in part IL at this stage I want to focus on the problems 
epiphenomenalism generates for self-knowledge and introspection. Specifically 
we need to consider how one can be aware of perceptions, sensations and 
thoughts. As we have already touched upon above, this is a separate problem 
from mental causation or the problem of how the physical world can contain 
discourse about epiphenomenal states. 
'Are you in pain?' is the sort of question that one can normally answer 
without the need for the type of introspection that might accompany questions 
such as 'Do you believe that p?' There are, of course, borderline cases such as 
the lack of concern one has for one's pain when on morphine, the ability to 
ignore chronic pain, or the threshold between discomfort and pain. Taking the 
last case as an example, if someone on the threshold of discomfort and pain is 
asked if they are in pain they may have to reflect on the nature of their sensation. 
In such cases, however, they do not discover pain that they were previously 
unaware of, rather, the focus of their attention serves to amplify the sensation 
such that it becomes painful. In such cases focussing on the sensation of 
discomfort may literally cause discomfort to become pain. These observations 
are neither original nor contentious; I mention them only to highlight the fact that 
PE is necessarily conscious. The second important point is that we experience a 
distinction between the sensation (thought or perception) and the self which is 
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the subject of conscious experience. We do not experience the self as a bundle of 
sense perceptions and thoughts (as Hume would have it). Regardless of the way 
one conceives of the self, the inescapable fact remains that we draw a distinction 
between different thoughts, sensations, and perceptions, each of which we 
confront as the object( s) of our conscious awareness, and the self. Armstrong 
defines introspection as ' ... a mental event having as its (intentional) object other 
mental happenings that form part of the same mind' (Armstrong 1994: 109). 
Since, according to Armstrong, a mental event can not be aware of itself, 
introspection must involve what he terms a 'self-scanning' process. Thus, 
becoming aware of a mental state requires a second mental state to scan the 
object of introspection. As a means of escaping the inevitable infinite regress 
entailed by this argument (where we require a third mental state to introspect the 
second, and a forth to introspect the third ... ), Armstrong claims there must be an 
'unscanned scanner' or self. Thus, for Armstrong, the self is conceived as that 
which is doing the scanning at any given time. If our version of 
epiphenomenalism is true then it should be obvious that this conception of the 
self and introspection requires modification. In our version, the job of scanning 
(that is becoming aware of a mental state) is not a function of the self or of any 
mental event. Rather, if epiphenomenalism is true, 'introspection' is a function of 
neural events and bears no causal relation to the PE that is the putative object of 
introspective awareness. 
Since epiphenomenalism entails that there is no self doing the 
introspecting, or any mental state having as its object other mental states, we are 
forced to argue that phenomenal states are intrinsically' self-conscious'. We can 
best approach this issue by considering the following question: Would we know 
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that we were in pain if pain were the only thing that we experienced? We would 
not, of course, be able to think reflexively about the sensation - we could not say 
to ourselves 'I am in pain' - since this would constitute an experience distinct 
from the pain (a mental state having the pain as its object of introspection). 
Nevertheless, though we may lack the cognitive recourses to label the sensation, 
there are no good reasons why a state of pure pain should not be possible. If this 
is the case then epiphenomenalism presents us with no special problems for self-
knowledge. 
Clearly though, this entails that cases of putative self-knowledge are 
merely illusions in the sense that saying or thinking 'I am in pain' is an event 
completely unconnected with the PE of pain. This presents us with the following 
picture which contrasts with the traditional model where self-knowledge relates 
directly to the PE: 
pheno enal pain the phenomenal experience 
'ouch!' 
physical pain -------------~. physical state having 
physical pain as its object of' introspection' 
Fig 5. I Epiphenomenalism and self-consciousness 
If this model of introspection is accurate then epiphenomenalism suggests 
that the problem of self-knowledge is merely a grammatical illusion generated by 
the use of the personal pronoun in relation to PE (as in, I am in pain). If the 
version of epiphenomenalism being developed here is correct then there is no I to 
experience pain. Rather, there are a succession of (directly) unconnected 
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phenomenal experiences, phenomenal pain followed by the PE 'ouch' as in the 
above diagram, for example. Though few endorse epiphenomenalism, the idea 
that we do not have direct access to qualia, that instead we are constituted by 
them, is fairly common. Clark expresses this possibility as follows: 'we can't, 
finally, say what it's like to have qualia since we don't have a first person 
perspective on them: we don't 'have' them at all, neither do they 'appear' to us, 
nor are we 'directly acquainted' with them. We, as subjects, exist as them' (Clark 
1998: 51). We are, of course, left with Hume's binding problem: what causes this 
succession of phenomenal experiences to be experienced as belonging to a single 
subject. However, as I will argue later in this thesis, ifI am correct in advocating 
epiphenomenalism then Hume's binding problem is a one for the neurologists to 
ponder and one that I am unqualified to answer. 
Ontological implications of epiphenomenalism 
Thus far we have focussed on the relationship between mental and physical states 
in the context of causation. We have dealt with the ontological nature of the 
content of mental states by showing that it is reducible to (perhaps even token-
token identical with) physical states in the brain - thereby guaranteeing its causal 
efficacy. However, we have yet to consider the ontological status ofPE. The 
irreducibility of PE was the principal reason why we concluded that it must be 
epiphenomenal but its irreducibility also has important ontological implications. 
Specifically, we have to confront the worry that the irreducibility ofPE entails 
that it is non-physical. To explicate, we have concluded that PE (say the PE of a 
pain in my foot) is caused by, but not identical with, events in the brain (in this 
case some event in my somatosensory cortex). The question we must now 
address is what has been brought into existence when an event in my 
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somatosensory cortex causes the experience of pain in my foot. Or, alternatively, 
what has been modified by the event in my somatosensory cortex causing a pain 
in my foot. If we claim that some material substance has been brought into 
existence, or in some way modified, then there would seem to be no good reason 
why this material substance should not be capable of causally interacting with the 
brain region with which it is spatio-temporally coexistent. Indeed, as Popper 
(1977: 72) notes, the idea that there could be something which can be acted upon, 
but which cannot act, is likely to contradict Newton's third law of the equality of 
action and reaction. Though Popper applies this as a general argument against 
epiphenomenalism, regardless of the ontological status of the epiphenomenal 
property, it only holds when the epiphenomenal property is physical (after all one 
can hardly expect a law relating to the material universe to apply to non-material 
substances, if there are indeed such things). 
The real problem with the possibility that PE is some material substance, 
however, is that it would seem to contradict our first principle. The principle of 
the irreducibility of PE, it will be remembered, states not that PE is irreducible to 
neural states but that PE is irreducible to physical states. Thus ifPE were some 
material substance brought into existence by events in the brain it would be 
irreducible to those states and we would have the start of an infinite regress. 
Alternatively we could embrace some form of dualism, either property or 
substance dualism. However, as I will argue below, I doubt that property dualism 
(where the two properties in question are physical and phenomenal) is consistent 
with epiphenomenalism. Property dualism (or double aspect theory) states that 
one thing, a person, can have both mental and physical properties and that neither 
of these properties can be reduced to the other. This is a perfectly consistent 
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position with regard to the description of mental and physical properties (c.r my 
discussion of Davidson's Anomalous Monism in chapter 2) but faces problems 
when the properties in question are intrinsic. To say that the pain in my foot is a 
property of a physical event in my somatosensory cortex implies that the pain is 
identical to the physical event (or an aspect of it), and this is something which I 
have strenuously denied. I experience the pain in my foot as being located in my 
foot (that is to say, the spatio-temporae location of my phenomenal pain is 
different from the spatio-temporallocation of my physical pain), property 
dualists would argue that this experience is an illusion, that the physical pain and 
phenomenal pain are both properties of a single physical event located in the 
somatosensory cortex. However, I have argued at some length (following Searle) 
that where PE is concerned the illusion is the reality. Accepting this has the 
consequence that (in this case) the pain is literally in my foot and cannot, 
therefore, be a property of an event in my somatosensory cortex. 
To elaborate, one line that an epiphenomenalist might adopt is that the PE 
of pain is analogous to the colour properties of chlorophyll. Being green is, after 
all, epiphenomenal with respect to photosynthesis. Such a position has the 
advantage that it would not fall foul of the evolutionary argument against 
epiphenomenalism. Despite being epiphenomenal with respect to photosynthesis, 
chlorophyll's instantiating the property of being green is not a biologically 
expensive trait. Moreover, there is a perfectly legitimate physical explanation for 
the greenness of chlorophyll. The trouble is that the property of being green is 
(token-token) identical to the tendency of chlorophyll to reflect light waves of a 
3 The temporal aspect of this argument concerns the possibility that phenomenal pain occurs after 
physical pain. This is implied by the claim that phenomenal pain is caused by physical pain and 
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particular frequency. Greenness and the property of reflecting light waves of a 
specific frequency are temporally and spatially coextensive. PE, I have argued, 
fails this identity criterion and cannot, therefore, be identical to a property of a 
physical state. 
This restricts our choice to an unsatisfactory version of materialism, 
where we postulate the existence of some material substance devoid of causal 
powers, or substance dualism. Although substance dualism (where the non-
material substance is epiphenomenal) is consistent with our three principles -
causal closure, causal explanatory exclusion, and the irreducibility of mental 
states - it seriously undermines the metaphysical position from which these 
principles are derived. Ifwe were to accept substance dualism, therefore, we 
would have to at least question our commitment to the three principles, if not 
abandon them altogether. Moreover, it is a small step from accepting substance 
dualism to embracing full blown dualist interactionism. After all, if matter has 
the potential to generate some non-material 'substance' there is no reason to 
suppose that this 'substance' should not be able to causally interact with the 
matter from whence it sprang. To my knowledge there has never been any 
serious attempt to elucidate the ontological nature of non-material substances 
(such as Cartesian or Platonic souls, for example) in the way that physicists have 
done with physical substances. However, substance dualism has always been 
associated with dualist interactionism and this is a view which we have already 
rejected. 
by our discussion of neuronal adequacy in ch. 2. For the purposes of this argument a spatial 
difference is sufficient and nothing hangs on there also being a temporal difference. 
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There is one more option open to us but I confess that I find it even less 
plausible than the first two. We could attempt to argue that PE is the arrangement 
of matter, rather than matter itself, as functionalists might want to argue. 
However, not only would such a move prompt the well known arguments against 
functionalism4 but it would entail that PE is (token-token) identical with the 
arrangement of matter which instantiates it. Token-token identity, as we have 
already seen, would violate the principle of the irreducibility of PE. (It should be 
noted that we cannot appeal to supervenience to avoid the identity thesis because 
supervenience is not an ontological thesis.) 
It might seem like the version of epiphenomenalism being developed here 
leaves too many loose ends, and forces us to accept too many counterintuitive 
conclusions, to warrant serious attention. However, the problems associated with 
epiphenomenalism are no greater than those faced by the contemporary 
materialist theories of mental causation. In opting for epiphenomenalism one 
merely trades one set of problems (of finding a place for PE in a world of 
physical causes) for the ontological, evolutionary, and epistemological problems 
that have been the subject of this chapter. Moreover, by choosing 
epiphenomenalism we have merely traded one set of counter-intuitive 
consequences for another; the only difference is that materialism has been around 
long enough for us to have become comfortable with its counter-intuitive 
elements. 
To return briefly to the distinction between acceptance and belief, Popper 
makes the point that even Einstein never accepted (in a similar sense to the way 
that I have been using the term belief) the general theory of relativity and that: 
~ See. e.g. Block (1978) 
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'science may be regarded as a growing system of problems, rather than as a 
system of beliefs. And for a system of problems, the tentative acceptance of a 
theory or a conjecture means hardly more than that it is considered worthy of 
further criticism' (Popper 1994: 103). For the reasons that I have outlined above, 
I do believe that contemporary theories of mental causation are wrong, but I 
would not wish to say more of epiphenomenalism than that it is worthy of further 
criticism. If nothing else pushing the argument for epiphenomenalism as far as it 
will go will help us to work out what is wrong with epiphenomenalism. And, 
who knows, working out what is wrong with epiphenomenalism might even help 
furnish us with a final solution to the mind-body problem. 
Part II: Epiphenomenalism and Social Theory 
Chapter 6 
Making Mind Matter More 
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My experience of wanting to know the time did not cause me to consult my 
watch, but neither was I merely following the stage directions in the 
situationalists' script. L qua conscious subject, may only be a passive by-product 
of physical processes, but I am nevertheless a product of endogenous processes. 
There is, therefore, a very real sense in which I am a self-creation and more than 
just a gift of society. I spent part I of this thesis making mind matter less by 
arguing that the conscious mind is devoid of causal powers. Paradoxically, I now 
want to spend part II making mind matter more in social theorising and empirical 
research. That is to say, despite having claimed that the mind is devoid of causal 
powers I still want to argue that an understanding of a person's mental life is of 
key importance in providing a causal explanation of their behaviour. There will, 
of course, be certain limits on the type of mental events that, given 
epiphenomenalism, may be legitimately employed in casual explanations. This 
chapter will begin to address where these limits should be placed. Following 
these preliminary remarks the discussion will be expanded over the course of the 
chapters which follow (which deal with the self, rationality, and action 
respectively). As will become clear over the course of this chapter, although 
epiphenomenalism allows us to rule out phenomenal states as having any causal 
role, it does not provide much of an insight into how we should treat the content 
of mental states or accounts. As I noted in chapter 4, whether or not propositional 
attitudes tum out to be functionally discrete and semantically evaluable states (as 
defenders ofPFP maintain) will have important implications for how we should 
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go about causally explaining behaviour. This is an issue which is independent of 
the debate on mental causation versus epiphenomenalism. The version of 
epiphenomenalism that is being developed here holds that PE is epiphenomenal 
but does not deny that the content of mental states (conceived as neurally realised 
information) may be causally efficacious. Epiphenomenalism is, therefore, 
insensitive to whether PE supervenes on neural states that display the triad of 
characteristics identified by Ramsey et at (and discussed in chapter 4) or whether 
it supervenes on some property of a connectionist network (or, indeed, any other 
alternative). 
Since the connectionism versus FP debate is still in its infancy it seems 
unwise for the social sciences to take sides at this stage - especially considering 
the fundamental methodological consequences that would result from their 
endorsing connectionism. Nevertheless it doesn't do any harm to be aware of the 
debate and start to consider its potential impact on the social sciences. More 
specifically, it might be helpful to be aware of which types of mental event 
causation can survive both epiphenomenalism and connectionism, if the latter 
turns out to be the correct theory of mind, and which it would be prudent to treat 
with a little more suspicion. Some of our conclusions regarding folk psychology 
and connectionism in chapter 4 are applicable here and will be expanded upon 
below. If epiphenomenalism and connectionism both tum out to be true then the 
consequences for our understanding of mental causation will be more far-
reaching than if epiphenomenalism and the PFP tum out to be true. With this in 
mind I will tend to focus on the implications of epiphenomenalism plus 
connectionism in the remainder of this thesis, but will often examine the 
implications of both scenarios. 
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At this stage it might be worth reminding ourselves of the substance of 
our third principle, the principle of causal explanatory exclusion. This principle 
states that there can only be one complete and independent causal explanation of 
behaviour. The principle does not, however, rule out the possibility that there 
may be both physical and rationalising explanations of behaviour. Rather, the 
principle rules out the possibility that there may be a rationalising explanation 
and a physical explanation that are both complete and independent causal 
explanations. Given that our second principle, the principle of causal closure of 
the physical, arguably entails that there will always be a complete physical 
explanation for behaviour that cites only microphysical causal interaction., 
rationalising explanations must always clarify their relationship to 'in principle' 
physical explanations. In what follows we will assume that connectionism turns 
out to be true and provides something which comes close to the complete 
physical explanation of behaviour that our second principle states must exist. We 
can then begin to consider how different types of explanation relate to 
connectionism. 
In chapters 1 and 2 we saw how PE is causally relevant in virtue of its 
supervenience on causally efficacious physical states. In chapter 4 it was further 
suggested that when propositional attitudes are consciously held it must be the 
case that the content of those propositional attitudes is physically realised. 
Moreover I argued that the content of consciously held propositional attitudes 
must be physically realised regardless of whether or not the brain turns out to be 
a connectionist network. Thus PE was again shown to be causally relevant 
because consciously held propositional attitudes are linked to action by a form of 
epiphenomenal causation. Unfortunately this causal relevance cannot be 
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exploited for predictive or explanatory purposes. Since if epiphenomenalism 
turns out to be true phenomenal states have no effects whatsoever, the individual 
who is experiencing them cannot directly report them and they cannot be 
detected by any scientific instrument (if they could they would not be 
epiphenomenal since to be detectable is to have causal powers). The claim, 
therefore, that PE is causally relevant is to say the least somewhat misleading. 
What we really mean is that PE would be causally relevant ifthere were some 
means of telling when and what a person experiences. 
Now the easy way out of this quandary would be to claim that actors' 
accounts of their actions, their citing of reasons, beliefs, hopes, and so on, 
covaries in a systematic and reliable way with their PEs. One could then say that 
if Jon says he wants to know the time, his account refers to his phenomenal time 
desire. We could then use the causal relevance of his phenomenal time desire to 
predict Jon's action of looking at his watch. This scenario is more or less what 
common sense would suggest and is how most academics treated accounts before 
the rise of social situationalism. Things, however, are not quite that simple. In 
order for Jon's speech act to refer to his phenomenal time desire, Jon would 
require access to his phenomenal time desire and this access is inconsistent with 
epiphenomenalism. How then are we to treat a person's accounts of their 
actions? Are we to assume that there is no relationship at all between an agent's 
accounts, their phenomenal experiences, and their actions? This would seem 
rather implausible. We can certainly assume that there is a determinate 
relationship between accounts and actions (though this, as we shall see in the 
final chapter, is not an assumption that is universally held). Such a relationship 
not only seems intuitively obvious but can be, and indeed is, demonstrated 
empirically on a daily basis since the very possibility of meaningful 
communication is dependent upon such a relationship. 
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Nevertheless, the conclusion that is imposed on us by accepting 
epiphenomenalism is that PE does not enter into the causal chain that culminates 
in actions and accounts. As we shall see, this does not mean that there is no 
relationship between PE and accounts, but it does mean that the relationship is 
not causal. 
phenomenal time desire 
--------+. checking of watch 
prompt for ------... memory -------tftccount 
explanation 
Fig. 6.1 The relationship between PE and accounts 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the relationship between PE, actions and accounts from an 
epiphenomenalist perspective. In line with epiphenomenalism there can be no 
direct causal relationship between PE and either accounts or actions, but there is 
a direct causal relationship between the content of mental states (defined in terms 
of neurally realised information and functional physical states) and actions and 
accounts. This relationship allows us to explain why accounts are useful tools for 
the explanation of individuals' conduct. Of course the neurological story that 
underpins this model, were one available, would be considerably more complex. 
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For a start different brain regions are involved in the initiation of movement and 
linguistic ability so accounts and actions can not be directly linked by the same 
neural structures. In the above representation all these processes have been 
combined under the category of memory. Memory here is to be construed as the 
physical recall of neurally realised information. As I pointed out in chapter 4, 
how that information is stored, as a set of connection weights or as functionally 
discrete propositional attitudes and propositional memories, will have important 
implications for how we treat accounts. These implications will be developed in 
this chapter and those that follow. Although the details of the causal chain may 
elude us, if epiphenomenalism is true and there is a determinate relationship 
between actions and accounts, then it must be the case that actions and accounts 
are linked by a causal chain of neural events. 
If the model outlined in figure 6.1 is along the right lines then 
connectionism may prove to be compatible with the standard FP and social 
scientific explanatory models for cases when a person cites propositional 
attitudes in their accounts. As I noted in chapter 4, however, even where 
propositional attitudes are realised by a connectionist network, and are causally 
efficacious in causing actions, it is unlikely that they will provide the complete 
cause. The reason is that the subvenient base for consciously held propositional 
attitudes (in the form of activation patterns) may form part of a larger neural state 
that is itself the cause of action. 
Where connectionism poses a more serious threat is for cases where 
propositional attitudes are hypothesised to account for what appears to be 
purposeful behaviour (as when the existence of causally efficacious propositional 
attitudes are hypothesised to have caused observed behaviour or when non-
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conscious beliefs and desires are invoked in causal explanations). In such cases 
there is no means of establishing whether the behaviour in question was indeed 
caused by physical states that were the physical realisations of propositional 
attitudes (perhaps in the form of activation patterns) or if the behaviour was 
caused by physical processes that instantiated no mental content and caused no 
PEs. 
Connectionism poses less of a threat to accounts that cite external factors. 
We can treat accounts that refer to external factors as referring more directly to 
the cause of behaviour than accounts which cite internal factors such as 
'motives', 'intentions', 'reasons', and so on. This is because reasons that cite 
external factors refer to objective features of external reality (we do, of course, 
need to explain how knowledge of external reality is possible given 
epiphenomenalism, but we shall leave this task until our discussion of rationality 
in chapter 8). External factors can only causally influence behaviour, according 
to epiphenomenalism, by having an effect on the internal physical states that are 
themselves the cause ofbehavioUf. When citing an external factor, however, it 
does not much matter whether the internal physical state it causes is an activation 
pattern or a functionally discrete and semantically evaluable state. As the 
following examples highlight, however, most actions are caused by both internal 
and external factors. These factors are then run together in accounts which means 
that in practice the distinction will rarely be clear cut. The following examples 
illustrate this point: 
(i.) 'I chopped more firewood because it was a cold evening.' This account 
cites external reasons for action and is a sufficient causal explanation that 
does not require supplementation with internal causes. FPists typically 
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want to extend such explanations to include beliefs, such as 'x believed 
that the best way to stay warm would be to chop more wood for the fire, ' 
and desires, like 'x wanted to get warm.' Such additions are appropriate 
within the PFP explanatory framework when the aim is a precise causal 
explanation but are unnecessary for more general explanations since they 
are logically entailed by the more parsimonious account. Within an 
epiphenomenalist ontology based on connectionism, however, such 
additions are not only unnecessary but spurious. As we saw in chapter 4, 
if connectionism is true, the only physical states that possess content 
displaying propositional modularity are those that generate a PE with 
content. Thus unless it was in the conscious mind of the wood chopper 
that he desired warmth, and believed that the best way to get warm was 
by chopping more wood for the fire, then such states cannot form part of 
a causal explanation for the action. Nevertheless, temperature, as an 
objective feature of external reality, can still be invoked in causal 
explanations of wood chopping behaviour regardless of whether the PFP 
or the most radical version of connectionism (or any other possible 
explanation) turns out to be true. 
(ii.) 'I don't want to tackle that overhang so I am going to avoid it by 
traversing to the left.' In this type of explanation the external world, in 
the form of an overhang, has had a causal impact on a climber's choice of 
route. The existence of the overhang is a partial explanation for the 
climber's decision to traverse but, assuming the overhang is within the 
climber's abilities, a complete causal explanation of the climber's 
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decision would require reference to their internal states (such as fear or a 
desire to conserve energy). 
(iii.) 'I took the philosophy course because I think that philosophy helps one to 
think clearly.' This account cites internal motivating factors and reasons 
that, if epiphenomenalism and connectionism are true, are at best only a 
partial cause of action. 
By contrasting the way that these accounts might be treated if one applies the 
PFP model and an epiphenomenalist perspective we can see how the ontologies 
of these two perspectives inform the way that accounts are treated. The PFP, it 
will be remembered, assumes that mentalistic terms refer directly to semantically 
evaluable, functionally discrete, and causally efficacious states. For the PFP 
these characteristics combine to make all three explanations sufficient causal 
explanations. In the third case, for example, the belief that 'philosophy helps one 
to think clearly' would be seen by PFP as a discrete state that, combined with 
other states, such as a desire to think clearly, directly cause the action of signing 
up for a philosophy course. An epiphenomenalist ontology in contrast, 
particularly one with connectionist leanings, does not view the belief that 
philosophy helps one to think clearly as an internal state with the triad of 
characteristics attributed to it by PFPists. As such the account cannot be seen as 
providing a sufficient causal explanation (and nor does it cite a necessary 
condition for the student to sign up for the course). Nevertheless, the account can 
still be used to predict behaviour since if a person says that they believe 
philosophy is a discipline that helps one to think clearly, and they claim to view 
thinking clearly as desirable, then this provides good grounds for predicting that 
they will sign up for a philosophy course. When using accounts in this manner 
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we are relying on the empirical observation that people tend to do what they say 
they are going to do, want to do, and so on. As this suggests, if 
epiphenomenalism is true then prediction and causal explanation cannot be 
treated as two sides of the same ontological and methodological coin. 
Epiphenomenalism plus connectionism allows for the possibility of accurate 
prediction based on a flawed PFP style ontology. That is to say, by adopting the 
intentional stance, the language and ontology of FP might be usefully employed 
as a methodological resource for the prediction of behaviour even if the terms 
employed do not refer to causally efficacious states. This analysis of accounts 
still leaves unanswered the question of how one should go about causally 
explaining actions and what role accounts (especially accounts of the third type) 
should play in casual explanations. I will have more to say about this topic in 
chapter 9 but at this point I will say that I think that the answer will be largely an 
empirical one that is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer. 
Turning now to the remainder of this thesis, I have already voiced certain 
reservations about both the ontology and the methodology of contemporary 
sociology. In chapters 7 and 8, which deal with the self and rationality 
respectively, I will review what I consider to be some of the principal failings of 
contemporary sociology and offer some preliminary suggestions as to how the 
ontology of epiphenomenalism can be used to address some of these failings. 
Both chapters are essentially a defence of human subjectivity, and the role that I 
believe subjective states should play in causal explanations, against the 
contemporary decentring /desubjectivising of the subject. In chapter 7 I will 
review the attempts made by sociologists, and Mead in particular, to undermine 
the autonomy of the self and its biological origins. Here I will argue along 
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similar lines to Margaret Archer who claims that sociological imperialists have 
conflated the universal sense of self with the (cultural) concept of self. I will 
suggest that such approaches conflate the selfwith self-identity and in so doing 
portray man as a one dimensional linguistic construct that is incapable of true 
action. 
My defence of a universal sense of self with origins in our biology and 
interaction with the external world does differ markedly from traditional 
concepts of the self. I will argue that the self is constituted by the PE of 
subjectivity. This self, being constituted by PE, is an epiphenomenal self that is 
generated by physical events in the brain in exactly the same way as PE 
generally. Conceived in this way the self is denied both a will capable of 
initiating action and its traditional role as the seat of reason. The latter 
characteristic has some profound implications for our understanding of 
rationality and these implications will be examined in chapter 8. Specifically we 
will have to confront the worry that if the self is not equipped to weigh up 
evidence and to make judgements based on that evidence then there can be no 
good grounds for accepting an argument as true or false. This not only has the 
potential to undermine the truth claims made in this thesis but to signal a 
complete collapse into relativism. Evolutionary epistemology can be usefully 
employed in order to shore up the foundations of rationality that the denial of an 
autonomous self undermines. Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemology in 
particular, and his argument that there can be knowledge without a knowing 
subject, will provide much of the groundwork. Popper's work provides the first 
step in an argument designed to show that physical systems are capable of 
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generating knowledge and evaluating truth claims without the intervention of an 
irreducible self. 
In chapter 9 I continue the theme, first outlined in chapter 7, that the 
ontological stance of contemporary sociologists makes human beings incapable 
of true action. I will begin by outlining Campbell's view that action has been 
written out of contemporary sociology and has been replaced by an impoverished 
concept of social action. This will be followed by the claim that sociology should 
return to a Weberian style interpretative method. To return to the example that 
opened this chapter, the act oflooking at one's watch is more likely to be 
explained by social situationalists as signalling to those present that, for example, 
the actor is not loitering around waiting for an opportunity to abduct one of their 
children, but is instead engaged in the perfectly legitimate activity of waiting for 
a friend who happens to be late. I would not wish to deny that such explanations 
can, on occasion, be true. What I will argue (in chapter 9), however, is that one 
cannot and should not presume to understand an individual's motives for 
performing any given action without taking the trouble to ask them. As we shall 
see it is a feature of the dominant paradigm within sociology (social 
situationalism) that the actor's subjective states and intrapersonal processes are 
largely ignored within both social theory and empirical research. The focus of 
contemporary sociology has now moved from the individual as the author of both 
their private and social lives (within, of course, certain constraints) to the 
individual as an actor reading from a collectively written script. The odd thing 
about this collaborative project is that the script is viewed as emerging out of 
interaction rather than being the culmination of the efforts of each participating 
individual. The upshot of all this is that there is now almost no interest in 
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anything internal, or 'in the head' of the individual. Sociology has thus 
constructed for itself an ontology and a methodology within which the simplest 
of actions, such as consulting one's watch, become impossible to explain as 
anything other than communicative acts. It is in this sense that I want to make 
mind matter more by highlighting the urgent need to make what's in the head 
central to sociological explanations. 
Chapter 7 
The Brain and its Self 
In a statement that captures most people's intuitions regarding the relationship 
between selves and brains, Popper wrote in The Self and Its Brain: 
... the brain is owned by the self, rather than the other way round. The self is 
almost always active. The activity of selves is, I suggest, the only genuine activity 
we know.) The active psycho-physical self is the active programmer of the brain 
(which is the computer), it is the executant whose instrument is the brain. The mind 
is, as Plato said, the pilot. It is not, as David Hume and William James suggested, 
the sum total, or the bundle, or the stream of its experiences: this suggests 
passivity. (popper and Eccles 1977: 120» 
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Popper, dualists generally, and a good many materialist theorists need an active 
self to complete their various theories of mind. The self is traditionally deemed to 
perform a number of functions: (1) the self initiates voluntary action; (2) it is the 
subject of conscious experience, thus unifying what many believe would 
otherwise be a disjunctive 'bundle' of experiences~ (3) it is able to entertain first-
person thoughts, which is crucial for the self-other and subject-object distinctions 
that so preoccupy philosophers; (4) and is capable of self-knowledge and 
introspection. The latter feature is often held up as vital for the ability of a person 
to recognise that past and present experiences are theirs, and to conceptualise 
their life trajectories (ending of course in death) enabling them to organise their 
desires, aspirations, and goals in the context of decision making. 
Epiphenomenalism, of course, requires no such self For epiphenomenalism: (1) 
there are no voluntary actions - only causal processes; (2) there can be no subject 
of conscious experiences (at least not of the traditional Cartesian kind) since this 
would imply that, at the mental level at least, phenomenal states have causal 
1 By 'genuine activity' Popper is presumably referring to agent causation (in the sense of genuine 
libertarian free will). rather than the standard relation of cause and effect which would not 
constitute action for Popper. 
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powers. That is to say, if we draw the traditional distinction between the subject 
of conscious experiences and the conscious experiences of which a subject is 
aware, we accord to phenomenal states the causal power of being observable. 
Moreover, we accord to the self the causal power of being able to introspect. 
Neither power is consistent with epiphenomenalism which denies both mental-
physical and mental-mental interaction. This point also extends to both (3) the 
ability to entertain first-person thoughts and (4) to have certain kinds offirst-
person knowledge and introspective abilities. For epiphenomenalism both these 
features are functions of physical processes not of the self 
It is a good thing that epiphenomenalism does not need an active, 
unifying self, since as the above makes clear such a self is unavailable to the 
epiphenomenalist theorist. Nevertheless the dualism expressed by Popper 
(between the self and body) is one that we can endorse. Throughout this thesis 
the sui generis real nature ofPE has been emphasised. This emphasis extends to 
all PE, including the PE ofselfhood, thus guaranteeing the existence of the self-
albeit a self devoid of causal powers. We can also agree with Popper's statement 
if we read it as a phenomenological description of the experience of selfhood. As 
an ontological statement, however, it is the complete antithesis of the theory to 
be presented here. In part I we spent a considerable amount of time discussing 
and developing the idea that PE supervenes on physical events in the brain. The 
supervenience of the mental on the physical, it will be remembered, entails that 
all phenomenal states are wholly dependent on and determined by physical 
events in the brain. Since these dual characteristics of dependency and 
determinacy appear to leave no room for mental causation we concluded that PE 
must be epiphenomenal. This leaves us with a fundamentally dualist ontology -
173 
though not of the traditional kind - and begs the question, where does the self fit 
into this ontology? We must choose between conceiving of the self as some 
physical property of the brain, thereby guaranteeing it causal efficacy, or as 
something irreducibly mental and hence epiphenomenal? As the title of this 
chapter suggests, I will argue in favour of the latter option. Although 
epiphenomenalists can agree with Popper that the self is ontologically distinct 
from the brain, what an epiphenomenalist perspective forces us to deny is that the 
direction of causation runs from self to brain. Where Popper views the self as the 
active programmer of the brain, we are forced to view the self as its passive 
creation. The passivity of the self, together with its dependency on the brain, is 
what warrants the inversion of Popper's dictum which now reads the brain and 
its self. 
Identifying the selfwith some irreducible and epiphenomenal mental 
property does present us with some serious methodological problems. 
Throughout this thesis we have been taking certain liberties with the ontological 
implications of epiphenomenalism. IfPE really is epiphenomenal we ought not 
to be able to discuss its existence, let alone use our 'knowledge' about PE as the 
basis for further ontological claims. Nowhere is this more apparent than when 
discussing the self The self is something which exists for us in PE and which we 
know only through PE. Introspection is thus one of the primary methodological 
tools for the investigation of the self If we were to hold steadfastly to 
implications of accepting epiphenomenalism, however, we would not only deny 
ourselves this method of investigation but we would have to remain mute on the 
whole topic. Any epiphenomenalist that attempted to use their own experience of 
selfhood as the basis for a discussion of the self would have to accept that their 
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theories and conjectures, as well as the words they type on their computers, are 
the result of neuronal processes that have no connection with their subject matter. 
This point also highlights a problem for rationality that will be discussed in the 
next chapter; if arguments, judgements, theories and conjectures, are just a 
product of blind physical forces, what reason could there be for our accepting 
them as true. Ifwe are to avoid epiphenomenalism from leading to complete 
scepticism and nihilism, however, then it seems unavoidable that we will have to 
take further liberties and hope that some future justification will be found for our 
indiscretions. 
The principal ontological liberty I propose to take is to begin our 
discussion by outlining the experience of seltbood. We will then test the 
characteristics belonging to the experiential self against the conclusions drawn in 
part I. As ever we must treat the experience as its own irreducible reality and not 
attempt to explain it away in some vain attempt to construct a reductionist 
account of the self Such attempts, or so I argued in part I, are doomed to failure 
since they end up either eliminating the object of reduction or describing its 
cause while leaving the object of reduction untouched. The latter form is typical 
of the biological sciences. Neurology, for example, is beginning to yield some 
detailed accounts of the neurobiological processes implicated in conscious 
experience, if PE is irreducible, however, such accounts relate only to the causes 
of conscious experiences rather than the experiences themselves. Thus far we 
have treated, following Searle's lead, PE as its own irreducible reality. This 
approach suggests that phenomenology should be treated as a branch of 
ontology, which if we remain committed to our first principle regarding the 
irreducibility ofPE must be the correct way to conceive of the relationship. 
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When discussing consciousness there is always a temptation to ask what is x 
(where x is some PEl. Where PE is concerned, however, the answer will always 
be either a tautology or a causal reduction. If one asks, 'What is the pain in my 
footT for example, one can answer in one of two ways. Either (a) it is a 
subjective experience of an unpleasant sensation that I experience as being 
spatially located at the end of my leg (tautology), or (b) it is nociceptive specific 
neuronal activity occurring in the somatosensory cortex (causal reduction). We 
have already argued at length that this style of reduction is unacceptable since it 
fails to answer the question of what the pain is (an ontological reduction) and 
instead tells us what causes the pain (a causal reduction). 
Taking methodological liberties with epiphenomenalism is essential if we 
are to avoid such reductionist or behaviourist accounts (which would seem to be 
the only other legitimate alternative). Being dutiful epiphenomenalists, and 
refusing to countenance the use of PE as a source of information about the self, 
would necessitate our adopting a behaviourist methodology that would inevitably 
result in our account of the self missing out the defining characteristic of 
selfhood as that which experiences the world. This seems to have been the fate 
of, amongst others, Goffinan's dramaturgical analysis of the self. Theories such 
as Goffman' s, which view the self as a product of social interaction and locate 
the self in the performance of actions, may be more kosher from an 
epiphenomenalist perspective than those that use introspection as a primary 
methodological tool, but they end up defining the self out of existence by 
excluding subjectivity from their definitions. If the 'very structure of the self is 
identified with the arrangement of the presentation of self and if the possessor of 
a self 'merely provides the peg upon which something of collaborative 
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manufacture will be hung for a time' (Goffinan 1971: 245) then the experience of 
seltbood is implicitly nullified. Treating the appearance as the reality means 
accepting that whatever external accounts, such as Goffinan's, claim to be about, 
they are not about the self That said, however, we must resist the temptation to 
take the experience of seltbood at face value and draw ontological conclusions 
from the experience alone (as in Descartes' Cogito). 
This chapter is going to be a largely negative discussion of the self I will 
have a lot to say about what the self is not, what conditions are not necessary for 
the emergence of the self, and what properties and powers are not possessed by 
the self These negative conclusions will provide the basis for the claim that the 
universal sense of self is not a legitimate area of study for the social sciences. 
The universal sense of self, it will be argued, develops quite naturally out of our 
ongoing interaction with the world and does not require society or its resources 
as a necessary condition for its emergence. 
The experiential self 
Gilbert Ryle nicely captures the puzzlement that confronts all of us when we 
reflect on the concept of the self: 
When a child, like Kim, having no theoretical commitments or equipment fIrst 
asks himself. 'Who or What am I?' he does not ask it from a desire to know his 
own surname, age, sex, nationality, or position in the form. He knows all his 
ordinary personalia. He feels that there is something else in the background for 
which his T stands, a something which has still to be described after all his 
ordinary personalia have been listed. He also feels, very vaguely, that whatever it is 
that his 'I' stands for, it is something very important and quite unique, unique in the 
sense that neither it nor anything like it, belongs to anyone else. There could only 
be one of it. (Ryle 1949: 178) 
Such is the sense of mystery that we have all experienced at some time or 
another. For those of us who continue to ask the question in an academic context 
our 'theoretical commitments and equipment' does little to lessen the sense of 
mystery. One thing is certain however, that whatever the self is (if it is indeed a 
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thing) it is something whose defining characteristic is that it is conscious. We 
may not be able to pin down the self but if it is to be found anywhere it is to be 
found in our conscious experience and it is with this experiential self that we will 
begin. 
We have the experience of there being an x that: 
1. is conscious or potentially conscious 
2. is indivisible 
3. is unique 
4. is elusive 
5. has language as its prime (almost exclusive) medium of thought 
6. is the locus of perception 
7. persists through time 
8. is capable of engaging in introspection 
9. makes decisions based on reasons 
10. acts on reasons and decisions to cause actions 
11. is responsible for its actions 
Despite having criticised reductionist and external accounts of the self for failing 
to treat the experience of selfhood as the reality, as epiphenomenalists we cannot 
treat all the properties and powers that appear on the above list as genuine 
ontological traits. The trouble is that where the self is concerned we are not only 
dealing with sensations and perceptions but also with cognitive judgements. If 
we consider our list of the features that go to make up our experience of the self, 
points 1 to 7 describe experiences which we have to accept as the reality if we 
are to continue treating phenomenology as a branch of ontology. We would, of 
course, have to be clear about what we mean by such things as uniqueness or 
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elusiveness, but each of these elements has a fairly straightforward interpretation 
that relates solely to the experience and has no ontological implications beyond 
treating the experience as the reality. Thus, for example, we might define 
uniqueness by noting that every person has a unique perspective on the world 
and a unique set of experiences, and we might define elusiveness as a feature of 
subjectivity (we will consider this feature in detail below) rather than as pointing 
to the existence ofa thing or substance for which the 'I' stands. The last four 
points, however, though they too describe the phenomenology of selfhood, also 
make ontological claims about the powers of the self Here, though we have to 
accept that the experience is partly constitutive of the self, we do not have to 
accept that selves have the causal powers they experience having. So, for 
example, although we have to accept that the experience of free will (implied by 
points 9, 10 and 11) is an ineliminable part ofthe experience of selfhood, we do 
not have to accept that selves really are in control of their bodies. 
Nevertheless, we must still confront the fact that during the lived 
experience of our self and body we view our bodies, including our brains, as 
something which belong to us and that, most of the time, we control. Although 
very few of our movements are accompanied by the experience of being 
consciously 'willed' this does not result in our feeling that we do not control our 
bodies. Habitual or routine actions are typically in accord with our desires, 
projects, goals, etc., and as is often noted with regard to actions that have become 
habitual, though we do not have the experience of consciously executing the 
actions we often have the experience of initiating them. Thus, although we often 
put our bodies on autopilot when walking to the comer shop or driving to the 
supermarket, we nevertheless believe that the initiations of these actions are 
consciously willed. 
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The control we believe we have over our bodies is central to the feeling 
of psychophysical dualism to which Popper points. Psychophysical dualism is 
also evident whenever we think reflexively about sensations, especially when 
those sensations are unwanted. Vrancken (1989) makes a similar point arguing 
that rationalising pain induces the experience of psychophysical dualism by 
sundering the subject 'I' from the pain as object. Our experience is, therefore, of 
an agency that controls the body but is not identical with the body or any of its 
parts. This must be the case since if we were to experience our selves as identical 
to our bodies we could not have the experience of our bodies acting without us 
(as in reflex actions) or in spite of us (as when our bodies become paralysed with 
fear) and nor could we experience the psychophysical dualism to which 
Vrancken points. There is, of course, an intimate connection between our 
experience of the self and the body but the connection is, as Popper highlights, 
one of ownership not identity. There can be no escaping the fact that we view our 
physical bodies as being under our mental control. If epiphenomenalism is true 
then we have to accept that this psychophysical dualism points to a genuine 
ontological division between the self and the body. The self, therefore, cannot be 
identified with the body (or any part of it). 
So where does this leave us? We have rejected reductionist accounts of 
the self, those that locate the self in the performance of actions, and those that 
attempt to identify the selfwith the body. We have also suggested that only 
points 1 through 7 on the above list point to any genuine ontological traits that 
we may use to define the self Even points 1 through 7, however, will be pared 
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down before we will be left with the essence of selfhood. To help us pare down 
this list I want to focus on the quality of elusiveness. 
His quarry was the hunter 
The self, we have concluded, is to be found in PE. As such it might be expected 
that epiphenomenalism would favour a Humean concept of the self where the 
self is identified with the sum total of one's occurrent PEs. Such an approach 
would be consistent with the dependency of the self on the brain, it would locate 
the self solely in PE, and would be consistent with our conclusion that PE is 
epiphenomenal. A Humean version of the self, however, despite originating as an 
antidote to problem of elusiveness, does not do justice to the experience. A 
Humean version of the self explains elusiveness away as an illusion rather than 
embracing it as part of the reality of selfhood. Hume, it will be remembered, 
famously proposed the 'bundle' theory of the self because he was never able to 
catch himself without some perception, and was never able to observe anything 
but the perception. The trouble is that whenever we ask ourselves questions such 
as: Is the sound of bird song that I hear through an open window part of me? We 
are compelled to say no. The sound of bird song is something I am aware of but 
it is not part of me. Perhaps then we should say that those experiences that derive 
from proprioception are what constitute the self. This doesn't seem quite right 
either though. I do not count the bitter aftertaste of coffee, the awareness of the 
position of my limbs, or feelings of hunger to be part of my self. Going' deeper' 
we might think that our beliefs, likes and dislikes, personality, and the rest are 
what constitute the self. Once again, however, the self eludes us; I do not count 
my desire for another coffee, my interest in the mind-body problem or my belief 
in epiphenomenalism as constituting part of my self. I might say that my interest 
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in the mind-body problem is part of what makes me me but this is not the same 
as saying that my interest in the mind-body problem partly constitutes me. Ryle's 
explanation for the elusiveness of the 'I' is that to reflect on the nature of one's 
self requires a higher order act and this' ... higher order action cannot be the 
action upon which it is performed' (Ryle 1949: 186). Ryle sums this up with the 
evocative phrase, which I have taken as the title to this section, 'His quarry was 
the hunter' (ibid. 189). Nevertheless, Ryle thinks that he could exhaustively 
describe his self in the past tense. Indeed Ryle even believes that he could 
exhaustively describe your past or present self This seems doubtful, however, 
since if we reflect on last year's self and ask the same questions we asked of the 
present self we would get the same answers (with my desire for another coffee 
now satisfied I do not consider that my self of five minutes ago was constituted, 
in part, by a desire for another coffee). Moreover, Ryle's explanation for the 
elusiveness of the self is not consistent with the epiphenomenalist perspective 
being developed here. When Ryle notes that a 'higher order action cannot be the 
action upon which it is performed' he is making the now familiar claim that a 
mental event cannot introspect itself Rather, according to Ryle, a second mental 
event is required to introspect other synchronous mental events. 
Epiphenomenalism, of course, denies the possibility of this type of introspection 
and so must reject Ryle's explanation for the elusiveness of the self 
Phenomenologically it does appear to us that we are able to introspect our 
mental states. Psychophysical dualism is an endemic feature of conscious 
experience that extends beyond the objectification of our bodies to include the 
potential objectification of all phenomenal states. Though the experience may be 
illusory we seem able to make every perception, sensation, verbalised thought, 
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emotion, or indeed any PE, the objects of our attention. Illusory or not, the 
experience of being able to objectify PEs means that we cannot identify 
ourselves with those experiences. Rather, we believe ourselves to be the subject 
of those experiences. As has been pointed out may times before, when Hume 
went in search of his self and was never able to find anything but some 
perception or sensation, we have to ask ourselves who was doing the searching. 
Hume could not find the self that he was looking for because, as Ryle puts it, his 
quarry was the hunter. Where Ryle went astray, however, was in imagining that 
the hunter is only elusive in the present tense and that a description of the 
hunter's experiences in the past tense is a description of a person's past self The 
trouble is, as I noted above, any description of my past experiences, no matter 
how complete, will always fail to describe my past self because I will always 
believe that I am (or was) the subject of the experiences being described. If this is 
right then it seems that subjectivity must be the key to the self Though it is of 
course true that we are always subjectively aware of something and can never 
experience a state of pure subjectivity, it seems that subjectivity is a distinct and 
irreducible component of every experience, and it is this component of 
experience that is the self 
Origins of the self 
There is a strong tendency within the social sciences to assume that the self is 
either a linguistic construct or somehow dependent on language. The first point 
to note is that by making the self dependent on language such theorists are forced 
to deny selfhood to organisms (including humans) that are not language users. 
Such a denial seems, to say the least, rather anthropocentric. Beings without 
language are still capable of experiencing psychophysical dualism, they are able 
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to objectify their bodies, sensations and emotions, and they are capable of 
engaging in practical action. Were they unable to draw a distinction between 
themselves as the subject of experiences, and the experiences of which they are 
aware, then beings without language would be unable to respond to their 
environment or to perform even simple actions such as withdrawing from painful 
stimuli. Even pain avoidance behaviour presupposes that the organism is capable 
of recognising that the pain is theirs but that it is not an intrinsic part of their self. 
That is to say, in order to act they have to be capable of making a subject-object 
distinction (where the pain is confronted as object). Once an organism is capable 
of making such distinctions they are already in possession of a rudimentary sense 
of self. 
One way social scientists and philosophers have made the development of 
the self dependent on language is by associating the self with narrative. Rorty, 
for example, views seltbood as a process of self-creation whereby we come to 
terms with the 'blind impress' which chance has given us by redescribing the 
contingencies of the past in our own terms (Rorty 1989: 23-43). Rorty's 
association of seltbood with narrative, and its concomitant dependency on 
language, ignores what I have argued is the most fundamental aspect of seltbood 
- human subjectivity. Moreover, it is unclear how a person is able to redescribe 
the contingencies of their own past unless they are already in possession of a 
sense of self. Just whose past are they attempting to redescribe? If it weren't my 
past, a past that I remember, then I would have no interest in its redescription. 
Rorty's account may be an accurate description of how a few postmodem 
intellectuals view the reflexive construction of their own self-identity, but it has 
nothing to do with the universal sense with which we are all blessed. 
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Where Rorty views narrative structure as constitutive of the self, others 
view language as a necessary precondition for the development of the self 
Above all others it is probably George Herbert Mead who is responsible for this 
belief Central to Mead's philosophy of mind is the claim that the existence of 
the mind is dependent upon the 'internalized conversation of gestures' (Mead 
1934: 156). According to Mead (ibid. 47), we learn the meaning of words and 
gestures, and are conscious of the meaning of our own utterances and gestures, 
only in so far as we take the attitude of the other towards them. 
Gestures become significant symbols when they implicitly arouse in an individual 
making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to 
arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed; and in all 
conversations of gestures within the social process, whether external (between 
different individuals) or internal (between a given individual and himself), the 
individual's consciousness of the content and flow of meaning involved depends on 
his thus taking the attitude of the other toward his own gestures. (ibid. 47) 
This internalised conversation of gestures is what, for Mead, constitutes thought 
and the life of the mind. Thought is thus dependent, both ontogenetically and 
phylogenetically, upon the pre-existence of language and society. That is to say, 
the potential for conscious thought is not, for Mead, an innate potential inherent 
in every member of the species and nor could consciousness develop in any 
given individual unless they were socialised in a language using community. 
Similarly, the development of the self is, for Mead, dependent on taking the 
attitude of others toward oneself Here Mead argues that there are two stages in 
the development of the self, both involving the internalisation of the attitudes of 
others but at neither stage does subjectivity playa primary role. 
At the first of these stages, the individual's self is constituted simply by an 
organization of the particular attitudes of other individuals toward himself and 
toward one another in the specific social acts in which he participates with them. 
But at the second stage in the development of the individual's self that self is 
constituted not only by an organization of these particular individual attitudes, but 
also by an organization of the generalised other or the social group as a whole to 
which he belongs. (ibid 158) 
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For Mead this process is logically and temporally prior to the development of 
self-consciousness. In other words, knowledge of how others view us must occur 
prior to our having any knowledge of ourselves. What is not clear is how self-
consciousness could be constructed by organising the attitudes of others without 
there already being some reference point for those attitudes. In order for me to be 
able to adopt the attitudes of particular others toward myself, which for Mead 
constitutes the primary phase of the development of the self, I have to be able to 
differentiate myself from others and be in possession ofa basic concept of 
seltbood in order to know that others' attitudes are about me. To do so I have to 
be able to draw on a fairly sophisticated folk psychology, though of course I need 
not be able to articulate the content of that folk psychology. To be able to 
internalise the attitude of a particular other one requires a working knowledge of 
propositional attitudes; I have to know that the other person is a conscious 
subject who has certain beliefs and attitudes about me. In short, I have to know 
that I am an I in order to know that I am a you to you and that your attitudes are 
directed toward me. By this I do not mean to suggest that one has to master the 
use of personal pronouns before one can intemalise the attitudes of others. Even 
animals such as dogs, which possess no linguistic ability, are adept at making 
these distinctions and are perfectly capable of understanding that, for example, 
their owner is angry at them for raiding the bins. 
What has led Mead and others astray is the conflation of self-identity with 
the self2 If, by self-identity, we mean a narrative about oneself, and if we read 
Mead's account as a theory concerning the construction of that narrative, then 
2 Margaret Archer argues along similar lines when arguing that sociological imperialists, like 
Mead, have a tendency to absorb the sense onto the concept (see Archer 2000: 125). 
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there is far less about Mead's work with which to quibble. Since we require the 
resources of a society (its language, definitions of social roles, norms, values, and 
so on) in order to construct a narrative about ourselves, the pre-existence of 
society is a necessary condition for the development of self-identity. Moreover, 
much of the content of the narrative we tell about ourselves is dependent upon 
our having internalised the attitudes of others; at least to the extent that we know 
what it is to be a good father, a dutiful son, etc. Although it is always open to us 
to question, and possibly reject, the opinions others have about us, it is 
nevertheless the case that others' opinions are of great importance to us (indeed 
the preoccupation with the opinion of others pays the wages of the growing army 
of therapists, psychologists and counsellors). Moreover, though man is certainly 
capable of self-deception, the deception is difficult to maintain in the absence of 
external corroboration. 
The self and self-identity are ontologically distinct and must be kept 
analytically distinct since their conflation is not only a denigration of humanity 
but represents sociological imperialism of he most insidious kind. As Ryle 
comments in the above quote, when a person asks themselves who or what they 
are, they are not interested in listing their surname, age, sex, or position in the 
form. Neither are they interested in listing their occupation, sexual orientation, 
religious affiliation, or any of their desirable qualities (such as being a dutiful 
son). Strip away the narrative and we are still left with a subject who stands in 
certain relations to his body and to the external world. It is this subject that is the 
something in the background for which the 'I' stands and not those attributes of a 
person that can be listed or those mental events that can be experienced as the 
objects of subjective awareness. The fact that we can take a step back from our 
187 
self-identity and treat it as a 'reflexive project' presupposes that self-identity is 
not synonymous with the self There is no vantage point to which one could 
withdraw and treat the self as a reflexive project because the self is that vantage 
point. It is for this reason that Giddens is wrong to treat the self as a 'reflexive 
project' (Giddens 1991) and Rorty is wrong to view the self as a self-created 
narrative in which we redescribe the contingencies of the past in our own terms. 
Of both accounts we can ask fundamentally the same question, who is treating 
the self as a reflexive project and who is redescribing the contingencies of their 
past? 
Despite arguing from a different ontological perspective Margaret 
Archer's discussion of the primacy of practice in the development of the 
universal sense of self is remarkably compatible with epiphenomenalism. In 
asserting the primacy of practice Archer is defending the idea that our practical 
engagement with the world has temporal and logical priority over language in the 
development of the sense of self Archer argues that socialisation is dependent 
on: 
(a) the fact that each and every member has already realised one potential of their 
species-being, namely to make the primary distinction between the self and 
otherness. on which learning the subsequent distinctions between social and non-
social depend Socialisation (b) requires human beings with performative capacity 
and memory in order that they are the kind of beings whose repertoire can be 
socially extended to incorporate such activities as handling a spoon, becoming 
toilet trained or leaning to speak. Finally, (c) the very possibility of 
communication, whether gestural or verbaL is ultimately dependent upon beings 
who are already obedient to the law of non-contradiction, otherwise no verbal 
information can be conveyed, including natural language itself, as distinct from 
mimetic babbling. (Archer 2000: 126) 
Taking these elements in tum, for epiphenomenalism (a) learning the self-
other/subject-object distinction can not be matter of the selflearning to 
distinguish itself from its environment. Having stressed the importance of 
subjectivity as the defining characteristic of the self this would amount to a form 
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of panpsychism whereby subjectivity shrinks from a starting point that 
encompasses the body and its environment to a perspective within the body. 
Such a position is obviously untenable given that perception is necessarily 
embodied. Rather, when we talk about a person learning the self-otherlsubject-
object distinction we mean that the sense of self develops in parallel with non-
conscious (neural) development that enables the organism to make the 
distinctions. Notice that it is the organism that learns to make this distinction not 
the self Given that we have defined the self in terms of subjectivity, 'learning' 
the self-other distinction is necessarily prior to, or at least synchronous with, the 
development of one's sense of self It is also important to stress that the 
completion of the neural architecture that enables the organism to make the 
subject-object split is not identical to the development of the sense of self The 
magic ingredient of subjectivity is, from an epiphenomenalist perspective, still 
missing. This subjectivity emerges (in part) out of this architecture but is not 
identical with it. Thus when Archer asserts the primacy of practice in the 
development of the self, epiphenomenalism inserts a second link in the causal 
chain. What for Archer is the origin of the sense of self is, for 
epiphenomenalism, the origin of the physically necessary (at least in humans) 
conditions for the emergence of a sense of self In other words, where Archer 
views practical action as contributing to the development of the sense of self, we 
view the same action as contributing to the development of the subvenient base 
that will eventually give rise to the supervenient and epiphenomenal property of 
a sense of self In the final analysis epiphenomenalism does not have the 
resources to explain the origins of the sense of self As epiphenomenalists we 
have to wait for the natural sciences to discover how the brain generates 
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consciousness. As epiphenomenalists all we can hope to achieve is an 
understanding of the environmental conditions which are physically necessary 
for the development of the neural structures that will ultimately generate an 
epiphenomenal sense of self Perhaps the following diagram will make this clear: 
body-world an epiphenomenal contributes to the 
~ ------.~ 
interaction development of the 
neural architecture which 
Fig. 7.1 The origin of the sense of self 
causes sense of self 
Epiphenomenalism may be able to say something about the first link in this 
chain, but must remain mute on the question of how neural processes generate a 
sense of self Critical realists, identity theorists, emergentists, and so on, are 
equally in the dark about the neural structures that relate to the sense of self 
However, because they view the self as either directly efficacious, or efficacious 
in virtue of its identity with its subvenient base, this unexplained element is not 
viewed as a distinct link in the causal chain. Rather, they view their accounts as 
complete causal explanations at a higher level of analysis than that provided by 
the natural sciences (which are left to fill in the details). 
Archer's second argument for the primacy of practice, that socialisation 
requires beings with performative capacity and memory, is fairly straightforward 
in relation to the development of the sense of self. Performative capacity is 
necessary for practical action and must, therefore, develop before a capacity for 
meaningful social action. Since even feral children and animals have a 
performative capacity, we can safely assume that it is not dependent on society or 
its resources. Memory too, in a broad sense, is obviously not dependent on 
linguistic ability (dogs can remember the location of their favourite toy and 
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horses can remember which gardens are home to ferocious dogs). Of more 
interest is Archer's claim that eidetic (visual) and procedural memories are more 
important in the development of a sense of self and its continuity than declarative 
memory. I have argued that the self is constituted by the experience of 
subjectivity that accompanies conscious experience. We have also noted the 
truism that one cannot experience subjectivity in a pure form. To be subjectively 
aware is to be subjectively aware of something. Thus eidetic memory, which 
Archer notes (citing Rose 1992) develops before declarative memory, provides a 
source of relived experience that links present subjectivity to past experiences 
enabling a person to maintain a continuous sense of self. It seems unlikely that 
declarative memory could perform this function since it lacks the temporal 
dimension of eidetic memories. That is to say, eidetic memories are time-indexed 
to the self that I was, whereas declarative memories lack this relived experiential 
component. Thus, because declarative memories are experientially atemporal, 
they cannot provide the basis for the continuity of the self 
The role of practical action as the source of our reasoning abilities is 
Archer's third argument in favour of the primacy of practice. Not only does it 
help to take back one more of mans' abilities from out of the jaws of the social 
imperialists, but it provides a good basis for our discussion of rationality in the 
next chapter. In the following chapter we will have to account for mans' ability 
to reason in the absence of a self capable of weighing up evidence and making 
judgements based on good reasons. Ifwe can show that practical action is 
sufficient to enable a child to learn the rules of non-contradiction and identity in 
a way that is consistent with epiphenomenalism then we will be one step closer 
to achieving this task. Embodied practice is held by Archer to be necessary for 
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the development of our powers of thought since these powers require a tacit 
understanding of the central tenets of logical reasoning: the laws of non-
contradiction and identity. Archer argues that practical action is essential for our 
understanding both principles. It should be stressed that developing an 
understanding of either of these principles does not require that we are able to 
discursively formulate them or, indeed, conceptualise them in any overt way. 
Rather these principles form part of the background assumptions that enable 
effective interaction with the world and provide the necessary pre-conditions for 
rational thought (both discursive and non-discursive). The following example 
helps to clarify this point: 
... the child lying prone in its cot, who moves away from the uncomfortable 
pressure of the cot bars is displaying mastery of both principles [of the 'object 
concept' necessary for identity and of 'conservation' /intransitivity necessary for 
both identity and non-contradiction]: she believes that the pressures come from 
without and that she can detach her body from the source of discomfort by rolling 
over and, moreover, that the bars are stationary in nature and will not come after 
her. (Archer 2000: 146) 
The child in this example (and we may note that the example could just as easily 
featured an animal) is displaying what we might term an embodied rationality. 
For our purposes it is important to note that the child is not yet in possession of a 
developed sense of self, rather, they are in the process of developing a sense of 
self Moreover, the child has not yet mastered the use of language. We have, 
therefore, an example of practical reasoning which is not dependent upon the 
existence of an irreducible self (thus helping to establish that the self is 
unnecessary for the operation of rationality) or of language, which demonstrates 
that the foundations of rational thought do not depend on society or its resources. 
Continuity of tbe self 
One important issue that we have yet to address is the continuity of the self. One 
of the most commonly cited features of the self is that it persists through time. At 
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first sight this appears indubitable, it is certainly an indubitable fact of experience 
that I perceive myself to be the same person today that I have always been (at 
least for as long as I can remember I have been me). Moreover, I have no reason 
to doubt that barring the misfortune of, for example, total amnesia, severe brain 
damage or mental illness, I will remain essentially the same person for as long as 
I remain conscious. Having defended the idea that the self is the subjectivity that 
we always feel lurking behind experience, we have implicitly denied that the 
continuity of the self can be accounted for in terms of the continuity of a thing or 
substance. In previous chapters I argued that all PE supervenes on the 
synchronous internal physical states of the organism. This dependency of one's 
sense of self on synchronous internal physical states entails that the self must be, 
like all PE that persists through time (for however short a duration), literally 
created and recreated by physical events for the duration of a person's conscious 
life. A good parallel to draw here is between the sense of self and an eternal 
flame. Both are created and recreated by their physical cause (neural events in 
the case of the self and, for example, a gas burner in the case of an eternal flame). 
Now the question we must pose is in what sense is an eternal flame the same 
flame now as it was when it was ignited as a memorial to the dead in, say, the 
siege of Leningrad and what makes me the same person now as I was ten years 
(or even ten seconds) ago. In neither case does strict numerical identity seem to 
do the job. Gas burners may be replaced and repaired and the physical structure 
of the brain is continuously changing. Similarly, the volume, heat, colour, and 
physical composition of an eternal flame or the qualitative experiences of a 
person are never the same from one moment to the next. Since quantitative 
identity does not look like it is up to the job of securing the continuity of the self, 
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we are forced to look towards a qualitative theory of identity. The literature on 
this topic is voluminous and we could easily devote a great deal of space 
reviewing the alternative theories and searching for counter examples. However, 
there seems to be no consensus amongst philosophers regarding suitable criteria 
for identity and little prospect of a consensus being reached. Such an endeavour 
would, therefore, be unlikely to reward our efforts. A more fruitful approach 
might be to set aside these issues and trust that our experience of being the same 
person over time is veridical. Having done so we may then seek to explain why 
this is the case. The search for this explanation could, if we are not careful, 
degenerate into the search for a criterion of identity if we approach the question 
by asking what makes it true that my experience of the continuity of self is 
veridical. A better way to approach the question is by looking to the experience 
of continuity and seeing what light the supervenience thesis might shed on the 
physical properties that realise this experience. To that end, ifI ask myself what 
makes me the same person today that I was yesterday, one plausible answer is to 
relate the continuity of self to self-identity and to link self-identity to memory. If 
you take away a person's self-identity, their memories, hopes, ambitions, 
personality, and so on, it seems plausible to say that they are no longer the same 
person (although they still have a genetic identity that will constrain the person 
they could become). Nevertheless, they are still in possession of sense of sel f 
(patients suffering from total amnesia are nevertheless still selves). In terms of 
the continuity of the selfwhat matters is that it is the same subjective 'I' that 
does the remembering and believes itself to have been the perspective from 
which the remembered events were experienced. Having made memory the key 
to self-identity and self-identity the key to the continuity of the self, we may then 
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ask how this relates to epiphenomenalism. Employing the supervenience thesis 
we may answer that those memories supervene on certain neural states in the 
brain and therefore conclude that it is these neural structures that are the key to 
the continuity of the self Although subjectivity may be the essence of the self, 
subjectivity alone cannot account for the continuity of the self Since to be 
subjectively aware is always to be subjectively aware of something, it must be 
the case that it is the content of our subjective awareness, particularly that which 
relates to past experiences, that accounts for the continuity of the self The 
memories that account for the continuity of the self, however, cannot be viewed 
as constitutive of the self Unless they are consciously held, memories are 
nothing more than (if one subscribes to a connectionist theory of mind) a set of 
connection weights, or (if one favours a more traditional FP approach) discrete 
semantically evaluable neural states. Either way they are not the sorts if things 
that could provide a physical realisation for the self 
I now want to broaden this discussion, and conclude this chapter, by 
looking at where this concept of the self leaves us and what work we can expect 
it to do. By focussing on the experiential elements of selfbood and their 
emergence from the practical order we have secured some safe ground and 
protected the self from those sociological imperialists who seek to redefine the 
self in terms of self-identity. As a topic of study, therefore, the universal sense of 
self is not one that belongs within sociology, though self-identity most surely 
does. The self should rather be left to psychologists, and perhaps ultimately 
neurologists, to investigate. Nevertheless, though the self should not be 
considered as a sociological topic, it is still of vital importance in forming part of 
the ontological foundations of the social sciences. Without a self that persists 
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through time there is nothing to link the actions that an individual performs over 
the course of their day-to-day routine, let alone a lifetime. 
One of the questions that Campbell argues sociology should address, 
indeed the question that he views as the most fundamental to sociological theory, 
is 'what are the conditions necessary for accomplishing individual practical 
action' (Campbell 1996: 157). One of the conditions necessary is the possession 
of a continuous sense of self (or rather the subvenient base for the possession of a 
sense of self). I have to be an I before I can engage in any action regardless of 
whether that action is directed towards other people or the natural world. That is 
to say, although neonates may reach out to grasp objects and attempt to keep 
moving objects within their field of vision, such movements do not constitute 
action until they have a developed sense of self Without such a sense of self they 
would not be able to make the subject-object distinction that is necessary for true 
action. Neither is the 'self described by the sociological imperialists such as 
Mead capable of true action. The imperialists' self, as we saw from our 
discussion of Mead, is constituted by the sum total of others' attitudes towards 
the individual and by the individual adopting the perspective of the generalised 
other. Such a self possesses no true subjectivity since even 'introspecting' 
phenomenal states like pain involves taking on the attitude of others towards 
oneself Archer comments (Archer forthcoming) that the Meadean self can never 
engage in a true inner conversation, and that what looks like an inner 
conversation is really society talking to society through the medium of the 
individual. The same is true of action. The Meadean self can never act in any real 
sense since they lack the subjectivity to do so and, therefore, what looks like 
individual practical action is really society acting on society. 
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Chapter 8 
Rationality 
This thesis is not the result of my endeavours qua rational subject in the 
traditional sense. It is rather the result of physical processes over which I (as a 
mere epiphenomenal subject) have no control. I have nevertheless presented my 
conclusions as objective truth claims about the nature of reality. There is a real 
tension here between the claims that this thesis is both true and that it is the result 
of non-rational physical processes. If the thoughts that pop into my mind and the 
words I type on my computer are all the result of blind physical forces, what 
reason could there be for our accepting their truth (or falsity)? Rationality, it 
would seem, requires a knowing subject, one capable of weighing up evidence, 
making judgements and acting on the basis of good reasons. Without such an 
autonomous rational subject many people would argue we have no reason to trust 
our own thought processes, let alone the truth claims made by other 
epiphenomenal subjects. The most important goal of this chapter, therefore, must 
be to provide some metaphysical justification for the truth claims made herein. I 
will begin this justification by arguing, contrary to popular wisdom, that the self 
is unnecessary for the occurrence of rational thought processes (though it may be 
logically entailed by the semantics of such phrases as 'the exercise of 
rationality'). This argument hangs on finding a source of objective knowledge 
that it not itself dependent upon the minds of conscious subjects. To find this 
source we may fruitfully apply Popper's theory of objective knowledge in 
conjunction with his evolutionary epistemology. 
With this metaphysical picture in place we will be in a position to 
consider the operation of practical reason in an everyday context. It is one thing 
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to justify the possibility of objective knowledge and rational thought processes 
without the operation of an autonomous self and quite another to explain how the 
man in the street approaches the day-to-day problems of existence. The social 
sciences are particularly vulnerable here since their whole methodology is based, 
to varying degrees, on the idea of a rational actor. Rational choice theory is 
obviously the exemplar of this methodology, but even those who tend toward 
seeing individual choices as the result of social forces need at least a minimally 
rational actor to translate social forces into actions. 
Rationality and the self 
We have already encountered the view that a self is a necessary condition for the 
operation of rationality in our discussion of Searle's theory of system causation. 
Searle claimed that the existence of an irreducible self is entailed by the logical 
structure of action sentences. When discussing Searle's work I noted that the 
logical structure of action sentences is rather flimsy evidence for the existence of 
the self and suggested that we might be better off questioning the logical 
structure of action sentences rather than inventing entities, properties, or powers 
that make them true. At this point I want to consider some other reasons why a 
self is held by many as a necessary condition for the operation of rationality. 
Before we can do so, however, we need to take a look at the concept of 
rationality itself Specifically we need to consider what it means for an action to 
be rational and consider the role played by free will (which itself presupposes an 
irreducible self) in rational action. Searle provides the groundwork for much of 
this discussion in his treatment of what he terms the Classical Model of 
Rationality (see Searle 2001: ch. 1). Although this is a model which both he and I 
reject (but for different reasons) a brief outline of this model will provide some 
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of the necessary background to the following discussion and is a useful entry 
point to the debate. Though not intended to be an exhaustive account, Searle 
identifies six elements of the Classical Model that form the background 
assumptions underlying most modem treatments of rationality. It is worth noting 
that these assumptions underlie the rational choice model as well as general 
theories of rationality. As such the following discussion may be used as a vehicle 
for questioning the rational choice model. 
The first element in this list concerns the role of beliefs and desires in 
causing rational action. We have spent a considerable amount of time discussing 
this issue in previous chapters as well as Searle's own view (see ch. 3) so a brief 
summary will suffice. The Classical Model holds that beliefs and desires function 
causally in the production of action and that an action may be deemed rational 
when they function in 'the right way'. That is to say, on the Classical Model 
beliefs and desires function causally by initiating a casual chain which, barring 
the intervention of external forces, culminates in action. In this sense beliefs and 
desires are causally sufficient for action. An action is deemed 'rational', 
according to the Classical Model, if the set of beliefs and desires which caused 
the action are logically consistent and in accord with the information available to 
the person. In chapter 4 I argued that although beliefs and desires (where the 
referents are functional physical states rather than PEs) may function causally, 
they certainly do not operate in the crude billiard ball style of causation that is 
typical of the PFP and the Classical Model being considered here. We can, 
therefore, agree with Searle that rational actions are not caused by beliefs and 
desires in the sense that beliefs and desires do not provide causally sufficient 
conditions for action. This, however, is not much of a concession towards his 
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position since I will argue, contrary to Searle, that being caused by beliefs and 
desires is not a mark of non-rational or irrational actions (even when beliefs and 
desires are defined in terms of functional states). 
Searle views actions where the antecedent set of beliefs and desires are 
causally sufficient to for the action to be paradigmatic of irrational and non-
rational behaviour. Rational action, in contrast, requires a gap between the 
antecedent beliefs and desires and action in which an irreducible self can freely 
choose, on the basis of the available evidence and their beliefs and desires, 
whether or not to perform an action. The behaviour of a heroin addict, for 
example, is deemed by Searle to be irrational because their behaviour issues out 
of causal necessity from an antecedent set of beliefs and desires. Thus if an agent 
could not have acted otherwise their behaviour is treated by Searle as necessarily 
irrational/non-rational. What makes this claim problematic is that, as I noted in 
chapter 4, with the exception of pathological cases and reflex actions, agency is 
never reported as having been entirely subverted. All actions, including those 
performed under duress or coercion, are accompanied by an experience of 
agency. Someone, for example, who is forced to sign a confession after even the 
most extreme torture still experiences the movements of their hand as being 
under their control, even if the act itself (the signing of the confession) is outwith 
their control. Thus an addict, regardless of the strength of their cravings, never 
experiences a complete absence of free will. Even assuming that all bodily 
movement is the result if causally sufficient physical conditions, there is surely 
some difference in the causal history of acts that are accompanied by an 
experience of agency and those, like reflexes, that are not. If, as seems right, 
there is some difference, then the act of giving oneself an intravenous injection is 
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different in kind from reflex or habitual action. Searle claims that rational action 
requires a self which can freely choose to act on beliefs and desires without being 
causally determined by those beliefs and desires. What is missing from Searle's 
account is some justification for the claim that some actions are determined by 
antecedent beliefs and desires while other 'rational actions' require a self to act 
on those beliefs and desires. OMRists, like Searle, have to treat a subject's 
experience of free will as indubitable. If an agent sincerely claims to have 
performed an action from their own volition neither philosophy, psychology, 
sociology, nor anyone else arguing from an OMRist perspective, can legitimately 
question this experience. The reason is that OMRists base their claim that human 
beings have free will on the PE of agency. Academics that attempt to question 
the veridicality of this experience are ultimately destroying the ontological 
foundations of their own argument. Epiphenomenalists, of course, are not 
constrained by such considerations because the foundations of 
epiphenomenalism do not rest on PE. Thus, OMRists, if they are to maintain a 
consistent position, must argue that someone with an intense desire to alleviate 
their cravings, and who believes that taking heroin would be the best way to do 
so, must still freely chose to act on the basis of their beliefs and desires so long as 
they experience their actions as voluntary. Within the tradition ofOMR it is 
perfectly legitimate to treat such cases as examples of weakness of the will (to 
which we shall tum shortly) but there is no justification for claiming that the 
actions were causally determined. 
A further problematic element in Searle's heroin addict example is that 
there are clearly a good number of heroin addicts who succeed in breaking the 
habit. If it really were the case that their heroin use was caused by a set of 
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causally sufficient beliefs and desires then it is something of a mystery how 
anyone ever manages to change their behaviour. By definition all addicts desire 
the substance or activity to which they are addicted and most are confronted with 
the object of their addiction on a daily basis. Most addicts also desire to be free 
from their addictions. Taking this as a simple set of beliefs and desires we might 
imagine two individuals equally addicted to substance A, both believing 
substance A to be the object of their addiction, and both equally desirous to be 
free from their addiction, yet one person taking the substance and the other 
refraining. The Classical Model is seemingly unable to explain how the same set 
of beliefs and desires can cause two different actions. Proponents of the Classical 
Model are likely to respond by arguing that it was the relative strengths of the 
belief-desire combinations that caused one person to relent and the other to 
refrain. This style of response, however, is little more than a just so story. I 
argued in chapter 4 that the ontology of propositional attitudes adopted by the 
PFP and by the computational theory of mind goes beyond that which can be 
inferred from experience. Rather, the existence of propositional attitudes is 
hypothesised by PFPists to account for what appears to be purposeful behaviour. 
In proposing that it is the relative strength of the belief-desire combinations that 
caused one person to relent and the other to refrain, the Classical Model adds 
another layer of supposition to a theory that is already without empirical or 
experiential foundations. 
The second assumption underlying the Classical Model concerns the role 
of rules of rationality. In itself this issue is of little concern to us here and can be 
dealt with quickly; it is worth looking at briefly, however, because it highlights a 
serious flaw in the rational choice model and because it illustrates an important 
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point relating to the role of semantics and syntax in rational arguments. Searle 
claims that the Classical Model views thought and behaviour as rational when it 
is guided by, and is in accordance with, the rules of rationality. Here Searle 
follows through an example of modus ponens1, which advocates of the Classical 
Model might appeal to in order to justify inferences of the form: 
If it rains tonight, the ground will be wet. 
It will rain tonight. 
Therefore, the ground will be wet. (Searle 2001: 18) 
Another example of the rules that supposedly govern rational thought, this time 
from rational choice theory, is the transitivity of preference ordering, but we will 
stick with Searle's example for now. Searle's point, with which we can agree 
wholeheartedly, is that appealing to modus ponens to justify an inference leads 
inexorably to the Lewis Carroll paradox (an infinite regress where further rules 
are required in order to justify the application of modus ponens). The fatal 
mistake, according to Searle, is to suppose that a valid argument requires any 
external justification from modus ponens or anything else. Rather, it is the 
semantic content of an argument that guarantees its validity. The primacy of 
semantic relations over syntactic relations in the justification of rational 
arguments presents problems for the version of epiphenomenalism being 
developed here. If epiphenomenalism is true then the brain must be blind to 
semantics. The brain can be nothing more than a syntactic engine which, if 
constructed in the right way and fed with the correct input, generates a valid 
output. There is a certain similarity here between epiphenomenalism and the 
1 Modus ponens are any inferences of the fonn: 'If p then q, and p; therefore q' as in the rain 
example which follows. 
203 
Classical Model. On both accounts it is the syntax that does the causal work. The 
Classical Model, however, envisages a simple set of rules (of the sort that one 
might use to programme a computer) whereas the version of epiphenomenalism 
being developed here leans more towards a connectionist approach to rational 
thought. The trouble with both approaches is that although one can imagine a 
connectionist system, neural network or good old fashioned symbol manipulating 
AI, being constructed such that it produces valid conclusions in the majority of 
cases, those conclusions still stand in need of justification and the only possible 
justification comes from the semantic content of the argument rather than its 
syntactic relations. One could easily programme a computer with the rules of 
modus ponens, for example, and reliably get the output 'the ground will be wet' 
when fed with the input 'ifit rains tonight the ground will be wet' and 'it will 
rain tonight.' Such a programme could not, however, be used to justify the 
inference. Prima facie, if the brain is just a complicated syntactic engine which 
learns to make inferences based on the same sort of algorithmic processes as the 
aforementioned programme, then there would be no grounds for trusting human 
thought processes. 
A related point concerning the role of the rules of rationality concerns the 
putative gap in which human beings have to exercise their free will and choose to 
make an inference. (This is the same gap that we discussed in chapter 3 between 
the antecedent causes of an action and its performance.) Searle's point here is 
that although the premises of an argument may logically entail the conclusion, 
human beings with free will can still choose not to make the inference. Such a 
gap, were it to exist could prove problematic for rational choice theory. That is to 
say, unless beliefs, desires, preferences etc, interact in the crude billiard ball style 
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characteristic of folk psychology and the Classical Model, rules of rationality can 
not be relied upon as a means of predicting behaviour on the basis of those 
beliefs, desires and preferences. Rational choice theory makes predictions based 
on the assumption that agents will follow certain rules of rationality, the 
aforementioned transitivity of preference orders being one example. If Searle is 
correct that rational behaviour is not determined by the rules of rationality, but is 
dependent instead upon semantic content which free agents can choose to ignore, 
then rational choice theory loses much of its predictive powers. If beliefs and 
desires do not function causally in the traditional sense and rationality is not a 
matter of following rules (that is, if connectionism is true), then rational choice 
theory is based on a flawed ontology. Despite being based on a flawed ontology 
rational choice theory might still be worth retaining if it enjoyed some predictive 
success. Since, however, along with much of the rest of sociology, economics 
and psychology (where it is currently fashionable), rational choice theory has not 
proved its methodological worth by making successful predictions, it might be 
time to reassess its usefulness. 
In real life decision making rational arguments often provides only the 
backdrop for the decision making process rather than determining its outcome. A 
good example of this is provided by Margaret Archer who provides a 
hypothetical example of a student deliberating over their choice of university. 
Archer first demonstrates how easily transitivity may be broken by the 
construction of a system of preference ordering based on assigning numerical 
values to the applicants criteria of 'league position', 'course content' and 
'location' - a method that would surely get the approval of rational choice 
theorists (see Archer 2000: 69-70). I should note that Archer's example is not in 
205 
the least contrived, as is so often the case with thought experiments designed to 
disprove a philosophical position. We need not go into the detail of the example, 
suffice to say that if people really did attempt to make decisions based on the 
rational choice model then the transitivity of preference ordering would 
frequently be broken. Archer then notes that in cases when a person ends up with 
two or more equally desirable options (according to their model) they are not left 
in the position of Buridan , s ass paralysed by indecision: 
She could behave impeccably [by the standards of rational choice theory] and 
introduce a tie breaker like 'accommodation'. Yet, why should she, for her main 
concern is to pick a university, not to establish a transitive preference order. So she 
is just as likely to pour over the brochures, meet some congenial people at one 
particular Open Day, or to ask her friends for their opinions. None of these are 
irrational reactions, but neither are they 'rational choices'. (ibid. 70) 
Far from determining the applicant's decision we might imagine that the 
hypothetical applicant uses the technique of preference ordering as a means of 
organising her thoughts and helping her to reach a conclusion. Indeed it is just as 
likely that even if one university had scored highest in each of the three criteria 
that the applicant would still have decided against the 'rational option'. This does 
not show any flaw in her original choice of criteria and nor does it suggest that 
she should conduct the exercise again with a new set. Rather, it shows is that real 
life decision making is more akin to developing a taste for cabbage over Brussels 
sprouts than a cold algorithmic process of reasoning. Just as it is not irrational to 
prefer cabbage to Brussels sprouts it is not irrational to prefer one university to 
another, even if that preference conflicts with what one 'rationally' decides 
would be the best choice. 
This nicely leads us on to the topic of weakness of the will. Weakness of 
the wilJ supposedly occurs when a person decides that, all things considered, it 
would be better to do x than y, it is within their power to do x and yet they do y. 
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Plausibly both the student who decides against the 'rational option' and the 
heroin addict discussed earlier could both be seen as exhibiting weakness of the 
will. Weakness of the will has long been a problem for philosophers who view 
actions as following out of causal necessity from antecedent beliefs and desires, 
so much so that some proponents of the Classical Model have denied its 
existence. The traditional solution to the problem has not been to abandon the 
idea of beliefs and desires being causally sufficient for actions, but to find 
something inconsistent or incomplete in the antecedent set. Thus Davidson, for 
example, questions the agent's commitment to performing the action he judged 
would be best, all things considered. Another popular approach, stemming from 
Aristotle and Aquinas, is to draw a distinction between rationality and emotion 
and to argue that reason can be led astray by the passions. Such a dualist picture 
is now thankfully faIling out of favour with the recognition that emotions play an 
ineliminable role in rational judgements (see e.g. Damasio 1994). However, even 
ifit were the case that reason and emotion were separate faculties (which, 
incidentally, Searle identifies as another feature of the Classical Model) it seems 
obvious that reason could anticipate emotional reactions and avoid situations 
which would, like Ulysses having himself tied to the mast (see Elster 1984), lead 
to weakness of the will. Such situations are common in everyday life. Any 
smoker who has tried to give up will, assuming they are committed to the project, 
avoid situations they know will prove testing. The pub, cups of coffee and meal 
times are just as dangerous to their project as the Sirens were to Ulysses' and are 
to be treated accordingly. 
Although weakness of the will is generally seen as a philosophical 
problem it is nevertheless of enormous importance to the social sciences. Many 
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of the issues that are of interest to social scientists, particularly in the field of 
deviance, can be treated as examples of weakness of the will. Criminal 
behaviour, drug abuse or truancy, for example, are often likely to be seen by the 
people who engage in such activities to be against their better interest. Although 
sociology tends not to talk explicitly about weakness of the will it is implicit in 
explanations that cite such factors as the lack of deferred gratification or peer 
pressure. One of the more patronising explanations that sociologists peddled for 
the underrepresentation of working class children in universities, for example, 
was that the working class tended not to engage in activities that required 
deferred gratification. Such an explanation relies on the assumption that working 
class sixth-formers realised that a university education would, in the long term, 
improve their employment prospects and life chances but were unwilling to defer 
financial independence (amongst other things) for the duration of a degree. As 
such this is a classic case of weakness of the will where one acts against one's 
better judgement due to immediate temptations. Weakness of the will, of course, 
is a philosophical problem that is not faced by epiphenomenalism - a non-
existent will cannot be weak. Although this does deprive the social sciences of 
one style of explanation it also saves them from having to deal with the 
unpredictable nature of fickle minds. 
The Classical Model, which as we have seen views rationality as being 
nothing more than the causal interaction of beliefs and desires according to 
certain rules of rationality, leaves little room for the operation of a rational self, 
which many view as essential for justification. Trigg, for example, puts the 
matter succinctly when he says: 'Consciousness is the necessary pre-condition 
for rational reflection, giving me the chance to make sense of my experiences. 
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Without a centre of consciousness 'r do not exist, and therefore I cannot make 
any rational judgements' (Trigg 1993: 206). Having denied the existence of a 
centre of consciousness, an 'J' that is capable of making the sort of rational 
judgements that Trigg views as so important, we are forced to claim that the 
work that was thought to have been done by the self is in fact performed by blind 
physical (in this case neuronal) forces. This is a view that Trigg finds wholly 
unsatisfactory. Any realist account, according to Trigg, requires that one is able 
to transcend the system of which one is a part and adopt a detached position from 
which to reason and observe. Thus a scientist who talks about the physical 
system of which they are a part implies that they are able to transcend the causal 
processes of that system and reason about them. Furthermore Trigg notes, 'I 
cannot admit that this ability in itself is purely physical without once again 
adopting a detached position and implying that at least at the next level I can talk 
about physical events, without simply producing another' (Trigg 1993: 222). 
Even the ability to see a system as a system, which is a pre-requisite for any 
natural or social scientific endeavour, implies this ability. In the context of social 
science, for example, Trigg points out that to see a culture as a culture or identify 
customs, traditions, norms and values, is already to have taken a step back from 
one's social milieu. Even the most banal sociological observation involves 
relating such things as customs and traditions to their social context and this, 
Trigg notes, pre-supposes that one is not bound by that social context. Moreover, 
if the social context under consideration is not one's own then one must become 
doubly detached and view traditions in relation to their own context rather than 
from the perspective of one's own cultural background. For Trigg and others 
only an irreducible self can attain this position: 
Scientific claims to truth gain their power precisely because they are understood in 
non-physicalist tenos, as saying something about the world ... Once they are 
conceived as only the end product of a complicated neuronal process, they are facts 
about individual brains and nothing more. (Trigg 1993: 214) 
Strictly speaking Trigg is quite correct here that if theories, conjectures and 
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observations were only the end product of neuronal processes then they would be 
facts about individual brains and nothing more. Scientific claims to truth, 
however, are never only the end product of neuronal processes. Since the brain is 
in constant interaction with the external world (via the five senses) scientific 
claims to truth, on a physicalist account, are the end product of complicated 
neuronal processes and the interaction between those processes and the external 
world. This would of course be accepted by Trigg. Trigg's real point is that if 
truth claims are only the end product of physical processes then, regardless of the 
complexity and scope of those processes, they are facts about physical processes 
and nothing more. It is this broader claim that I want to counter in the latter half 
of this chapter. I will argue that far from only being facts about physical 
processes, theories, conjectures, observations and the rest, can be objective truth 
claims about the external world. Physical systems such as the human brain are, 
thanks to a long evolutionary history, learning, and the cultural accumulation of 
knowledge, able to (almost literally) know themselves. By this I mean that the 
physical system itself is able to 'know itself in a manner that does not depend 
upon any conscious experience that may result as a by-product. 
Evolutionary epistemology 
The typical physicalist response to the above arguments is to appeal to evolution 
as an explanation for human rationality. It is doubtful, however, whether 
evolutionary epistemology can shoulder the entire burden. 
People who do not see holes in front of them are liable to fall into them. So-called 
'evolutionary epistemology' is built on this insight.. . Yet it is unclear that the 
whole edifice of Western science, including the latest research into the nature of 
subatomic particles, can rest on this need for survival. (Trigg 1993: 44) 
Clearly the ability to calculate pi to the nth decimal place is something which 
cannot be linked to genes and the need for survival in the same way as the 
perceptual abilities that enable us to avoid obstacles. Someday soon it seems 
likely that we will be able to tell a complete story that shows how our genes 
guide the development of phenotypic traits such as the optic system which 
sub serve this ability. Such a story will not be forthcoming for our ability to 
calculate pi or theorise about quantum indeterminacy. Such paradigmatic cases 
of rational thought are simply too far removed from anything faced by human 
beings in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (the Pliocene era) to be 
directly linked to genetics. Not only are such abilities unnecessary for our 
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survival, but as has often been pointed out, they may well hasten our demise by 
allowing us to construct weapons of mass destruction, destroy the ozone layer, or 
cause global warming. What we need, therefore, is an evolutionary epistemology 
that allows us to go beyond crude genetic determinism and provides scope for an 
explanation of rational thought that embraces learning and the cultural 
accumulation of knowledge. 
The quasi-naturalistic theory of rationality that follows is heavily 
indebted to and relies on Popper's theory of evolutionary epistemology. Before 
outlining this approach, therefore, we need to take a close look at Popper's 
contribution to the debate, especially as it is presented in Evolution and the Tree 
of Knowledge (1972b) and Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject (1972a). 
Popper divides reality into three classes or Worlds, the physical world as 
described by physics (World 1), the subjective world of conscious experience 
(World 2, what we have been calling PE), and an objective world of knowledge 
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(World 3). With one important exception Popper's ontology is compatible with 
epiphenomenalism. Popper views World 2 as causally efficacious and as 
providing the bridge between Worlds 1 and 3. I will argue, on the other hand, 
that Worlds 1 and 3 interact directly, without the mediation of World 2. Before 
suggesting how this may occur, and in so doing providing a sketch of a quasi-
naturalist epistemology,2 we first need to take a look at World 3. 
The most obvious candidates for inclusion in World 3 are the contents of 
books, journals, and libraries. These World 1 texts are the physical instantiations 
of objective knowledge which exists independently of any knowing subject(s). 
World 3, despite being largely created by human beings, is by Popper's standards 
autonomous. Thus, for example, although the sequence of natural numbers is a 
human creation, once created they display properties (such as prime numbers, 
odd and even numbers, etc.) that are independent of their human creators. 
Contrary to the protestations of social constructionists, mathematics is more than 
an internally coherent language game and we can no more choose to alter its 
axioms than we can choose to make cheap travel possible by changing the laws 
of gravity. Another important feature of World 3 is that the objective knowledge 
it contains need not have been produced by the human mind. A nice example of 
this is provided by Popper who asks us to imagine a computer programmed to 
calculate tables oflogarithms. Once calculated the tables may be published and 
distributed but, for whatever reason, left unread. Regardless of whether these 
logarithms ever see the light of day, however, they remain objective knowledge 
so long as they have the potential to be understood. Thus even if mankind were 
to become extinct it remains possible that an extraterrestrial being might uncover 
2 QuaSi-naturalist because naturalism does not typically talk of World 3 objects. 
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the logarithms, understand them and put them to use. Objective knowledge need 
not have been produced by the human mind nor ever be understood by the human 
mind in order to qualify as knowledge. 
The above case also demonstrates the autonomy of World 3 in that the 
objective knowledge contained in the books of logarithms exists independently 
of any knowing subject. Nevertheless, since the autonomy of World 3 is such a 
crucial element in the following argument, I shall present another of Popper's 
thought experiments (see Popper 1972a: 107-8). This time Popper asks us to 
contrast two different scenarios. In the first scenario all our machines, tools, and 
technology is destroyed, along with all our subjective knowledge of how to use 
those instruments. Nevertheless, in this scenario, libraries remain and so too does 
our ability to learn from them. The conclusion Popper invites us to share is that 
after some time, perhaps a few generations, life would return to norma], In the 
second scenario not only are our machines, tools, technology and our knowledge 
of how to use those instruments destroyed, but in this case so are libraries, 
rendering our capacity to learn from books useless. If the second scenario were to 
transpire we would be pushed back into the Stone Age and it would take as long 
to recover the lost knowledge as it did to create. 
As we shall see below, the autonomy of World 3 can be used to provide 
the basis for an epistemology consistent with epiphenomenalism. Just as the eye 
has evolved within a physical environment containing light waves of particular 
frequencies, so the brain has evolved (both ontogenetically and phy]ogenetically) 
within a linguistic environment containing such World 3 objects as states of 
discussion and states of critical argument. Determinism does not lead to 
relativism with regard to perception since we can invoke evolutionary arguments 
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to explain the veridicality of perception in a physically determined world. Indeed 
physical determinism actually makes the veridicality of perception more rather 
than less understandable since there are no unpredictable or random events to 
intervene in the causal chain running from object to percept. Similarly, free will 
has no impact whatsoever on the veridicality of perception. There is simply no 
way for free will to enter into perception except in the choice of where to look. 
As has been pointed out before, one cannot raise one's hand to one's face and 
choose not to perceive it. In what follows I will argue that the same goes for 
rationality. Until quite recently one of the main arguments for the existence of 
God, and against Darwinian evolution, was that a structure such as the human 
eye could not have evolved without divine intervention (an argument that is sadly 
still being peddled by some creationists). In a similar vein there are several 
aspects of rationality that seem to require the exercise of a rational agency, 
judgement, the weighing up of evidence, etc. In what follows I want to draw a 
parallel between the evolution of the eye, and structures like it, and the 
development of human rationality. The crucial difference, and this is where 
Popper's ontology comes into its own, is that while structures like the eye 
evolved solely in World 1, the environment in which our ability to reason has 
evolved is comprised of both Worlds 1 and 3. Very crudely then, the operation of 
rationality reduces to the following causal chain: 
Fig. 8.1 A quasi-naturalist account of rationality 
Objective Problem Neurophysiological 
-----.. -----+. 
Situation Events 
Rational 
Conclusion 
This quasi-naturalist explanation of rationality is likely to be met with the claim 
that it is no explanation at all. All that has been done, the objectors will claim, is 
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to take the epistemological and metaphysical problems associated with 
rationality and to bury them in a box marked 'neurophysiological events'. Now I 
quite readily admit that there is as yet no convincing empirical evidence to flesh 
out this account. Nevertheless if we contrast this account with the OMRist 
account the incompleteness of the quasi-naturalist account is brought into 
perspective. 
Objective Problem Subjective Thought Rational 
-------+~ -----.~ 
Situation Processes Conclusion 
Fig. 8.2 the OMRists theory of rational thought processes 
The OMRist faces the same epistemological and metaphysical problems as the 
quasi-naturalist but instead of a box marked 'neurophysiological events' they 
insert a box marked 'subjective thought processes' or 'the operation of the seIr. 
Not only is the quasi-naturalist account no worse off with regard to its 
explanatory power, but it has the advantage over the OMRist story in that future 
empirical discoveries may one day flesh out its claims. This is decidedly not the 
case with the OMRists' claims. For reasons that we have already discussed, the 
irreducible mental states and the irreducible self that the OMRists claim are 
doing the work will never be amenable to scientific investigation since to do so 
would require their reduction. 3 
Although we cannot flesh out this claim with empirical material we can 
help make it seem more intuitively plausible and deal with at least some of the 
metaphysical problems of justification it generates. One of the issues we touched 
3 See Dennett (1993) for an elaboration of the inadequacy of explanations that cite an irreducible 
self or irreducible conscious experiences. 
215 
upon earlier concerns the supposed inadequacy of evolutionary epistemology in 
explaining our reasoning abilities. I cited Trigg in connection with this issue 
who, although happy to admit that the ability to avoid obstacles may have an 
evolutionary explanation, was dubious about whether evolutionary epistemology 
could be used to explain the achievements of modern science and in so doing 
provide a justification for scientific claims to truth. I have already admitted that 
the specific achievements of modem science are too far removed from the 
environment of evolutionary adaptation to have a direct evolutionary 
explanation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is not the specific 
achievements of modem science that require justification (many of which are 
likely to be well off the mark anyway). Rather, it is the reasoning process that 
constitutes scientific method. Here the important issues relate to providing a 
proper grounding for our beliefs. As such we need only show that evolutionary 
epistemology provides an explanation for why we should be concerned with 
issues of truth (and falsity) and evidence. This is a much more manageable task 
for evolutionary epistemology for while our ability to calculate pi is unnecessary 
for our survival the ability to predict the time of day most conducive to a 
successful hunt, or when and where we can safely get clean drinking water, most 
certainly is. Although their subject matters could not be further removed, the 
same issues of truth and falsity and grounding beliefs in the evidence apply to 
both hunter gatherers and contemporary scientists. Moreover, as soon as 
language began to emerge early humans had to interact with World 3 as well as 
World 1. Thus World 3 became a part of the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation when humans first communicated thoughts such as 'there is water 
over there' or 'such and such an animal is easiest to hunt at dawn.' Those who 
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were adept at interacting with World 3 would have gained a huge evolutionary 
advantage over those who could not. The important point about rationality is that 
it is not, and indeed cannot, be defined relative to any context. While the eye 
evolved to register light waves of specific frequencies no such constraints 
operate on rationality. We could not have evolved to apply standards of 
rationality to anticipating the escape route that our prey is likely to take and not 
be able to apply those same methods to constructing iron tools, bridges, or 
particle accelerators. 
As human rationality evolved in conjunction with our linguistic abilities 
we not only confronted a pre-existing World 3 but we began to actively create 
our own World 3 environment. A good example of this self-created environment 
comes from Popper who describes a meeting with Bertrand Russell: 
Many years ago I visited Bertrand Russell in his rooms at Trinity College and he 
showed me a manuscript of his in which there was not a single correction for many 
pages. With the help of his pen, he had instructed the paper. This is very different 
indeed from what I do. My own manuscripts are full of corrections - so full that it 
is easy to see that I am working by something like trial and error; by more or less 
random fluctuations from which I select what appears to me fitting. We may pose 
the question whether Russell did not do something similar, though only in his 
mind, and perhaps not even consciously, and at any rate very rapidly. For indeed. 
what seems to be instruction is frequently based upon a round about mechanism of 
selection ... 
I suggest that we might try out the conjecture that something like this happens in 
many cases. We may indeed conjecture that Bertrand Russell produced almost as 
many trial fonnulations as I do, but that his mind worked more quickly than mine 
in trying them out and rejecting the non-fitting verbal candidates. (popper 1987: 
145-6) 
We have here a nice example of the way that an individual mind creates for itself 
an environment of conjectures and objective knowledge within which it can 
reason. Though Popper claims to be producing almost random fluctuations this 
can not be quite right. The story of the thousand monkeys at the thousand 
typewriters comes to mind here, though one can imagine a situation where the 
brain produced random combinations of words and concepts for the scrutiny of 
the self, such a method of thought could not possibly generate the vast quantity 
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of more or less coherent thoughts we all experience. Rather, it must be the case 
that fed with the appropriate material the mindlbrain generates a series of novel 
re-combinations all of which are to a certain degree logically coherent. It may 
well be the case that most of the trial combinations are edited or discarded well 
before they become conscious. Those that make it to the level of consciousness, 
and especially for those that survive to be recorded, become World 3 objects and 
thereafter are themselves the subject of appraisal and re-combination. I should 
note that it is not in virtue of their being conscious that such recombinations 
become World 3 objects. We know from empirical research on neuronal 
adequacy (neuronal adequacy relates to minimum time span a neuronal state 
must persist if it is to generate conscious awareness) that those states which 
generate conscious awareness involve proportionately larger neuronal assemblies 
and remain active for a proportionately longer period of time than those that do 
not. This, it seems plausible to suggest, makes it more probable that they will 
become the objects of other neuronal states 'attention'. 
Whether innate or learnt it seems likely that the brain is wired such that it 
produces grammatically correct sentences without the intervention of a conscious 
self. I suggest that something similar goes on in the brains of those who seek to 
address such questions as the problem of induction, of structure and agency or of 
quantum indeterminacy. Their prior knowledge of and experience within their 
respective disciplines wires their brains such that only relatively plausible 
solutions are generated. The more prior knowledge and experience one has of a 
discipline the more likely one's initial conjectures are to hit the mark. Anyone 
who has considered an issue for a prolonged period of time will recognise this 
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from reviewing early drafts of their work which, in retrospect, appear laughable 
to their author. 
The phenomenology of rational thought lends some support to this 
hypothesis. When we approach a problem we begin by feeding the brain with a 
good number of theories, conjectures, evidence, etc. from which, without 
conscious intervention, thoughts and ideas that are an amalgam of and a 
reworking of previous ideas pop out. We have no phenomenal experience of the 
process of reasoning only of its consequences. The self passively experiences the 
scales of rational judgement which have been weighted by some non-conscious 
process. What does one do when one engages in rational decision making? 
Speaking for myself I do not do anything. I experience certain thoughts, some 
negative others positive, some trivial or irrelevant, and a good many that are 
emotionally charged, and after some time I experience a decision or a conclusion 
popping into my mind without my having done anything. If there really is a self 
weighing up the alternatives then it is a self of which I am unaware. 
Perhaps one day connectionism, or some similar discipline, will elucidate 
the ways in which non-rational bits of matter are able to make novel scientific 
discoveries, create works of art and develop theories of evolutionary 
epistemology. Such an achievement, it seems, is some way off, and the mind 
boggling complexity of any imaginable solution beguiles the imagination into 
conceiving of the project as an ill-conceived flight offancy. It is much simpler 
and more intuitively plausible to conceive of reason as a faculty belonging to and 
exercised by an autonomous self By doing so, however, we surrender any 
attempt at explanation by invoking some mysterious 'mind-stuff', to borrow 
Dennett's phrase. As this is a work in philosophy and social theory we need not 
concern ourselves with the empirical details of a theory of evolutionary 
epistemology, nevertheless, if possible it is incumbent upon us to present our 
theories in a manner which is both intuitively plausible and logically coherent 
(the two not necessarily being close bedfellows). The following quote from 
Campbell goes some way to achieving this task. 
A major empirical achievement of the sociology of science is the evidence of the 
ubiquity of simultaneous invention. If many scientists are trying variations on the 
same corpus of current scientific knowledge, and if their trials are being edited by 
the same stable external reality, then the selected variants are apt to be similar, the 
same discovery encountered independently by numerous workers. This process is 
no more mysterious than that all of a set of blind rats, each starting with quite 
different patterns of initial responses, learn the same maze patterns, WIder the 
maze's common editorship of the varied response repertoires. (Campbell 1987: 71) 
Where scientists ( and rats) have an external physical reality to edit their 
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conjectures, social scientists, philosophers, mathematicians, logicians and (to an 
even greater degree) artists, are often several floors removed from the editor's 
office. Though ultimately all objective knowledge must be grounded in external 
reality, the above disciplines frequently have to deal exclusively with World 3 
objects embodied in World 1 texts. In such cases, despite their being far removed 
from physical reality, they are able to test their theories and conjectures against 
the autonomous world of objective knowledge (World 3). There is a danger 
common to all disciplines that operate solely with World 3 objects embodied in 
World 1 texts of becoming little more than internally coherent language games 
with little or no connection to the physical or social realities they purport to be 
about. It is important to recognise that World 3 may be autonomous without 
being true. A good example of this comes from science fiction writing. A science 
fiction writer is constrained by the pre-existing cultural, technical and physical 
'laws' of their genre and these laws in part determine the realms of possibility. 
Previous films, series, and books become the autonomous World 3 environment 
which 'edits' the author's storylines. The danger is that academics have the 
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potential to become constrained by their own 'fictional' World 3 environment in 
just the same way as science fiction writers are constrained by theirs. Once texts, 
authors, or theories, gain currency within a discipline and are accepted as true, 
they exert a power on future writers that is analogous to that of the physical 
world on those working in the natural sciences. There are several schools of 
thought within the social sciences that might be thought to have fallen into this 
trap. Certain strands of critical and deconstructive social thought, for example, 
might be seen as little more than internally coherent language games. One 
candidate for this line of criticism is Marcuse's Eros and Civilization (1998). 
Marcuse's seminal work is based almost exclusively on Freudian and Marxian 
theories. Marcuse's aim was to unify Freudian and Marxian theory in order to 
develop a critical theory of contemporary society. How successful Marcuse was 
in this endeavour is not an issue that I wish to tackle here, the point at issue is 
that Marcuse was operating almost exclusively within a World 3 environment 
(there is no rigorous empirical work contained in the text). There is a fact of the 
matter about whether these two theories can be unified, but it is an objective fact 
that is independent of the truth of either theory. The works of Marxists and 
Freudians (World 3 objects) are in this case the editors of Marcuse's theories and 
conjectures and have far more authority than an independent physical or social 
reality. Given the well known speculative nature of Freud's work, his lack of 
rigour in documenting case studies, and his reluctance to consider the possibility 
that his patients might be sutTering from organic illnesses (see Webster 1995), 
one of the foundations for Marcuse's project is of dubious worth. Couple this 
with the dogmatism of the Marxism of the period and Marcuse's World 3 
environment does not look conducive to the discovery of truth. Now, of course, 
Eros and Civilization is a World 3 object and forms part of the environment in 
which contemporary critical theorists reason. 
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The existence of an autonomous World 3, in conjunction with an 
evolutionary epistemology that explains how we can come to have knowledge of 
the content of World 3, provides the groundwork for a realist perspective on 
rationality. This then allows us to counter the relativism/social constructionism 
of certain currents within the sociology of knowledge such as the 'strong 
programme', which views all knowledge as normative. Academics and students 
within the social sciences (and sociology in particular) have become obsessed 
with issues of self-reflexivity and interpretation that have emanated from within 
postmodemism. No longer do they see themselves as dispassionate observers 
who can at least attempt to understand and report about other cultures (even 
those that are similar to their own). Such an attitude begs the question of why 
bother continuing to work within the social sciences. After all, if one abandons 
the belief that the social world is open to objective investigation one may as well 
take to novel writing. 
Epiphenomenalism does lead to scepticism about the correspondence 
between PE and objective reality, since if epiphenomenalism is true it would 
make no causal difference if there were no correspondence between the content 
ofPE and objective reality. However, epiphenomenalism is consistent with 
realism and is straightforwardly compatible with evolutionary epistemology. The 
only caveat is that the realm of objective knowledge is restricted by 
epiphenomenalism to that which is contained in Worlds 1 and 3. World 2 may 
also contain knowledge about objective reality, but since such knowledge is, 
according to epiphenomenalism, inaccessible and cannot be tested against 
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objective reality, we may never be in a position to judge how closely the content 
ofPE mirrors objective reality. The supervenience thesis does lend some support 
to the hypothesis that the content ofPE covaries in a systematic and reliable way 
with external reality, but it cannot guarantee correspondence. To explicate, 
evolutionary epistemology guarantees the veridicality of perception for a person 
with normal vision and sufficient light (at least in the majority of cases). That is 
to say, we can be sure that if a person directs their gaze towards a tree their 
brains will register certain of the objective features of the tree. Knowledge of 
such objective features then enables the person to, for example, walk around it 
without bumping into it. The supervenience ofPE on neuronal events also 
guarantees that every instantiation of a given neural event will invariably be 
accompanied by the same PE. Thus we can be sure that every time a person 
perceives a tree their brain will instantiate a neural state with tree related content. 
We can also be sure that every time a person's brain instantiates a neural state 
with tree related content they will experience a similar PE. What we can not be 
sure about is that their PE corresponds in any way to the objective features of the 
tree they are perceiving. The conclusion then is a restrained scepticism about PE, 
but confidence about the possibility of objective knowledge. Epiphenomenalism, 
therefore, lends no support to relativism as long as that knowledge has been 
tested (in an appropriate way) against Worlds 1 and/or 3. I will leave the 
worrying about what the 'appropriate way' is to philosophers of science. The 
greatest threat to rationality, therefore, comes not from epiphenomenalism or the 
denial of the existence of an autonomous self, but from those who embrace the 
contradiction and attempt to reason away reason. 
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Chapter 9 
Action, Social Action, and Epiphenomenalism 
In previous chapters we have sought to explain what man is and have set aside 
questions about what man does. In this final chapter I want to explore the latter 
question and consider how we should approach the study of action given the 
conclusions drawn earlier. Action, it seems fair to say, is the most important 
concept within the social sciences. Without a sound understanding of action, 
including a basic definition of the concept, an account of the conditions 
necessary for action, and an appreciation of how action relates to interaction and 
social action, all conduct would be unintelligible. That said, however, it seems 
unlikely that the traditional concept of action, being (loosely) conduct which is 
both voluntary and subjectively meaningful, can survive within any discipline 
that embraces epiphenomenalism. Once subjective states are conceived as 
causally inefficacious, and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
conduct is rendered spurious, the distinction between action and behaviour (the 
latter being defined, again loosely for now, as reactive responses) collapses. 
Given the importance of the concept of action, therefore, our primary 
goal in this chapter has to be to reconstruct the concept in a manner which is 
compatible with an epiphenomenalist ontology. Equally important, however, is to 
defend this reconstructed concept against those who doubt the usefulness of the 
concept or even the existence of action as a subject matter distinct from social 
action. Here I refer to those that have bought into what Campbell calls the 
paradigm of social situationalism and the myth of social action. Social action, 
defined as action which possesses a social meaning, has, according to Campbell, 
come to displace the more general concept of action (which, as I stated above, is 
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defined as conduct which is voluntary and subjectively meaningful). The upshot 
of this shift in perspective is that sociologists no longer have the tools at their 
disposal to provide a causal account of how and why people behave the way that 
they do. Since the ultimate goal of any science is causal explanation, this is a 
worrying trend that I shall attempt to counter in this chapter. Doing so will 
involve, somewhat paradoxically given the subject matter of this thesis, making 
mind matter more in the ontology and methodology of the social sciences. 
Specifically it will involve making actors' accounts that are traditionally thought 
of as referring to PEs central to the study of action. That is to say, I will argue 
that accounts which cite such things as beliefs, hopes, fears, desires, interests, 
motivations and so on, should be the primary (though by no means exclusive) 
resource for the study of action. I have previously hinted that the referent of such 
mentalistic terms is not, as has previously been assumed, PEs. Rather, if 
epiphenomenalism is true, the referent of mentalistic terms is the content of 
causally efficacious neural states. Thus the stated aim of 'making mind matter 
more' is perhaps a little misleading since what I mean is that the language 
traditionally associated with the mind should be made to matter more. 
Before we get ahead of ourselves let's begin by outlining the ontological 
implications of epiphenomenalism for the traditional concept of action. At the 
ontological level, since this thesis is concerned only with the individual and does 
not consider the interaction between man and society, we will confine our 
discussion to the proximate causes of action. That is to say, we will consider 
what internal causes are implicated in causing actions and ignore the wider 
question of how these internal causes came to exist in the individual at any given 
time. Thus we will consider what internal states y of an individual caused action 
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x, and not what social or biological forces were causally effective in bringing 
about state y. The most obvious implication of epiphenomenalism for action is 
that all actions are caused by antecedent and synchronous physical states and not 
by the PEs that accompany them. PE, being entirely inefficacious, is thus 
irrelevant for a causal study of action. As I previously noted, however, despite 
PEs themselves being irrelevant to the causal study of action, the language that is 
thought to describe those experiences is essential. 
This obvious conclusion presents us with our first quandary. Traditionally 
action has been differentiated from behaviour by reference to their respective 
causes. Action is typically defined as voluntary or purposeful conduct in contrast 
to behaviour which is viewed as reactive or (sometimes) habitual conduct. 
Despite the long standing debates over free will versus determinism and reasons 
and causes that have made reaching a precise definition of voluntary action 
notoriously difficult, it is nevertheless the case that there is a common consensus 
that voluntary action is caused by some conscious act of 'will'. Since 
epiphenomenalism offers such a radical alternative to this debate we need not 
revisit this old battleground and consider what is meant by 'willed' conduct. 
Suffice to say that in all the traditional definitions of voluntary action PEs of a 
particular kind always playa causal role. That is to say, whether one is a 
determinist who views actions as just one more link in a relentless causal chain, 
or one believes in the existence of an irreducible subject who causes actions by 
performing an act of will, action is always differentiated from behaviour by 
having the right kind of causal history and phenomenal states of a particular kind 
always form part of this causal history. If epiphenomenalism is true, however, 
then it would seem to render this action-behaviour distinction meaningless. After 
all, if all movement is caused by internal physical states then what difference 
does it make if some of those states are accompanied by epiphenomenal 
experiences? 
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Despite this I will argue that the action-behaviour distinction is worth 
retaining. Epiphenomenalism notwithstanding, there surely is a difference in kind 
between a reflex knee jerk and the 'deliberate' act of kicking someone in the 
shins. The challenge is to find a means of differentiating between the two classes 
in a way that does not rely on giving PE a causal role. One means of doing so 
might be by retaining the classificatory emphasis on the causal history of the act, 
but to emphasise the causal role of antecedent physical states in place of the 
traditional focus on phenomenal states. So, for example, we might say that 
movement is action if it is caused by physical states that are themselves the 
subvenient base for PEs such as intending, trying, concentrating, etc. This then 
makes PE causally relevant in predicting and explaining actions. Things, 
however, are not quite that simple. Although I have previously claimed that there 
is a systematic and reliable relationship between the occurrence of certain 
phenomenal states (such as pain) and certain behaviour patterns (like 
withdrawal), this relationship can not be exploited for the purposes of either 
defining the difference between action and behaviour or for prediction and 
explanation. The reason for this is quite simply that because PEs are 
epiphenomenal their occurrence cannot be used to demonstrate the existence of a 
causally effective subvenient base since to do so they would require some causal 
powers (indicating the presence of causally efficacious properties is itself a 
casually efficacious property). The claim, therefore, that PE is causally relevant 
must be read as shorthand for the following: PE covaries in a systematic and 
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reliable way with neural states that are causally efficacious in bringing about 
actions. Thus pain covaries with withdrawal because pain covaries with a neural 
state/mechanism that causes withdrawal. Similarly, both pain and the subvenient 
base for pain covary in a systematic and reliable way with certain behavioural 
manifestations of pain such as wincing, crying, screaming and expressions such 
as 'ouch' and '(insert your favourite expletive) that hurt'. Thus we can use both a 
person's observed behaviour and their accounts as the raw material upon which 
to make the action-behaviour distinction. Throughout the rest of this chapter any 
use oflanguage that implies the causal efficacy of PE should be read as 
shorthand for the above. 
This classification of behaviour and action has certain behaviourist 
overtones that some will find objectionable. Objectionable it may be but some 
form of behaviourism seems to be the inescapable consequence of 
epiphenomenalism. Though I can do little more than flag up the issue here it also 
seems that epiphenomenalism lends considerable support to a number of 
behaviourist doctrines. Perhaps the most striking example concerns the 
behaviourist theory of how people learn the use of words referring to sensations 
and mental states. Wittgenstein has done much to dispel the idea that people 
learn the meaning of terms for sensations on the model of 'object and 
designation'. In his famous beetle in a box analogy Wittgenstein showed the 
absurdity of the idea that people know the meaning of words like 'pain' only 
from their own case - by naming a private object or picture (see Wittgenstein 
1968). Wittgenstein's argument, which we shall encounter again below, is that 
such private pictures have no relevance in the grammar of the expression of 
sensations since there is no way of ensuring that the same mental picture is 
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present in the minds of different users of the language or, indeed, that the picture 
remains constant in the mind ofa single language user. His conclusion was that 
the meaning of mental states (such as hoping, wanting, believing) and the terms 
for sensations cannot be learned exclusively from introspecting one's mental 
states and naming what one finds. Instead, part of the meaning of these terms 
must be derived from, and learned with reference to, their public use. If 
epiphenomenalism is true then it turns out that no mental 'pictures', including 
such things as the PE of pain, hoping, wanting, believing, etc., have a causal role 
in our learning the meaning and use of mentalistic terms. Furthermore, once 
learned we cannot even use these public terms as a means of giving expression to 
our subjective states. To do so, of course, would again be to ascribe a causal role 
to PE. Thus it would be impossible for a person to learn the meaning of the word 
'pain' by observing other people's pain-behaviour and then to use that 
knowledge to label their own experience of pain. Epiphenomenalism then would 
seem to lend considerable support to behaviourism generally and the doctrine of 
logical behaviourism in particular. The central tenet of logical behaviourism is 
that the meaning of mental terms is exhausted by the observations that are used 
in the determination of their use. That is to say, once one has learned the 
meaning of a word by observation of the external world and the behaviour of 
others, there is no 'surplus meaning', PE or Wittgensteinian 'picture' which 
contributes further to its meaning. Though Wittgenstein' s arguments, and those 
of the logical behaviourists, were designed to deal predominantly with the 
meaning of mental terms, if epiphenomenalism is true then it extends to the use 
of all words including, for example, nouns and proper nouns. 
229 
The behaviour-action distinction can still be usefully retained even in the 
absence of a voluntary-involuntary distinction. It seems fair to suppose that 
behaviour and actions are the culmination of two quite different kinds of causal 
history. Though we may be in the dark about the specific details of these causal 
histories (and will likely have to wait some time for the special sciences to fill 
the gaps in our knowledge) knowing from which kind of causal history a 
person's conduct results, and labelling that conduct action or behaviour 
accordingly, will remain an essential tool in predicting and explaining that 
conduct. The most effective means of illustrating this point is with an example. 
Consider a medical researcher who is interested in why people engage in conduct 
to which they are addicted or to which there is a possibility that they might 
become addicted. In the first case, of conduct which is caused by addiction and 
hence may be termed behaviour rather than action, there will be a physical cause 
that is different in kind from conduct which only has the potential to become 
addictive and hence constitutes true action. Being able to tell the difference 
between action and behaviour, so defined, will be essential if the medical 
researcher's goal is to develop ways of preventing people from engaging in 
activities that have the potential to become addictive (such as the first cigarette, 
shot of heroin or visit to a casino). In the case of conduct caused by addiction, 
there may often be behavioural cues that allow researchers to identify the cause 
of the conduct in question (such as the visual manifestations of withdrawal 
symptoms). Often, however, it will only be by listening to an actor's account of 
their conduct that the researcher will be able to gauge the level of addiction and 
hence identify the cause of the actor's conduct. 
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Social situationalism: the paradigm 
Having briefly considered some of the more obvious ontological consequences of 
epiphenomenalism for action theory I now want to consider the contemporary 
approach to action theory within sociology. Here we will focus much of our 
attention on Campbell's recent (1996) work The Myth of Social Action in which 
Campbell examines what he calls the dogma of social situationalism. Campbell 
describes his work as a critique of a critique. It is a critique of social 
situationalism which is itself a critique of traditional Weberian action theory. 
Campbell's aim is to defend Weberian action theory against the contemporary 
obsession with interpersonal communication, and the interpersonal construction 
of meaning, over intrapersonal processes in the understanding of action. That is 
to say, in all areas relating to the ontology and methodology of action theory, 
social situationalists place greater emphasis on the social dimension of action 
than on its subjective and private dimension. Although an epiphenomenalist 
ontology does not sit easily with Weber's (since Weber was certainly an 
OMRist) it is nevertheless the case, or so I shall argue, that Weber was at least 
looking in the right place for an explanation of action. Campbell claims that 
, ... the key feature of classical action theory was the attempt to explain the 
conduct of individuals via an understanding of the meanings which their actions 
have for them' (ibid. 30). Now although epiphenomenalists' approach to 
meaning is radically different from that of Weber or the classical tradition 
generally, they would still argue that classical action theory is a fundamentally 
sound methodology. That is to say, if the version of epiphenomenalism set out in 
the previous chapters is correct, to understand action one has to look primarily to 
the internal states that are the proximate cause of action. Thus, classical action 
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theory is fundamentally correct to seek an explanation for action that refers to the 
internal states of the actor. Where an epiphenomenalist approach and that of the 
classical tradition diverge is over the issue of which internal states are causally 
efficacious. Where the classical tradition views PE as the irreducible cause of 
behaviour and action, epiphenomenalists view those states as causally inert. 
Nevertheless, as I argued in the introduction to part II, if we treat actors' 
accounts as referring to causally potent neural states rather than causally 
inefficacious phenomenal states, the language of folk psychology can still be 
usefully employed as a means of predicting and explaining behaviour. It is 
because actors' accounts are causally relevant in this sense that the methodology 
of classical action theory is fundamentally sound. As such Weber's methodology 
is one that can be moulded to suit an epiphenomenalist ontology in a way that the 
various methodologies comprising social situationalism cannot. 
Because social situationalism privileges the interpersonal and 
intersubjective it fails, according to Campbell (see ibid. 153), to address the 
question of why action happens at all. That is to say, social situationalism fails to 
explain why a person chooses action over inaction or one course of action out of 
the myriad of possibilities open to them. I will, of course, expand on this point 
later, but the important distinction is that classical action theory correctly 
identifies the cause of action as being 'in the head' of the actor and, therefore, on 
this issue at least, is not antithetical to my own position. Social situationalism, in 
contrast, is typically not interested in what is going on in the head of the actor 
and consequently lapses into observer relative descriptions of social interaction. 
It is important to stress that this is not a mere methodological quirk of social 
situationalism: it is a problem that goes to the ontological heart of the paradigm 
and nothing less than its replacement will get sociology out of its current 
predicament. 
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Campbell is on the whole very charitable to social situationalists, 
declaring on page one of the critique that sociology should be a broad church 
'which permits its members to study any aspect of social phenomena in any 
manner they wish.' This is, perhaps, too charitable an approach. I have for a long 
time wondered quite what the point of sociology is, or rather what the point of 
contemporary sociology is. Historically sociology was a discipline that sought to 
causally explain the structure of human societies as well as the interaction of its 
members and groups. Until recently the ontological foundation for this project 
was a concept of man as a creative and active subject who, by their actions, 
helped to shape the social world of which they were a part. That is not to say that 
the early sociologists did not place great importance on social and economic 
forces, for clearly they did, but these forces, where active, were always seen as 
operating through the medium of active subjects. Though many of those 
explanations now strike us as rather simplistic, naive and in many cases 
ideologically prescribed, the endeavour was both laudable and defensible. The 
belief that one can understand (as well as predict and explain) actions from the 
inside made these important projects which, if successful, could have a real 
impact on peoples lives. Contrast the work of the early pioneers with the fruits of 
conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, dramaturgical analysis, all conducted 
by practitioners that are so consumed with postmodemist inspired anxieties that 
little empirical work gets done and one wonders if one is looking at the same 
discipline. Now in one sense Campbell is quite correct, we have no right to tell 
people how to do sociology, but unless the ultimate goal is a causal explanation 
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or in some way helps to enhance the lives of the subjects of sociological research 
(and ultimately fund that research) then sociology will find it increasingly 
difficult to justify both its existence and its funding. 
As we shall see, the defining feature of the dominant paradigm within 
sociology (social situational ism) is the privileging of interpersonal processes 
over intrapersonal processes in the understanding of action. This has the 
methodological consequence of making interaction the focus of empirical 
research and social theory and fosters a disinterest towards actors' points of 
view. Prima facie this development within sociology would appear to be well 
suited to an epiphenomenalist position. After all, if mental states are causally 
inefficacious why bother with the old style Weberian interpretative method, far 
better to focus on interpersonal communication which we know to be causally 
potent and is relatively untouched by epiphenomenalism. Interpersonal 
communication is, of course, untouched by epiphenomenalism because, despite 
often making references to PEs and propositional attitudes, the medium of 
communication (sight, hearing, etc.) is not dependent on PE for its efficacy. That 
is to say, the causal mechanisms implicated in one individual asking another to 
'pass the condiments', and the other doing so, (an example that Bhaskar (1998: 
105) erroneously believed falsified epiphenomenalism and physicalist 
determinism) are explainable in microphysiological terms which make no 
reference to PE. One might expect therefore, that the methodology of social 
situationalism would be ideally suited to an epiphenomenalist ontology since it 
makes little if any use of phenomenal states. As I have previously noted, 
however, although PEs themselves should have no place in causal explanations, 
mentalistic terms and the language offolk psychology certainly do. In chapter 4 I 
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argued that folk psychology remains a useful predictive tool so long as we 
interpret the referent offolk psychological terms to be causally efficacious neural 
states and not their epiphenomenal consequences. Indeed, barring some great and 
improbable leap forward in neuroscience, folk psychology and the interpretative 
method will remain the only means of gaining access to causally potent neural 
states. Thus the methodology of classical action theory is entirely consistent with 
an epiphenomenalist ontology such as my own. 
Before beginning our discussion of contemporary action theory within 
sociology - or rather the lack of it - it might be worth reminding ourselves of the 
classical position on action. Here I will confine myself to a brief discussion of 
Weber's original position and the distinction he drew between action and social 
action, before outlining Campbell's claim that this has been usurped by social 
situationalists. For a detailed discussion of Weber and the classical tradition, as 
well as the influences that led to its revision, I would encourage the reader to 
refer to Campbell's text. Weber, in common with most philosophical action 
theorists, draws a distinction between behaviour, viewed as involuntary or 
reactive responses (often including habitual behaviour), and action, which is 
differentiated from behaviour by being both voluntary and subjectively 
meaningful conduct. Social action, in Weberian terms, is then defined as action 
which is orientated towards others. For Weber the defining characteristic of all 
action was that the act possessed a subjective meaning for its executor. Social 
action is, therefore, no less subjectively meaningful than action and should 
properly be conceived as a sub-class of the more general category of action. 
Campbell's contention is that action, so defined, has all but disappeared 
from both social theory and the empirical practice of the discipline and has been 
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replaced by the concept of social action. Despite this transition having frequently 
been made (erroneously) in Weber's name, the modem concept of social action, 
according to Campbell, bears little relation to Weber's original definition. For 
social situationalists the defining characteristic of social action is not, as it was 
for Weber, action that is orientated towards others, but instead is action which 
possesses a social meaning. Having made this claim, which we shall examine in 
detail below, situationalists extended their argument to claim that, since 
according to their ontology all action possesses a social meaning, all action is 
necessarily social action. In this way action was dropped from sociology's 
ontology and with it went the interpretative method and any interest in subjective 
states. 
Although the historical details of how, when and by whom this transition 
was effected are of little interest to us here, the arguments proffered by the 
situationalists to support their contention that all action is necessarily social are 
worthy of consideration. The first argument to be considered here is the claim 
made by situationalists that mental states, as they have been traditionally 
understood, either do not exist, or if they do are inaccessible. The basic tactic 
employed by situationalists is to relocate meaning in social situations, 
'situationalists deny that meaning resides in the minds of actors, insisting instead 
that it is located in the social situations and it is shared, "intersubjective" and 
contextually determined and manifest' (ibid. 43). As Campbell correctly notes 
(see ibid. 45, 53), strictly speaking meaning can only be located in the minds of 
individuals (though I would argue that such things as texts or theorems remain 
meaningful in the absence of any conscious observer). This ontological truism 
highlights something of a contradiction within the situationalists' paradigm, for it 
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is logically impossible for meaning to be located only in social situations and for 
it to be shared and intersubjective. For meaning to be shared and intersubjective 
the same meaning must be present in the minds of at least two individuals and, 
therefore, the claim that meaning resides in social situations rather than the 
minds of individuals must be false. Consequently the claim that meaning resides 
in social situations must 'be taken as shorthand for statements which specify the 
precise circumstances under which given meanings are registered in the minds of 
particular individuals' (ibid. 45). The longhand version of this claim might be 
that in denying that the mind is the location of meaning situationalists mean to 
suggest that the origin of meaning comes from social situations rather than being 
generated in the mind. If this is what the situationalists have in mind, however, 
then it is easily falsified by the existence of misunderstandings. If meaning really 
were generated by the situation and then somehow 'transmitted' into the minds 
of those present, or read from the situation, then one would expect those present 
to share the same understanding of the situation. The moment that one admits the 
existence of misunderstandings one has admitted that actors have somehow 
contributed to or distorted the meaning which the situation has imparted to them. 
In so doing they have created meaning independently of the social situation and 
the situationalists' claim must, again, be false. In addition to misunderstandings 
another obvious fact that can not be dealt with from within the situationalists' 
paradigm is the existence of original thought. This latter problem will be dealt 
with below. 
One of the arguments that situationalists use to justify their ignoring 
subjective mental states is what Campbell calls the argument by denial. This 
amounts to the claim that sociology can legitimately ignore subjective states and 
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intrapersonal processes because these states either do not exist or are accessible 
only through first person knowledge and hence are inaccessible to the researcher. 
One of the main sources of support for this thesis was drawn from Wittgenstein 
and the post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of Winch and others. In particular it 
was Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that the meaning ofa word is derived 
from the thing, or mental 'picture', that a word stands for that situationalists 
latched onto. However Wittgenstein's argument that the meaning of mentalistic 
terms does not derive from the mental 'pictures' to which words seem to refer, 
but instead derives from their use, has no implications for the debate surrounding 
the causal role of subjective states (at a methodological or an ontological level). 
The fact, for example, that the verb 'to imagine' could not exist in an absolutely 
private language! has nothing whatsoever to do with whether or not (for 
example) a climber's act of imagining themselves successfully completing the 
crux of a climb is causally efficacious in helping them to do so. Indeed we can 
take this argument a step further, for while it is certainly the case that in order for 
a climber to be able to say to himself or another, 'I am going to imagine myself 
successfully completing the crux of that route', they must make use of language 
(which is social in origin) the ability to perform the act itself is not dependent on 
any linguistic ability. Moreover, since the ability to imagine evolved in humans 
well before language, it must be the case that innumerable acts of a similar type 
were performed well before man uttered his first word. 
Since we have already discussed similar issues in previous chapters I do 
not want to overlabour the point here, but I should like to reiterate the claim 
I In an absolutely private language the referent of a word would be a mental picture of the object 
or concept to which the word refers. Wittgenstein successfully demonstrated that such a language 
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made earlier that although the origin of language is social its use can be entirely 
private. Thus although social situationalists are correct in their assertion that the 
genesis of meaning is dependent on intersubjective agreement relating to a 
situational context, once humans have acquired language they have acquired the 
ability to transcend its use in the social situation in which it was acquired. If this 
were not the case then there could never be any original thought since, by 
definition, original thought involves the independent creation of new meaning. 
What's more, as we noted in our discussion of Popper, original thought remains 
meaningful (in the sense, for example, of its being true or false) regardless of 
whether another conscious subject ever becomes aware of the content of that 
thOUght. This point is important because it denies situationalists the escape route 
(and one that might have particular appeal to social constructionists) of being 
able to claim that although individuals are able to formulate new sentences or 
write down new theorems, that these sentences and theorems only become 
meaningful once they have gained the assent of, for example, the scientific 
community. 
Subjective meaning in action and accounts 
In this section I want to contrast what I think are two different classes or types of 
action. Examples of type I actions are as follows: spinning a prayer wheel, 
hanging prayer flags, throwing salt over your left shoulder, waving goodbye. 
These are actions which are unquestionably subjectively meaningful to the actor 
performing them and, one would assume, where the subjective meaning is 
causally relevant in an explanation of the actions. They are also the types of 
would not be possible because, in essence, there is no means of ensuring the constancy of the 
mental referent. 
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action for which a relatively coherent explanation could be provided by the actor 
if their conduct were questioned. Contrast these examples, however, with type II 
actions such as chopping wood, cooking dinner, having a nap, taking the car in 
for a service and so on, and it is not at all clear what the subjective 'meaning' 
attached to these acts is. They are certainly examples of purposeful behaviour but 
they do not possess the same sort of readily identifiable subjective meanings as 
those of type I. It is worth asking why, if someone were questioned about an 
action of type I, they would be able to respond in a clear and coherent way, but if 
asked to explain an action of type II, they would likely respond with a look of 
puzzlement. One reason might be that that the meaning of the second class of 
actions is embedded in the act itself Chopping wood is just chopping wood and 
the meaning of the action is likely to be obvious from the context (i.e. a 
workplace or a domestic setting). Moreover, the purposes underlying such 
actions are likely to be universally understood and readily apparent. The 
subjective meaning that is attached to examples of actions that comprise the first 
class, in contrast, is in no sense inherent in the act. Spinning what one knows to 
be a prayer wheel, for example, is a different act from spinning what one takes to 
be just a piece of wood with marks inscribed on its surface. It is for this reason 
that one can confidently say that the subjective meaning that the actor ascribes to 
the act is causally relevant in any explanation of that act. The example also 
serves to highlight the fact, commented upon by Campbell, that an observer can 
not assume knowledge of the subjective states of the actor, or what the social 
meaning of the act might be, without directly enquiring as to the content of the 
person's mental states. From the perspective ofan observer, for example, there is 
no way of telling whether an individual is spinning a prayer wheel as an act of 
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worship or whether they are a naive tourist spinning what they take to be just a 
piece of wood with marks inscribed on its surface. Now it may turn out that the 
proportion of cases where misinterpretation occurs is insignificant and that 
researchers may continue to read off the subjective and/or social meaning of an 
act from observation alone. However, this is an empirical question which is yet 
to be settled and as such it remains a dangerous assumption (see Campbell 1996: 
132-135). The moral is that acts tend only to have a true subjective meaning 
rather than being just purposeful and intentional when the meaning or purpose is 
not embedded in the act. There are of course exceptions to this general rule, 
chopping wood might be an excuse to avoid getting down to writing the next 
chapter and in this case the meaning would no longer be embedded in the act. 
Nevertheless I think that this is a useful distinction and exceptions only serve to 
highlight the fact, recognised by all those working within the Weberian tradition, 
that the only way of finding out the subjective meaning of an act is to ask the 
actor. 
A second important distinction between the two classes of action is that 
the meaning of type I has to be learned (through socialisation) in a way that the 
purpose of type II actions do not. This should not be taken to mean that the 
ability to perform the second class of actions is somehow innate, or that their 
execution does not constitute a skilled performance on the behalf of the actor 
involved. Rather, it means that the type of knowledge invoked in actions of each 
type is different in kind. Actions of type I require that the individualleams and 
internalises a shared social meaning, whereas actions of type II require only the 
internalisation of practical and technical knowledge. This may provide a partial 
explanation for why sociologists have moved from Weber's wide definition of 
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action towards the modern narrow interpretation that action is behaviour that 
possesses a social meaning. The reason for this is that many of those actions that 
possess a true subjective meaning (as in type I), rather than being behaviour 
where the purpose is embedded in the act (as in type II), also have a social 
meaning. The boundary between the two classes is of course imprecise and the 
same act may, under different circumstances, fall under a different class. 
Chopping wood, as we have already discussed, may be a functional act or a 
conscious distraction from work. 
If contemporary sociologists insist on restricting the horizons of their 
empirical research and social theorising to those actions that are socially 
meaningful (roughly those that fall under the first class outlined above) then they 
will be blind to what is certainly the more common type of action (that which 
belongs to type II). It would be a rather pointless exercise to try to Quantify the 
proportion of actions that fall under either class, or the percentage of people's 
time that is spent performing actions of either type. Any such attempt would be 
so reliant on such things as the definition of an act (which is notoriously 
difficult) as to be meaningless. What is clear, however, is that without actions of 
type II, life, let alone social life, would be impossible. Moreover, they are acts 
that are not necessarily easy to perform. Many such acts require considerable 
effort on behalf of the actor, an investment of time and an emotional or financial 
commitment. The social sciences, therefore, dare not take their performance for 
granted and should treat them as just as important and problematic as acts of type 
I. 
As I have previously noted, one of the issues that Campbell views as 
central to a theory of action concerns the question of how action is possible at all, 
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and what are the necessary conditions for the execution of actions. Now it goes 
without saying that many of those necessary conditions fall under what Giddens 
calls enabling and constraining conditions (cultural capital, the distribution of 
resources, the pre-existence of language and social institutions, etc.) but just as 
important are the antecedent internal states of the actor. To state what should be 
blatantly obvious to anyone that has not been taken under the spell of social 
situationalism, the only way to investigate a person's antecedent internal states is 
to ask the person involved. What should also be obvious from the previous 
chapters is that this is a methodological truism that transcends ontological 
disputes about the causal efficacy of mental states. That said, however, one's 
ontological position regarding the causal efficacy ofPE does determine how one 
treats the answers one receives. An OMRist (who, it will be remembered believes 
in the causal efficacy ofPE) is likely to treat an agent's account, when their 
account cites antecedent PEs as the cause of their action, as a sufficient 
explanation for the proximate cause of the behaviour in question. To provide a 
complete explanation of an individual's behaviour, of course, the OMRist will 
want to delve deeper into the individual's past, as well as their social and 
material background, but will be content that they have identified the proximate 
cause of behaviour once they have an explanation that cites the individual's 
antecedent PEs (which includes such things as their cognitive and conative 
states). Those persuaded by epiphenomenalism will have a similar interest in the 
individual's background, the social and environmental circumstances, etc., but 
they will be reticent about treating an individual's antecedent PEs (which for the 
OMRist constitutes the proximate cause) as a sufficient explanation. The reason, 
to summarise material from the preceding chapters, is that epiphenomenalists do 
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not view those physical states that are referred t02 in individuals' accounts of 
their actions as being sufficient causal explanations. The reasons for this are 
twofold. Firstly, as Dennett observes, it is all too easy to imagine that accounts of 
actions mirror the thought processes that are the putative cause of the action, 
rather than being highly edited versions. Secondly, during our discussion of 
supervenience we agreed with Kim that the subvenient bases of mental states 
have disjunctive causal powers. This means that each time a given mental state is 
instantiated it may be realised by a physical state with different causal powers. 
The same goes for actors' accounts of their actions. Even more problematic is the 
fact that mental states, such as a reason, a belief, a desire, etc., do not occur in 
isolation. Almost all decisions and actions, therefore, are the outcome of the 
combined causal powers of the physical instantiations of many different reasons, 
beliefs and desires. Moreover, not only are the causal powers of the physical 
instantiations of each of the elements of this composite state disjunctive, but their 
causal powers are modified by their interaction with other elements of the 
composite state. This latter point means only that, for example, a desire to have a 
glass of wine with dinner will have different causal powers dependent upon 
whatever other beliefs and desires the individual has. Thus if a person believes 
that they will have to drive home after dinner, or do some work, their belief may 
influence their decision about whether or not to have a drink. 
From an epiphenomenalist perspective, because of the disjunctive causal 
powers of the subvenient base of mental states, explanations that cite mental 
2 I should remind the reader that by 'referred to' I do not mean that the individual is indicating 
that they have any knowledge of their causally efficacious physical states. By refers to I mean 
that if we apply the sort of theory of reference discussed in chapter 4 to the folk psychological 
terms (such as propositional attitudes) that appear in individual's accounts of their actions. then 
these terms can be seen as referring to the causally efficacious subvenient base not the PE. 
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states can only ever be partial explanations. The upshot of all this is that if one 
adopts an epiphenomenalist perspective towards action then one will be far more 
interested than OMRists in the background of the individual as well as 
sociobiological and neurological explanations which may usefully supplement an 
individual's account of the proximate cause of their behaviour. It may well be the 
case that OMRists will also have recourse, on occasion, to sociobiological or 
neurological explanations (though there is little evidence to suggest that 
contemporary sociologists pay anything more than lip service to the natural 
sciences) but when they do it will be to provide a structuring rather than 
triggering or proximate cause of the behaviour in question (for an explanation of 
this distinction see my discussion ofDretske's dual explanandum strategy in 
chapter 2). 
Conclusion 
We have covered a lot of ground over the course of this thesis and come to some 
very controversial conclusions. I now want to sum up and conclude by applying 
some of these conclusions to a real case. The example I propose to consider is 
that of having an animal put to sleep. Though this is perhaps not a standard 
sociological example, it is ideally suited to our purposes since it allows us to 
consider just about every aspect of action that might be of interest to social 
scientists.3 It is an action where both cognitive and conative states play important 
causal roles; there is a central place for expert knowledge and rationality; and it 
can be analysed as a social action but could also plausible be construed as simply 
action. Moreover it is well suited to demonstrating the failure of social 
3 For those readers that would prefer a more standard sociological example. the case could easilv 
be applied to. for example, situations where carers are involved in a person's decision to end th~ir 
life due to a tenninal illness. 
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situationalism since the situationalist perspective ignores intrapersonal processes 
which our previous discussion would suggest are of central importance for both 
an understanding and a causal explanation of the action. Furthermore it is not 
clear who is performing the action (vet or owner), whether it is a single action, a 
compound action or several different actions. In short, it provides us with ample 
scope to apply Campbell's critique of social situationalism to a real case and 
allows us to consider how a sociology that has embraced epiphenomenalism 
might begin to approach action and social action. We will begin by describing 
the case from an OMRist perspective. This will then allow us to contrast the 
orthodox account with a description and causal analysis of the action from both 
an epiphenomenalist and a social situationalist perspective. In what follows we 
will focus on the cause of the action as well as its execution and consider both 
from the two OMRist perspectives that we encountered in chapters 7 and 8. 
Option 1, free action performed by the self: the decision 
Acting on the advice of the veterinary surgeon an irreducible self weighed up the 
diagnosis, the best interest of the dog, their duty of care to the animal, the 
emotional consequences of the action (feelings of loss), and inaction (feelings of 
guilt at not having acted in the dog's best interest), and concluded that the best 
course of action would be to have the dog put to sleep. 
Option 1: the performance 
During the decision making process and the events that followed, the owner had 
to exercise their free will. Their decision was an act of true libertarian free will 
and following their decision they had to choose to continue with the course of 
action they had decided upon. At any point they could have freely chosen to 
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cancel the appointment and allow their dog to die naturally. Performing the meta-
action of having their dog put to sleep involved the performance of a number of 
more basic actions. Some of these actions would, under normal circumstances, 
constitute mere behaviour or habitual actions. Driving to the veterinary surgery, 
for example, becomes a series of actions in their own right. The emotionally 
charged situation means that even such things as keeping up a constant speed, 
signalling a turn or changing gear, are actions which require close monitoring 
and conscious acts of will. 
Once in the waiting room part of the owner's attention is turned to 
maintaining a dignified presentation of self Again, until the completion of the 
action the owner has to continue to freely choose to pursue the course of action 
set in motion by their prior decision. 
Option 2, action follows from causal necessity: the decision 
When the owner receives the diagnosis by telephone they come to believe that 
their dog has a terminal cancer and that their quality of life is unlikely to 
improve. Together with pre-existing beliefs and desires (such as the belief that 
when one becomes a dog owner one tacitly accepts that one has a duty of care 
towards the animal, a desire not to see their dog in pain, and so on) their newly 
acquired belief completes a set which provides causally sufficient conditions 
(ceteris parihus) for their decision to have their dog put to sleep. That is to say, 
barring the intervention of external factors the belief-desire combination will 
cause them to make and keep an appointment to have their dog put to sleep. 
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Option 2: the perfonnance 
Once made the decision sets in motion a causal chain that involves the use of 
practical reason. The owner's faculty for practical reason takes the decision as its 
input and generates a plan of action for how best to enact the decision. Its output 
includes such things as the making of the appointment, planning the route to the 
surgery, and so on. In contrast to option 1, the owner (the owner's 'self) in this 
scenario is passive. All the causal work is being done by their beliefs and desires, 
their faculty for practical reason, etc. Even behaviour that seemingly relates 
directly to the self, such as the desire to maintain a dignified presentation of self 
in the surgery, follows out of causal necessity from their pre-existing desire not 
to draw attention to themselves or to publicly display their emotions. 
It is important to note that on both options 1 and 2 it is the owner's PEs 
that cause him to embark on his chosen course of action. How PE relates to 
neurophysiology is, of course, a matter of debate within the OMRist camp. 
Nevertheless, as we saw in chapters 2 and 3, any theory that deserves to be called 
a theory of mental causation has PE perfonning an ineliminable causal role. It is 
also important to note that on both options OMRists believe that the owner's 
accounts of their action refer directly (or indirectly if mediated by memory) to 
the causes of their action. That is to say, if the owner were to explain his action 
by saying that he thought 'it was the right thing to do', the referent of this 
account is his feeling disposed towards the proposition4 'having the dog put to 
sleep is the right thing to do' when he considers the issue. 
4 See my discussion of beliefs in ch.4 for an explanation of how 'feeling disposed towards a 
proposition' constitutes the referent of propositional attitudes. 
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An epiphenomenalist critique of the orthodox accounts 
In the preceding chapters we have seen how an epiphenomenalist perspective is 
forced to deny the central theses of both orthodox accounts. In the first account 
we are forced to deny that the action was caused by the decision of an irreducible 
self and in the second we have to deny that the action was caused by an 
antecedent set of beliefs and desires. Nevertheless, there are several elements of 
the above accounts that are consistent with epiphenomenalism. Both accounts 
correctly cite internal states in the owner's mind as the cause of his actions and 
both accounts correctly cite the content of those mental states as being causally 
efficacious in the decision making process. Epiphenomenalism, as we have seen, 
need not deny that such things as the owner's desire not to see their dog in pain 
or the belief that as an owner one adopts a duty of care towards one's animals, 
are causally efficacious. Where epiphenomenalism and the orthodox stories 
diverge is that epiphenomenalists view all of the phenomenal states experienced 
by the owner as entirely inefficacious. Where an epiphenomenalist cites internal 
motivating factors (such as the desire not to see their pet in pain) they refer not to 
the phenomenal states themselves but to whatever neural states instantiated the 
content, 'I don't want to see my dog in pain'. In making this claim 
epiphenomenalism faces methodological and ontological problems. They face a 
methodological problem deriving from the fact that they have no direct access to 
the neurophysiological events that they claim are the real causes of the action. 
This lack of direct access means that they are forced to infer the existence of 
these states based on observed behaviour and people's accounts of their actions. 
In this sense epiphenomenalists are in a similar position to the PFPists considered 
in chapter 4. Both epiphenomenalists and PFPists have to hypothesise the 
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existence ofintemal states (non-conscious beliefs and desires in the case ofPFP) 
to account for what appears to be purposeful behaviour. Epiphenomenalism, 
however, also faces a serious ontological problem relating to its hypothesising 
the existence and causal efficacy of propositional attitudes defined in terms of 
their content. In chapter 4 we exploited the supervenience relation to support the 
claim that where there is a conscious experience of using a propositional attitude 
term, or holding a propositional attitude, there must be a neurally realised 
subvenient base which instantiates the same content as the conscious experience. 
From the empirical observation that people tend to do what they say they are 
going to do, and act in accordance with their stated beliefs and desires, we 
inferred that the aforementioned subvenient bases must be causally efficacious. 
The ontological problem for epiphenomenalism relates to the first step in this 
argument. Strictly speaking, as we have previously noted, epiphenomenalists 
cannot appeal to the supervenience relation to hypothesise the existence of a 
subvenient base for occurrent supervenient properties such as the PE of using 
propositional attitude terms or holding propositional attitudes. The reason, to 
repeat, is that if epiphenomenalism is true we have no means of identifying when 
and what a person (including oneself) is experiencing. This seriously undermines 
the basis from which we inferred the existence of neurally realised propositional 
attitudes defined in terms of their content. It ought to be possible to construct a 
methodology that inferred the existence of neurally realised functional states 
based solely on observed behaviour, including accounts of action. As the 
historical failures of behaviourism have shown, however, any such methodology 
would be severely restricted in its explanatory powers. 
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Another serious problem for epiphenomenalism is that the content of 
mental states is often linked to phenomenal states. Epiphenomenalists can 
happily maintain that there was some neural state that instantiated the content 
'belief that the dog has terminal cancer'. Moreover, as we saw when discussing 
Dretske's dual explanandum strategy, they can happily adopt the functionalist 
strategy of claiming that the neural state gains its efficacy in virtue of its content. 
Epiphenomenalism, however, does not seem able to offer an adequate 
explanation for why mental content is causally efficacious when that content 
relates to phenomenal states. Suppose that the dog owner in our example was 
unable to go through with their decision to have their dog put to sleep. Suppose 
also that their reason was that they have had pets put to sleep in the past and it 
was an experience that they knew they would not be able to cope with again. The 
epiphenomenalist line would have to be that they had a neural state which 
instantiated the content, 'I have had pets put to sleep before and I know that I 
will not be able to cope with it again.' Such an explanation does not seem to be 
open to the epiphenomenalist, however, since the neural state in question has a 
phenomenal state as its referent. That is to say, it seems to imply that their 
previous experiences (the PE oftheir sense ofloss and grief) were causally 
efficacious and that thereafter their previous experiences were remembered and 
had a causal influence on the decision making process. 
The upshot of all this is that an epiphenomenalist methodology, if it is to 
remain true to its ontological foundations, would have to adhere to strict logical 
behaviourist methods. Logical behaviourism, however, is just as unsatisfactory 
since it too seems unable to cope with accounts such as, 'I have had pets put to 
sleep before and I know that I will not be able to cope with it again.' There 
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inevitably seems to be some 'surplus meaning' that cannot be accounted for in 
terms of the observations used to determine the appropriate use of the concepts 
involved. There is a 'surplus meaning' that relates to the experiences of the dog 
owner that cannot be accounted for by observations of their own behaviour or the 
behaviour of others. Epiphenomenalism may accept the existence of this 'surplus 
meaning', but what good is that if it does not allow the experiences to have any 
causal role? This is no trivial problem that can be ignored as a mere anomaly. 
Much of human behaviour is orientated towards the pursuit of pleasure and the 
avoidance of pain and explanations for action frequently cite previous 
experiences, both pleasant and unpleasant, as the cause of present behaviour and 
future plans. Unless some solution can be found for this problem 
epiphenomenalism does not stand much of a chance of being taken seriously 
(particularly as the ontological foundations for a social scientific methodology). 
The failure of social situationalism~ 
Despite the failures of epiphenomenalism it still has a far better chance of 
explaining the cause of actions than social situationalism. We have already 
discussed the failures of this paradigm but it is worth highlighting these failures 
by applying the situationalists' methodology to the case outlined above. Doing so 
will highlight situationalism's inability to move beyond descriptive analysis (and 
flawed description at that) to genuine causal explanation. The situationalists' 
5 Because the teon social situationalism denotes a set of taken for granted assumptions rather than 
a well foonulated 'ism', it is impossible to predict bow a social situationalist would approach the 
study of any topic area, particularly because there are a plethora of different sociological schools 
that come under the broad beading of social situationalism. In one sense, therefore, I am doing 
something of a disservice to many of those in the discipline by suggesting how they might tackle 
the topic under consideration. It could be argued that I have deliberately misrepresented the 
paradigm in an attempt to show its inadequacies. Nevertheless, by restricting my attention to the 
broad themes discussed above and applying them to a specific topic, I think the inadequacies of 
social situationalism can best be highlighted. 
252 
refusal to acknowledge the casual role of intrapersonal processes means that 
neither of the two orthodox approaches, nor the epiphenomenalist approach 
considered above, is open to the situationalist researcher. Rather, situationalists 
are far more likely to be interested in the intersubjective creation of meaning. As 
such situationalists might focus their attention on such things as the performance 
of the roles of caring pet owner and compassionate vet. As we shall see, they do 
not seem to have the methodological tools to provide any meaningful account of 
the decision, and they are equally unable to explain the private emotions and 
coping mechanisms that are employed by the owner after they have received the 
diagnosis. 
The decision 
The decision is surely the most important element that needs to be understood if 
a causal explanation of the meta-act is to be achieved and it is here that the 
shortcomings of social situationalism are most apparent. Where 
epiphenomenalists and OMRists would approach the decision by seeking to 
understand the intemaVintrapersonal processes of the dog owner, social 
situationalists simply do not have the methodological tools to investigate the 
decision making process. With their emphasis on the interpersonal construction 
of meaning social situationalists are likely to focus their attention on such things 
as how the diagnosis is delivered to the owner (does the veterinary surgeon use 
euphemisms for terminal cancer, for example), how they broach the sensitive 
subject of whether the dog should be put to sleep, and so on. Similarly, their 
focus on the owner is likely to be related to such things as how they display that 
they understand the diagnosis that has been presented to them or how they elicit a 
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professional opinion about what the 'right thing to do' would be, rather than how 
the diagnosis affects the decision making process. 
It is by no means inevitable that the owner of a dog diagnosed with 
terminal cancer will choose to have their pet put to sleep. It is quite possible that 
they will find the experience too harrowing to go through with or they might 
have a moral objection to having animals destroyed. As such it seems that the 
only way to causally explain the owner's decision is by looking towards their 
internal states. The way that the diagnosis is delivered, or how the owner and vet 
interact during the delivery of the diagnosis, are irrelevant to the decision making 
process. It is their having an internal state (a physical state for epiphenomenalists 
and a conscious mental state for OMRists) with the content 'my dog has terminal 
cancer', and how that state relates to the rest of their beliefs and desires, that is 
important. Since situationalists typically view such states as inaccessible (or 
worse non-existent) they cannot be used by situationalists as an explanatory 
resource. This means that the decision is beyond their remit and consequently the 
meta-act is rendered unintelligible. 
The performance 
Part of the performance of the meta-action takes place in a public arena and 
involves interpersonal communication, so here at least the situationalists have 
some material with which they can work. Nevertheless, the interactional element 
is of secondary importance if a causal account is the goal of the research and, 
perhaps more importantly, the situationalists methodological approach to 
interaction means that a descriptive analysis is all that they can deliver. Let's 
begin by breaking up the performance into three distinct phases: there is the time 
between the owner making the appointment to have their dog put to sleep and 
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their embarking on the journey to the veterinary surgery, there is the journey 
itself, and there is the time spent in the surgery. Ifwe suppose that the first and 
second stages were performed in private then there is little material available for 
situationalists to analyse. There is no interaction, no interpersonal construction of 
meaning, and (arguably) no roles being performed. Nevertheless, from both an 
OMRist and an epiphenomenalist perspective there is a lot going on that stands 
in need of causal analysis. To list few elements that might be of interest to 
researchers, there is the question of how the owner copes psychologically with 
the knowledge that in a few hours they are going to have to drive to the 
veterinary surgery and face what they know is going to be an extremely 
harrowing experience. At any time they could freely choose (according to the 
OMRist camp) to avoid the trauma by cancelling the appointment, or (according 
to epiphenomenalists) their brain might instantiate the content 'I just can't go 
through with it'. They will also face the non-trivial task of ensuring their dog has 
the opportunity to go to the toilet, of 'saying goodbye' in a private space and 
before they face the public arena of the surgery. There are the emotions of grief, 
love, dread and guilt, that, despite viewing the emotions from two different 
perspectives (one physicaVchemical and the other in terms of their PE), both 
OMRists and epiphenomenalists agree causally influence the owner's actions. 
All this is beyond the scope of situationalism. 
Jumping to the final stage when the owner enters the surgery, 
situationalists will be interested in how the owner presents themselves to the vet 
and members of the public. They might want to investigate such things as how 
the owner manages to present a dignified appearance (or fails to present a 
dignified appearance) amongst people who are attending the surgery for routine 
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vaccinations and check-ups. Or how the vet perfonns the role of the caring 
professional that is trying to present the image that they 'understand' what the 
owner is going through and believe it is 'the right thing to do'. They may also be 
interested in the Goffinanesque designation of 'front' and 'back' regions and are 
sure to be fascinated by the fact that the owner is forced to sit in the public 
waiting room but offered the opportunity to exit through a back door. I would not 
wish to deny that an analysis of such factors is essential for an understanding of 
how the interaction progresses. Nor would I wish to suggest that they are 
irrelevant to a causal understanding of the act (knowing that one will be treated 
with compassion and spared the embarrassment of exiting through the waiting 
room in floods of tears no doubt has a causal impact on, for example, whether 
one attends the surgery or calls the vet out). As soon as these elements are treated 
as 'performances', however, their explanatory power is severely diminished. 
Unless observed behaviour (the owner's grief or the vet's compassion) is treated 
as displaying real psychological states (and remember that both the OMRist 
camp and the epiphenomenalist camp do treat these displays as reflecting real 
psychological states) the responses they elicit cannot be treated as genuine. There 
is surely something missing in an account of the owner's tears if they are treated 
as analogous to an atheist's swearing an oath on the bible in court. What is 
missing is not some pointless discussion of 'private' and unobservable internal 
states. What is missing is the essence of action and the key to causal explanation. 
Concluding remarks 
The sui generis real nature of subjective experience was the motivating factor 
behind our refusal to accept reductionist accounts of mental causation and was 
also cited as the defining characteristic of seltbood. Paradoxically the 
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irreducibility of PE provides both the ontological foundations for 
epiphenomenalism and its greatest challenge. Throughout this thesis we have 
been confronted by the ontological and methodological problem that if 
epiphenomenalism is true we should not be able to discuss the nature ofPE. If 
epiphenomenalism is true, any discussion ofPE has to be viewed as merely the 
end product of complicated neuronal processes together with the interaction 
between those processes and Worlds 1 and 3. As such everything we have said 
'about' PE has no causal connection to PE. This is likely to be seen by many as 
not only undermining the foundations of just about every argument presented in 
this thesis, but as a complete refutation of epiphenomenalism. I have to confess 
that I can see no solution to this problem. 
Despite its inadequacies epiphenomenalism does deserve to be taken 
seriously and now seems to be the right time to get the discussion started. Over 
the last fifty years there has been a growing consensus within the philosophy of 
mind that PE is not reducible to physical states. This consensus has not, however, 
led to the resurgence of interest in dualism that might have been expected. The 
overwhelming majority of contemporary theories of mind may be characterised 
by an adherence to the three principles set out in the introduction plus the belief 
in mental causation. There seems to be something fundamentally inconsistent in 
this set (or at least in the formulation of the principles) and sooner or later 
something will have to give. That there is some inconsistency is now, finally, 
beginning to be accepted. Of the four principles, however, PI (the irreducibility 
of mental states) is the only one to have received serious and sustained attention. 
Here there have been two main strategies: some have attempted to provide 
reductive accounts and some have argued that the seeming irreducibility of 
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mental states is just an epistemological consequence of our approach to the 
problem or of our limited cognitive abilities (as McGinn argues). Though all 
these attempts should be welcomed, there is surely much that could be learned 
from placing the other three principles under equal scrutiny. The principle of 
causal explanatory exclusion, being a logical truism, is unlikely to be rejected. 
The other two principles (of the causal closure of the physical and the belief in 
mental causation), however, are neither logical truths nor empirical certainties. If 
we are ever to solve the mind-body problem then both need to be subjected to the 
same scrutiny as has been applied to reductionist and anti reductionist arguments. 
Emergence (in the sense of emergent powers) and epiphenomenalism have been 
woefully neglected by philosophers of mind. The knowledge that we stand to 
gain by pushing these arguments as far as they will go should not be 
underestimated (regardless of whether either theory turns out to be true). 
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